The theatre of promiscuity : a comparative study of the dramatic writings of Wole Soyinka and Howard Barker by Price, Amanda
The Theatre of Promiscuity 
A Comparative Study of the Dramatic Writings of Wole Soyinka 
and Howard Barker 
Amanda Price 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Leeds, 
School of English (Workshop Theatre), 
April 1995 
I confirm that the work submitted is my on and that appropriate credit has 
been given where reference has been made to the work of others. 
il 
Abstract 
The word 'artist serves as a pivot to the major concerns of this study. Consideration 
of its application and meaning in relation to contemporary society facilitates a 
detailed exploration and analysis of selected dramatic writings by Wole Soyinka and 
Howard Barker. The comparative nature of this work begins by charting the parallel 
journeys of these writers - within widely differing cultural contexts - from a critique 
of social determinations which serve to define and bound authorial intent to a process 
of "promiscuous" self-definition whereby the artistic imagination is used to name and 
designate a specific relationship to the cultural and social structures within which . 
their work will be received. 
Working from a theoretical base which, in the case of Soyinka, finds its foundations 
in critique and commentary upon nationalist discourse, and in the case of Barker, 
rests upon contemporary critiques of Enlightenment reason, the study debates their 
development of theatrical form within both social and cultural contexts. Emphasis is 
placed upon the relationship of the author to the dramatic text, the creation of 
character and the defined channels of communication through which dramatic 
performance is to be received by the spectator. The concept of 'transgression' is 
explored as a key principle by which to define the 'theatrical' as opposed to the 
'social' text. 
Chapters Four and Five link the work of Howard Barker and Wole Soyinka through 
the application of Nietzschean philosophy, with especial emphasis being placed upon 
the concept of genealogical history, the creation of the aesthetic, and the 
consideration of 'tragedy' as a means by which to offer resistant critique to the social 
imperative of national citizenship as a badge and boundary to identity. The formation 
of the 'tragic' or 'catastrophic' individual is explored through key dramatic texts, thus 
allowing dramatic form the status of a discourse in its own right. 
Throughout the study an attempt is made to develop an argument which allows the 
artist to be distinguished as one who speaks to his nation, rather thanfor his nation. 
With regard to the work of Barker and Soyinka this has involved both the exposure 
and exploration of a theatrical space unmapped by social cartography, and a peopling 
of the stage with creations who could be described as 'ethical' rather than 'political' 
individuals. 
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Introduction 
It is the aim of this study to link, through the process of extended argument, 
selected dramatic writings by the Nigerian playwright Wole Soyinka and the British 
playwright Howard Barker. There is an emphasis placed on argument throughout 
the following pages, reflecting both the means by which Barker and Soyinka have 
forged the appearance of unique theatrical manifestations in their respective 
cultures, and the critical pathway I have forged through the two widely divergent 
imaginations which serve as source to their dramatic texts. 
To argue is to offer proof - in language - for a manifestation, or phenomenon, 
which, by virtue of its status as a source of argument, is not yet a fact. It would 
seem, therefore, that argument proves an admirable starting-point for any 
discussion of the theatrical event, but particularly with regard to these specific 
playwrights for whom language-based theatre is, in its very form, the constitution 
of an argument with its reader or spectator. Theatre, for Soyinka and Barker, 
argues at the level of representation with that which it unceasingly attempts to 
represent; the imaginative life of individuals in its relationship to the 'reality' of 
their society. 
The pleasure inherent in argument is dependent upon the evasion of a 'solution' 
and its attendant discursive compromises. It is perhaps for this reason that the 
yoking of two playwrights so occupied in the discrete theatrical exploration of their 
widely diverse cultures should have proved such a fertile source for the form of the 
study which follows. 
The dramatic texts of Howard Barker and Wole Soyinka first became linked in my 
own mind by an experience for which I have never found a better description than 
that offered by Sigmund Freud in his attempts to define "The Uncanny". ' As a 
basis for his essay on the subject, Freud introduces the 'uncanny' to the reader as 
"material for the study of aesthetics" 2 and offers the following as a foundation 
upon which to build his own observations: 
... an uncanny effect is often and easily produced when the distinction between imagination and reality is effaced, as when 
something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears 
before us in reality, or when a symbol takes over the full functions 
of the thing it symbolizes, and so on. 3 
This basic effect Freud likens to the apprehension of "magical practices" and the 
ease of its production he attributes to the continued cultural traces of an archaic 
belief in the "omnipotence of thought". 4 More complex, however, is his 
2 
etymological tracing of the 'uncanny' to both a sense of "home-sickness" -a 
realization that what was once familiar and loved now forms the object of the 
exile's desire - and a fear born of "intellectual uncertainty" whereby confidence in 
the notions of 'progress' and 'enlightenment' is undermined by an imaginative 
intrusion which appears to be closer to reality than the intellect which has 
supposedly surmounted its premiss as a possibility. Thus, the appearance, or 
experience, of the 'uncanny' as an aesthetic phenomenon may be described, after 
Freud, as the recognition, or familiarity, of that which bears no relation to 
contemporary intellectual perceptions of reality. 
It is, perhaps, unfair to cite Freud at this stage, as his psychological enquiry into 
the sources of the 'uncanny' as a phenomenon are not a focus for what follows. His 
description of the experiencing of the 'uncanny' does, however, lend articulation to 
the distinct affect which was afforded by my - initially - unrelated readings of 
Barker's and Soyinka's plays. The excitement which this early engagement aroused 
- which centred upon Howard Barker's Victory: Choices in Reaction, 5 and Wole 
Soyinka's Death and the King's Horseman 6- emerged from an awareness that in 
both cases a sense of recognition, or familiarity, had occurred in the absence of 
intellectual comprehension. I was not able, therefore, to rationalize the sense of 
'rediscovery' or 'remembering' that was occurring in my relationship to these 
texts, and certainly with regard to Soyinka's work the foundation of my aesthetic 
response had either to recognize its wholly irrational base, or be content to answer 
its paradox with the solution that a process of cultural translation was the source of 
my spurious engagement. 
My fascination was fed by practical incursions into the work of these two 
playwrights, and a growing conviction that their particular contribution to 
contemporary theatrical discourse was unique in its exploration of 'lives' or 
'realities' which defied both ideological explanation and assimilation. It also 
seemed to me that their work 'proved' the elusive power of theatrical performance 
in that their printed texts, for the most part, remained frustratingly 
incomprehensible until realized in performance, at which point 'meaning' danced 
and proliferated as if liberated by the resonances of the actor's body. Here was a 
drama which only worked in the process of theatrical performance and appeared to 
insistently evade explanation as a stem to the complex emotional responses and 
intellectual confusions it engendered. 
The argument which forms the thrust of this study is based, therefore, upon an 
aesthetic response to texts which appeared to converge in their interrogation of, and 
challenge to, contemporary intellectual and ideological perceptions of identity and 
its relationship to reality. The aim of the work as a comparative study is to test my 
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own observations concerning the similarities demonstrated - at an aesthetic level - 
in selected theatrical texts produced by these two playwrights. 
Wole Soyinka's theatrical career began roughly a decade before that of Howard 
Barker with the drafting, whilst still at the University of Leeds, of two plays which 
have proved the mainstay of Soyinka's reputation as an 'accessible' playwright; 
these were The Swamp Dwellers 7 and The Lion and the Jewel, 8 written around 
1957, and first performed respectively in 1958 (with the Nigerian Drama Group in 
London) and 1959 (at the Arts Theatre, Ibadan). He, like Howard Barker in the 
early seventies, found nurturance at the Royal Court theatre where he worked as a 
Play Reader and participated in the Court's Sunday 'Evening' events which were 
designed to offer a platform for new writing. 9 Howard Barker's first stage play, 
Cheek, 10 was premiered at the Theatre Upstairs, with William Gaskill as director, 
in 1970; an event which proved the beginning of a long and not untroubled 
relationship with the Artistic Directors of Royal Court, and in particular with the 
direction their artistic policy was to take throughout the late seventies and early 
eighties. Il 
This would be a very different study had I decided to concentrate upon the 
theatrical sources and influences which have shaped the work of these two 
playwrights. Wole Soyinka has worked in film and radio, as well as for the theatre, 
and his theatrical activity includes satirical revue, "hit and run" street theatre, 12 as 
well as a large output of language-based drama, much of which he has directed 
himself in Africa, Europe and America. Barker has been most widely acclaimed by 
critics for the 'accessibility' of his radio drama; he has also worked in film and 
television as well as writing prolifically for the theatre throughout the last three 
decades. In 1988, The Wrestling School theatre company was created by a group 
of actors and directors, with the sole intent of performing Barker's work. As 
Robert Shaughnessy has noted, it is a rare thing indeed that a dramatist should be 
so honoured by his accomplices in the theatre profession, and it stands as a mark of 
the excitement and challenge his work has engendered within the profession that 
such a bold testimony to his status as an actors' dramatist should have emerged. 13 
In considering the very broad span of work offered by each of the two playwrights 
in relation to the aesthetic response from which this study emerged, it seemed to 
me that a relatively small cluster of plays would prove particularly fruitful as a 
source for comparative criticism. These are plays which emerged, in both 
instances, at moments of social and cultural revolution. Thus, the two periods cited 
by my choice of plays written by Wole Soyinka are the moment of Nigerian 
Independence and the years 1965-75 which encapsulate the Nigerian civil war, and 
with regard to Barker, the focus is upon the proliferating political authoritari anism 
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of the Thatcher years. In neither case does the content of their plays reflect an 
overt commitment to temporally specific political debate, rather it is their response 
at the level of the formal structuring of their dramatic material which serves as the 
focus of my comparative analysis. 
The plays I have chosen are: A Dance of the 'Forests, 14 Death and the King's 
Horseman, and The Road is by Wole Soyinka, and Victory: Choices in Reaction, 
The Last Supper, 16 Uncle Vanya, 17 The Bite of the Night, 18 and (to a lesser 
extent) The Europeans 19 by Howard Barker. In each of these texts, the mediation 
of the dramatic material selected by the playwright questions - at the level of 
narrative, characterization, authorial intervention and demands made upon the actor 
- the means by which individuals are able to articulate their appearance and 
affectivity within the parameters of the stage-world represented. The repeated 
iteration of this dramatic enquiry into the validity of 'human' representation upon 
the stage engenders a theatrical form which is itself in a state of fluid transition, 
leading both the actor and the spectator back again and again to questions 
concerning the nature of their response to actions and individuals that refuse the 
stable accommodation of the psychologized 'I' as an organizing principle for 
explanation and understanding. 
The comparison made between these two playwrights relies therefore, not upon 
their status as political commentators but rather upon their formation of an aesthetic 
in response to the conditions of valid discursive articulation operating within their 
given cultural and social conditions. 
The charges of inaccessibility which have circumscribed many of the texts selected 
for this study have necessarily drawn both Barker and Soyinka into debates 
concerning the 'proper' relationship for theatre as an artform to the society in 
which it is produced. The 'arguments' which have emerged from this encounter 
with detractors form both the raw material for their drama and the basis of a 
continuing contemporary debate concerning the responsibility of the playwright to 
the moral tenets of his time. For both writers the theatrical or artistic tradition from 
which they emerge has proved essential as an element of the social and cultural 
critique out of which their dramatic form is hewn; central consideration is thus 
given to the historical formation of theatrical structures and conventions, in 
particular the development of the actor, in his relationship to the playwright, as a 
non-ideological body through which conflicting concepts of identity and 
represention may be played out. 
The difficulty of writing about Barker's or Soyinka's work emerges at the level of 
articulating dramatic structures which are in themselves the crystalline formations 
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of complex, individual critique. It is impossible, therefore, to describe their plays, 
without re-constituting both the structural development of social and cultural 
debate, and the forged perspective upon that debate proffered by the text's creator. 
Descriptions of the plays tend to flatten their effect, involving the reader in a 
convoluted progression which aids little in either the understanding of, or 
engagement with the real text which has, even within literary production, to flicker 
between the printed word and its theatrical articulation. My approach is therefore 
one which attempts to place the texts within their structural contexts, and thus to 
compare at the level of illumined moments the theatrical affectivity of the 
playwrights' aesthetic. 
In trying to articulate that which began as a non-rationalized aesthetic response, I 
have trusted in the two subjects of my study as guides to the formation of an 
argument by which to define the nature of their dramatic texts. This guidance 
occurs at the level of prioritized discourses which re-occur throughout their texts, 
and through particular attention paid to that which speaks as articulated absence in 
their work. The commitment indicated by both Soyinka and Barker to a theatrical 
discourse premised upon philosophical enquiry has invited research into the 
contemporary constitution of philosophical debate. Throughout the following 
chapters a philosophical grouping emerges, to which I have given the name 
"Philosophers of the Gap, or Abyss", their concentration upon man's contemporary 
negotiation of his condition of nihilism, or non-belief, being particularly pertinent 
to my discussion of the playwrights' work. 
Finally, in formulating the argument which would lend articulation to my initial 
sense of the 'uncanny' in response to both Barker's and Soyinka's work, I also 
found a question with which to underpin the method of my enquiry. This question 
rests upon a comment offered by Simon During on Michel Foucault's use of 
genealogical excavation as a resistance to historical investigation: 
.. society 
is, for Foucault... constituted precisely by resistances 
(ultimately grounded on the body's resistance - pain). Genealogy 
attempts to keep memories of such resistance alive against 
historicism and the human sciences; in doing so it uncovers an event 
- the emergence of modem power - that had previously been ignored 
... The emergence of modem power has been concealed by those traditional and 'evolutive' histories which concentrated on 
topics like religion, nationality, and the law. 20 
In response to During's exposition, I began to wonder whether the odd sense of 
'remembering', allied to Freud's notion of exiled memory, in response to the texts 
of Soyinka and Barker, was not a symptom of the re-emergence of the Foucauldian 
'event' whereby the invisibility of modem power - upon which its efficacy rests 
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and to which end it discursively 'naturalizes' its own effects - is made visible by 
the eruption, at the level of resistance, of a body of experience which had hitherto 
lain dormant under the pressure of more organized configurations of experience. It 
was this possibility, linked to the awareness that both Barker's and Soyinka's 
theatrical form emerges at the level of social and cultural critique, that allowed me 
to articulate the nature of the enquiry from which this study proceeds: 'In what 
manner and to what degree is the illusory nature of theatre equipped to make 
visible that which 'reality' renders invisible? ' 
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Chapter One 
What is a Playwright? 
The paradox of the artist's relationship to his society, and the nature of his 
commitment to that society, is one which has constantly proved the shadowy 
penumbra to even the most incandescent moments of literary endeavour. To pose 
the question 'What is a Playwright? ' is to require of this historical paradox a 
specificity consistently blurred by its wholesale inclusion within the edifice which 
we have come to know as 'literature'. The Nigerian playwright, Wole Soyinka, 
uses as a paradigmatic example of this paradox the Mbari-house sculptor who 
... shuts himself away from the day-to-day contact 
[and] undertakes 
this period of purgation and reflection on behalf of his society. The 
resulting mud figures are never given the same interpretation by any 
two individuals yet the presence of this isolated sculpting - placed 
usually away from the frequented parts of the village and left to 
crumble and decay with time - is experienced by the community as 
contributing to the spiritual well-being of the village in its homage to 
earth. I 
This passage, written in response to critics who perceive all literary endeavour to 
be a catalogue of cultural aims and political development, reminds us that the 
playwright, despite the published-text which stands as a 'monument' to his work, is 
the producer of perishable goods. 2 His medium, the perishable clay of the actor, 
allied to the malleable substance of language, stands as a testimony to the 
transience of man's experience of the world; its very ephemerality pays homage to 
the finite nature of that experience. The playwright is a builder of edifices whose 
mutability is the condition of their existence; he therefore makes his image of man 
out of man himself and not of the printed word. 
The British playwright, Howard Barker, writes of his texts as a relationship 
primarily with actors. The language employed within his work is not a literary one 
therefore, but rather a pre-verbal promise which is utterly dependent upon the 
actors' art for its realization: 
It has been often remarked that my theatre is predominantly an 
actors' theatre, and it is certainly true that actors have been my 
greatest allies and collaborators. This reflects the supreme 
responsibility that is placed in them, in their powers of articulation 
to conduct what is in effect a symphony of speech. It is this 
displacement of attention from meaning to texture that characterizes 
the first moments of the play. 3 
Barker considers his work a gift offered, not to the director, but to the actors, and 
in articulating the nature of the responsibility of the actor to language, exposes the 
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fact that the playwright 'loses' his text to a second system of signification as an 
innate element of the theatrical process. The control an author may have over the 
form of his literary work is, therefore, refused the playwright as a fundamental 
condition of his chosen sphere of communication. The theatrical text must pass 
through living bodies in order to achieve its stage life; those bodies, as conductors 
of historical and cultural experience are only, themselves, partially in control of the 
significations they transmit. The playwright's art is, therefore, built upon a 
promiscuous relationship to language and meaning, for its very structure is 
dependent upon the interpretative facility of the actor's body as a vessel of 
transitory expressiveness. 
Consideration of the playwright as a scion of literary pursuit thus requires a 
framework of enquiry which distinguishes the profession as unique in relation to 
the generic aims of authorship. The pursuit of this framework, always conditional 
upon the culture by which it is contextualized, forms the meeting point for the two 
playwrights upon which this study focuses. Although one could consider the 
confluence of their particular engagement with the figure of the playwright to stem 
from a shared educational immersion in the English literary canon, I believe that a 
comparison of this nature would prove limited and ultimately return one to a 
determinist view of their subsequent careers which would not, in the end, prove 
fruitful. Instead, I shall consider their theatrical output as the development of a 
specific relationship to the diverse cultures of which they are a part, and as one 
which is unique to the role of the playwright. The temporal, cultural and political 
specificity afforded by a comparative study of this kind thus allows examination of 
the playwright as an historical entity; the carrier and cultivator of particular 
questions inscribed and pursued through and by his chosen medium. His 
relationship to his society will, therefore, be considered as a fundamental and 
historical symptom of social and cultural questioning, rather than as a phenomenon 
solely determined by and subject to the economic framework of the forces of 
production. 
Concentration upon the dramatic writings of Wole Soyinka and Howard Barker has 
necessitated the exclusion of a large body of poetic works published by both men, 
and of two novels and three autobiographical studies produced by Wole Soyinka 
over the past three decades. The fact that this study focuses upon their work as 
playwrights reflects their prioritizing of the theatrical medium throughout the 
roughly parallel span of their careers, and the diverse nature of their contribution to 
dramatic form throughout those years spawns a fluid relationship to central 
considerations of what it means to be a playwright. 
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The theatrical careers of both playwrights are distinguished by a prolific output of 
dramatic material, accompanied by volumes of essays which, whilst not offering 
specific commentaries or explanations of their theatrical texts, serve to demonstrate 
a highly personal engagement with key cultural and critical debates which 
adumbrate the nature of their dramatic endeavour. The sheer breadth and 
development of argument and debate contained both within the essays and the 
theatre texts stands as a testimony to the writers' commitment to theatre as a unique 
area for examination of contemporary cultural experience. It has also engendered, 
for my purposes, a further process of selection whereby particular texts, or clusters 
of texts, will be given priority as a means of defining the boundaries of this study. 
The texts to be included are those which demonstrate most clearly the processes of 
the playwrights' own exploration of theatre as a mode of communication and means 
of expression. These tend to be the texts which have given critics and 
commentators the most acute problems in finding the means whereby they may be 
approached, apprehended or accessed to a broad reader/spectatorship. The title of 
'Difficult Playwright' is one to which both Soyinka and Barker have been subject 
at various points in their careers. This designation, which carries in its wake 
charges of elitism and wilful obscurantism, raises fundamental questions 
concerning the social function of the playwright as perceived by the critical 
establishment and will form a central focus for this study. 
The quality which links these texts could be most economically described as the 
wilful abrogation of a uni-plane line of communication between the theatrical 
product and its audience. Critical response tends to treat these texts indignantly, 
charging the playwright who dares to deny his audience coherent meaning with 
arrogance and lack of craft. In 1992, by chance, Howard Barker's A Hard Heart 4 
coincided, in its premiere at the Almeida Theatre, Islington, with a production of 
Wole Soyinka's The Road, 5 which marked the launch of the Talawa Theatre 
Company at The Cochrane Theatre, Holborn. This resulted in reviews appearing 
simultaneously in the Sunday papers, and allowed comparison of the critics' 
response to the very particular theatrical experience attempted in these two 
instances. Irving Wardle, in the Independent on Sunday, wrote of them thus: 
What, finally, does Barker's fable mean? It appears to be saying that 
the seige-mentality makes a stone of the heart; and that culture does 
not survive by intelligence alone. But the function of Riddler's son is 
to credit her with one human weakness; but for him, intelligence 
would have conquered... The story does not add up. 
The Road [is] a rarely performed Wole Soyinka piece of the 1960s. Set in an abandoned motor park and drawing on Soyinka's Christian 
and Yoruba background, this is a work of white-hot imagination, fusing past and present, metaphysics and underworld comedy in a 
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single seamless action periodically lifting off into tribal ritual I 
could make no sense of the work in performance. 6 
For Irving Wardle - and the majority of his colleagues who reviewed the two plays 
- the criteria by which the work is to be judged focuses upon the ability to "make 
sense of" or 'understand' the material placed before the spectator. The perspective 
is - we presume - offered on behalf of a theatre-going public who are likely to 
experience the same problems in watching the play that the critics did. The critic's 
inability to comprehend or unravel the paradoxical material is prima facie 
presumed to be the fault of either the playwright or the production, suggesting that 
the role of the theatre is first and foremost the presentation of clear and coherent 
meanings to its audience. The understanding of the play in performance is thus 
demanded as a right each member of the audience may expect in return for the 
price of a ticket purchased. The naturalization of these critical requirements, upheld 
to a large extent by the brevity and insubstantiality of the journalistic form through 
which they are mediated, allows consensual opinion - offered as informed opinion - 
to masquerade as critical debate. 
Throughout the course of his career as a writer and dramatist, Wole Soyinka has 
tirelessly repeated a challenge to his critics, which he insists must be acknowledged 
if a given culture wishes to claim as one of its goals the foundation and 
encouragement of artistic commitment and development of creative expression: 
... attention must also be paid to the sociological conditioning of 
critics and criticism as a means of providing safeguards against an 
alien orientation of judgement or evaluation -a factor of which the 
critic may remain blissfully unaware... [critics] recognize the 
importance of the sociology of the writer: we must now emphasize 
the even greater importance - as the self-appointed moulder of tastes 
- of the sociology of the critic.? 
The essay from which this passage is taken was written in 1976 and belongs, of 
course, to the particular context of a developing literary canon specific to Nigerian 
identity and experience. Soyinka's main cause for concern is the choice of material 
offered as 'canon fodder' by those critics whose crudely functionalist criteria are 
served by polemical attacks upon any artwork which refuses to meet the demands 
of their own ideological perception of African culture. Whilst Soyinka applauds the 
underlying ambition to formulate an African poetics, he singularly abhors the 
usurpation of the collective voice as a means by which to achieve this aim. His 
demand is therefore simple in its requirement that the critic be relieved of the self- 
assumed mantle of the peoples' voice. For Soyinka, critical debate may only 
achieve its real purpose as a creative genre in its own right, once the politics of 
social engineering and its attendant ideologies are themselves offered as the subject 
of rigorous critique. 
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Soyinka's strident hostility towards the more extreme Marxist ideologues of the 
African continent, who have - over the past three decades - found their way into 
print via literary criticism, is well known. His ire at what he calls the "theological" 
application of Marxist dogma is repeatedly asserted throughout his critical essays, 
always carrying in its wake a plea for the recognition of an individual - often tragic 
- experience of the world which refuses the determinist categories of ideological 
optimism. 
Is literary criticism presumptuous enough to deny that moment of 
total disintegration which may or may not be a prelude to social 
resurgence? Those who seek easy (optimistic) answers from 
literature are trapping themselves within the same cul-de-sac where 
extremist schools of European criticism of 'commitment' have 
stubbornly confronted opaque walls for over a century. 8 
The 'Literary Critic' is rounded upon as an example of ideological agencies which, 
in the name of social progress and truth, offer interpretation as a means of 
censoring, curtailing or appropriating areas of human experience shrouded in 
uncertainty or doubt. Soyinka's central concern in exposing the perspective of the 
critic is to demonstrate the reified consciousness to which their ideological 
doctrines serve as vehicles. His writings insist that no ideology is innocent, nor 
may it be grafted to an alien stem without consideration of the hybrid it may 
engender: _ 
The danger which a literary ideology poses is the act of consecration 
- and of course extermination. Thanks to the tendency of the 
consumer-mind to facilitate digestion by putting in strict categories 
what are essentially fluid operations of the creative mind upon social 
and natural phenomena, the formulation of a literary ideology tends 
to congeal sooner or later into instant capsules which, administered 
also to the writer, may end up by asphyxiating the creative process. 9 
The cultural context within which Howard Barker places his work is obviously one 
built upon the founding literary tradition described by Soyinka as the symptom of 
"a compartmentalising habit of thought" 10 which stands as anathema to "the fluid 
operations of the creative mind". Because his writing will inevitably be judged 
through and against this tradition, Barker's concern is to distinguish the theatrical 
event from literary form. Thus he asserts that the playwright's text belongs truly to 
the actor - the vessel through whom the language will pass as a life-force - and 
thence to the spectator for whom it becomes the source of imaginative speculation. 
His texts he describes as an invitation to "reach down beyond the known for 
once", " asserting that only by taking this leap may the creative imagination come 
into play. To the critic therefore who insists that appreciation and satisfaction are 
achieved only by secure understanding, he would counter: 
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Those who are threatened by the dictat of accessibility, 'Be 
understood or Perish', need to keep their nerve, since in a populist 
culture the abuse from certain quarters is bound to become 
increasingly violent. The writer of 'inaccessible' theatre will be 
repudiated as a poseur, or, most favoured of all English calumnies, 
identified as 'pretentious'. His collaborators will be seen as dupes, 
the actors vilified as brainless exhibitionists, and the institution 
which mounts the production attacked as corrupt, elitist and overdue 
for demolition. 12 
The inference is, as with Soyinka, that the exposure of the critic as the carrier of an 
historically specific ideology is essential to theatrical enterprise, if the 
communication it engenders is to be safeguarded against what amounts to covert 
censorship perpetuated in the name of an audience perceived as a mass. 
The critique offered by Barker of the literary mediations of the critic signals his 
endeavour to return to the geography of the theatre a relationship between the 
spectator and actor which would articulate the unique qualities of communication 
made possible by the dramatic event. The sham democracy he perceives to be 
operating in the majority of contemporary civic theatres is one which offers the 
spectator an illusory relationship of power and autonomous judgement over that 
which occurs on the stage, in return for his passive incorporation into the body of 
the audience which is identified by- its singular and unified pursuit of consensual 
meaning: - 
By collectively situating the audience in blocks who peer into the pit 
of the stage, or even gaze down a raked landscape of seats, this is a 
theatre which implies a unanimity of response. 13 
Barker's observation serves not only as an indictment of contemporary theatrical 
conventions - commonly attributed in their development to the predominance of a 
middle-class audience - but also serves as a critique of what he has called elsewhere 
"the sickening and secret compact between the author and his audience that 
distinguishes liberal art". 14 
The relationship between the artwork and its audience, and the implications this has 
with regard to the political structures by which it is framed, lies not only within the 
province of the playwright's concerns. The "liberal" pact has been widely debated 
throughout the twentieth century by Critical Theorists - most notably by members 
of the Frankfurt School of philosophy - and may be generally defined as the 
illusory assumption of individual autonomy via the private ownership of property, 
in return for a monogamous relationship to State beliefs and ideologies, so long as 
those ideologies continue to reflect the primacy of the property base. The key 
element of this pact is what Herbert Marcuse calls "the privatisation of reason", 
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whereby the understanding and rationality of the individual constitutes a knowledge 
of the society as a whole: 
Liberalism believes that through adaptation to... 'natural laws' the 
conflict between different wants, the strife between the general 
interest and private interests, as well as social inequality are 
ultimately overcome in the all-encompassing harmony of the whole, 
and that the whole thus becomes a blessing for the individual. Here, 
in the center of the liberalist system, society is interpreted through 
its reduction to 'nature' in its harmonizing function: as the evasive 
justification of a contradictory social order. 15 
Liberalism asserts itself within theatrical practice, therefore, via the re-iteration of 
ideological positions which - although they may give voice to dissent and diverse 
opinion - basically return to the spectator the illusion of autonomous individuality 
premised upon shared knowledge and belief in the ameliorating principles of 
society as a whole, the whole being visibly represented in this particular instance 
by the configuration of the audience in relationship to the stage. A liberal artform 
is therefore, one which perpetuates the illusion - for the spectator - of autonomous 
individuality whilst concurrently maintaining the 'whole' of a society which in its 
political and economic practices is actually opposed to the principles of 'liberty' 
and 'autonomy' which its harmonizing 'nature' purports to uphold. 
Barker's refusal of this 'sham-democracy' is therefore a refusal of theatre as a 
public event which replicates the 'democratic' procedures operating outside the 
theatre walls. His naming of the invisible pact between audience and playwright 
serves as critique in that it problematizes that which would appear to be natural and 
therefore 'self-evident'. In exposing this relationship as an articulation of innate 
assumptions concerning the function of theatrical practice he not only opens to 
question the alternative possibilities inherent to theatrical communication, but also 
posits an enquiry into the relationship of the public arena to the practices of State 
democracy. 
For Wole Soyinka, writing on his return to the newly-independent State of Nigeria 
in the early 1960s, the imposition of civic structures upon a nascent theatrical 
creativity awoke in him the awareness that the articulacy of architectural 
frameworks extend beyond their functional capacity of containment: 
The building itself is an embodiment of the general misconception of 
the word 'theatre'. Theatre, and especially, a 'National Theatre', is 
never the lump of wood and mortar which architects splash on the 
landscape. We heard of the existence of a National Theatre and ran 
to it full of joy and anticipation. We discovered that there was no 
theatre, there was nothing beyond a precious, attractive building in 
the town centre. 16 
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The playwright's fear is that the striving towards an articulation of theatrical 
possibility, offered as a thread to the weave of cultural potential, will be replaced 
by the easy definition offered to theatre by its civic costumiers in the name of 
cultural excellence. That which contains the imagination - Soyinka states - may also 
repress the imagination, or serve to define the nature of the theatre it houses rather 
than aid its expression. Soyinka's attack on the civic theatres which sprang up in 
the African States in the 1960s is another form of his attack upon the consumer-led 
categorization of thought which he perceives to be peculiar to the Western 
approach to artistic form. The very idea that a ready-made category or shape 
should be used to define the work of art as it struggles into existence is anathema to 
Soyinka's concept of "fluid creativity", for, like the mediation of the critic at the 
vital moment of theatrical process meeting the spectator, the pre-packaged 
categorization of work threatens to stunt, or give premature delivery to that which 
is not yet ready to define its artistic parameters. 
Soyinka's theatre, like that of Barker, insists upon the right to initiate structures of 
theatrical response which would appear to be at odds with the demands of both the 
critics and the buildings within which their work is housed. The Frankfurt 
philosopher, Theodor Adorno, describes the contemporary requirement - that a 
committed artist should offer clarity and coherence to his public - as one which 
essentially undermines the communicative process inherent in artistic endeavour: 
This theory wants art to speak to human beings directly, as though 
the immediate could be realized directly in a world of universal 
mediation. But it thereby degrades word and form to a mere means, 
to an element in the context of the work's effect, to psychological 
manipulation; and it erodes the work's coherence and logic, which 
are no longer to develop in accordance with the law of their own 
truth but are to follow the line of least resistance in the consumer. 17 
Adorno's description of the spectator, or receiver, of the artwork as a consumer is 
helpful in considering the refusal implicit in critiques offered by both Barker and 
Soyinka of the frameworks - whether abstract or material - which circumscribe the 
audience's relationship to the stage. The concept of theatre as unilinear 'call and 
response' suggests a reification of the cultural potential offered by the specific 
meeting of live actors and spectators. Their refusal, therefore, amounts to a denial 
of the spectator's assumed right to instant gratification which makes the point of 
purchase the moment of consumer satisfaction. Rather, the experiential pleasure of 
the theatre offered by these two playwrights lies in the witnessing of acts which, 
owing to their refusal of commodity status, seek responses other than those which 
satisfy the utility value of consumer durables. The theatre which replaces free 
market commodification, they would seem to say, offers the spectator the 
experience of being a consumer in a foreign land, where the laws of exchange have 
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to be intuited or interpreted and neither the innate value of goods nor their purpose 
is immediately obvious. 
In attempting to communicate the nature of theatrical experience in its opposition to 
what Adorno calls "the line of least resistance", both Barker and Soyinka make 
clear their abhorrence of audience participation as a means of proving the physical 
reality of the encounter. Soginka in particular, goes to great lengths to debunk the 
myth that African theatre may be distinguished from its Western counterpart by 
virtue of the uninhibited participation of its audience members. He berates what he 
perceives to be the Western romanticization of this form of 'experience' and hotly 
denies its claims to revolutionary effect: 
When I go to the theatre it is not to suffer drooling morons translate 
audience participation into a license to maul me with their bodies 
simply because they are incapable of reaching me with their minds. 
This is the debasement of the principle of ritualistic communion at 
its most nauseating, the triteness which comes sooner or later to any 
culture whose rationale is based not on irreducible truths of universal 
experiences but on a cultural emptiness which can only feed on 
novelties, extremisms and personal fantasies. 1s 
For Soyinka, the revolutionary possibility, which he believes to be inherent in the 
social event of theatrical performance, has little to do with the prioritizing of the 
body and the physical breaking of barriers which separate audience from 
performers. Rather, he opines, the problem - which returns once again to the 
concept of categorization - lies with the perception of separation, owing to the 
existence of different spheres of activity occurring within the unified space of the 
theatrical arena. To force an audience, therefore, to participate physically, is to 
deny the very real and active experience which has the potential to occur within 
what appears to be the inert body of unified audience perception. 
Both audience and effect are contained within a very malleable 
matrix which is the sum of the physical energy and intellect, the 
sensual and moral interaction, of the audience and the protagonist 
forces on stage. 
... this is the operative technique, this technique of interaction, a technique whose end can only be change, not consolidation (change, 
however fragmentary, illusory, however transient, however lacking 
in concrete, ultimate significances, but nevertheless change) - it 
suggests that theatre is perhaps the most revolutionising art form 
known to man. 19 
Soyinka does not require proof of audience participation or activity. Nor does he 
perceive his audience to be a mass which requires a standardized form of 
communication. Rather, his work is an act of faith which attributes to individual 
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spectators the desire, hunger and curiosity for participation in a realm of experience 
particular to theatrical expression. 
Despite the very different material upon which their work focuses, Barker and 
Soyinka find a solid meeting point in their location of theatrical experience within 
the mind of the spectator. For both playwrights, theatre is the witnessing of 
embodied language, or languages; it is the witnessing of language which has 
achieved the status of an action via the sensitized body of the actor. In order that 
the mind may achieve a focus equal to the exigencies of this specific activity, 
Barker is insistent that certain conditions are necessary to the nurturance of the 
spectator's willing involvement, a process he calls "seduction", 20 which is entrusted 
to the actor as a primary task: 
... all theatre that affronts or offends the audience 
by direct 
engagement wrecks that sacred compact between actor and witness 
that is older than history. To insult the audience for the paltry 
gratification of the actors destroys theatre, erodes its authority as an 
art, just as-all invitations to debate what has been witnessed diminish 
its beauty. The great play is immune to discussion, the play 
eliminates debate, it is not about arguments, it replaces arguments. 21 
The faith which these two playwrights would seem to place in the spectator's 
ability to apprehend the demands made upon them by the artwork is not, finally an 
act of altruism. Rather, their faith is a by-product of need; the stringent 
requirement of texts which refuse to take as their starting point the easy pleasure 
born of a desire to gratify the spectator's social self-image. What is offered in its 
stead is theatre which defines itself as a process of creation to which the spectator 
is invited as participant. The invitation carries with it certain pre-conditions which 
are re-iterated by the text, namely that the "saying" of the "idea" will be 
subordinated to an "experiencing" of complex thought as action and, therefore, that 
the play will eschew the concept of the "solution" in order to pursue the fluid 
continuance of this process beyond the boundaries of the theatrical event. The 
altered status of the spectator from customer to creative participant is one which 
refuses the deferral of moral responsibility to the playwright. Thus, the equation 
which allows the playwright privileged knowledge by virtue of his ordering of the 
material to a state of coherence, is replaced - once that coherence is removed - by 
an equality born of shared struggle towards meaning. In an interview given early in 
his career Soyinka stated his position with regard to the spectator unambiguously: 
Quite frankly, I do not think of any audience when I write. I write in 
the firm belief that there must be at least a hall full of people who 
are sort of on the same wave-length as mine from every stratum of 
society and there must be at least a thousand people who are able to 
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feel the same way as I do about something. So when I write, I write 
in the absolute confidence that it must have an audience. 22 
Likewise, Howard Barker has described his writing as daring to dream "life as it 
might be lived", 23 an intensely private process which is made public by the actors' 
mediation of a language to which his struggle gives birth: 
The dramatist explores the terrain, half-knowing, half-ignorant. His 
journey is mapped by the actors. The audience participate in the 
struggle to make sense of the journey, which becomes their journey 
also. Consequently, what is achieved by them is achieved 
individually and not collectively. There is no official 
interpretation. 24 
The process of exposing the mind's creative relationship to the socio-historic 
'reality' within which their work achieves meaning, appears to be central to both 
Barker and Soyinka's relationship to theatrical communication. Their recognition of 
the privileged perspective of the playwright, as one who is 'paid to imagine' carries 
in its wake a refusal of the social and cultural creation of the author within 
ideological discourse, described by Michel Foucault as "the ideological figure by 
which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning". 25 
In a paper addressed to the College de France in 1971, entitled "What is an 
Author? ", Foucault suggests that the contemporary discourse which holds our 
notion of the author in place is a symptom of the historic development of a 
rationalized worldview which is specific to the creation of European culture and is 
most commonly identified as the Age of Enlightenment. Foucault pinpoints the 
eruption of authorial discourse as the moment at which texts became the property 
of the individual; that is to say, the moment at which the author and not the 
language which formed his raw material became the source of meaning for the 
reader of his texts. Foucault is precise in his location of this moment, in which the 
author is created, by a process of ideological reversal, from 'pure being' in a 
discourse - as a product of that discourse which has no meaning outside its own 
production - to the owner of a discourse for which he must take responsibility and 
prove the boundary marker to its significations: 
The author's name serves to characterize a certain mode of being of 
discourse: the fact that the discourse has an author's name, that one 
can say 'this was written by so-and-so' or 'so-and-so is its author' 
shows that this discourse is not ordinary everyday speech that merely 
comes and goes, not something that is immediately consumable. On 
the contrary, it is a speech that must be received in a certain mode 
and that, in a given culture, must receive a certain status. 26 
Thus, the moment which, for Foucault, furnishes our contemporary understanding 
of the author-function, is that moment at which texts become the property of the 
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named individual. This yoking at once served a classificatory function and also 
initiated the formulation of an ethics of authorship whereby the producer/owner of 
the text became a householder accountable for its functioning in society. 
"What is an Author? " both challenges and upholds the deconstructionist stance that 
would negate the author in order to facilitate a proliferation of texts and textual 
meaning. This is achieved by the fact that Foucault rehearses the means by which 
the contemporary author-figure was created. In removing him from a discourse 
which defined his being as pure immanence and locating him outside that discourse 
as owner and producer, the illusion of wholeness replaced ambiguity and absence 
in an attempt to ward off chaos and return meaning to an attributable source. The 
proper name, which assumed vital importance as an indicator of property 
ownership, also invited the creation of an identity which would function to support 
the text's meanings. It is Foucault's assertion that the death of the author - as being 
in discourse - occurs at the moment in which his being is dispersed across the text's 
absences. Thus the death of the author, for Foucault, heralds the birth of the 
psychologized identity of the named owner of the text. The imperative working to 
produce this moment is fear; a fear born of the need 'to understand', which 
countenances the construction of a fixed identity in order to veil the transgressive 
possibilities of language as a chaos of free-floating signifiers - as a structure of 
meaning wholly divorced from the world it would seek to describe. 
Whilst Foucault would agree, therefore, that the named author must disappear in 
order to reveal the multiple texts masked by his psychologized persona, he would 
challenge the supposition that this action is an end in itself. For the named author is 
also a text; a metatext which serves a classificatory function. To call for the death 
of this figure is to fall prey to the ideology which objectified his function and 
placed him outside a discourse in order to name that discourse. Rather, Foucault 
suggests, we should interrogate the construct which parades as individual 
authorship in order to discover the repressed texts written into the history of his 
engendering: 
... [those] aspects of an individual which we designate as making him 
an author are only a projection, in more or less psychologizing 
terms, of the operations that we force texts to undergo, the 
connections that we make, the traits we establish as pertinent, the 
continuities that we recognize or the exclusions that we practice. 27 
Thus, to remove the named author is to attempt to ignore a catalogue of fear and 
repression which is, in itself, a commentary upon the formation of a discourse 
which cannot free or transform itself without recognition of the power structures 
which have called it into being. These power structures operate ideologically, 
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attributing to the author the question which - in truth - should be posed by the 
reader in order to expose that which the author functions to disguise: 'What are the 
social and cultural requirements which underpin the formulation of meanings 
represented by a text? '. For Foucault, to answer this question is to demonstrate the 
means by which discourse functions, and further, to lever open the doorway 
through which one may glimpse the possibility of texts awaiting the structures 
which may call them into being. To follow this proposition through to its natural 
conclusion, one might state that the contemporary, named author is created in the 
image of his society's fear of its own destruction, defined in this instance as the 
inability of language to place man in a stable and understandable relationship to the 
world of his perceptions. 
For Foucault, authorship is not a profession but a mode of 'being' in the world; it 
represents the immanence of subjectivity. By this I mean that subjectivity is an aim, 
or an object of critique, rather than the prima facie attribute or condition of the 
author's function. To return to the author the questions a text raises is therefore to 
refuse to take responsibility for those questions; it is also to refuse the possibility of 
new varieties of the self which lie beyond the safety-net of ideological thought. The 
entry of the author into a system of ownership which designates his work as 
labelled property - all enquiries being referred to source - is the negation of the 
potential of the author to proliferate and make promiscuous 'meaning' as 
understood by a rational worldview. The discourse which seeks to define the 
author, once exposed as boundary or marker to that worldview, opens up the 
possibility of uncharted territory; what Foucault calls the "limitless reign of the 
limit". 28 
The relationship which Barker and Soyinka have attempted to articulate with their 
audiences would appear to be the consequence of a refusal of the discourse of 
authorship, as an ideological linkage to the text defined as private property. This 
linkage may also be defined as an element of the liberal pact which sustains 
autonomous individuality based upon the private ownership of property in return 
for fidelity to the 'natural' functioning of the State. We may surmise, after 
Foucault, that what they wish to put in its place may be described as an authorship 
premised upon promiscuity, this being a non-ideological, non-monogomous 
attachment to rationality which offers critique in place of certainty and speculation 
in place of State-driven interpretation. 
Theodor Adorno's pursuit, as a literary critic and philosophical thinker, of a 
literary form which has not - in the name of mass consumption - allowed reified 
consciousness to be both the driving-force and the raison d'etre of its coming into 
being, causes him to focus upon a bastard child of literary endeavour: 
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The essay allows for the consciousness of nonidentity (sic), without 
expressing it directly; it is radical in its non-radicalism, in refraining 
from any reduction to a principle, in its accentuation of the partial 
against the total, in its fragmentary character. 29 
Adorno premises his paean to the essay form upon its promiscuous relationship to 
knowledge, realised in its refusal to offer thought as explanation. The intimacy it 
attempts with its reader, is born of a denial of the self as a source of 'absolute' or 
'theological' meaning. The version of authorship which holds authorial identity to 
be the source of 'truth' has been described by Roland Barthes as the construction of 
the "Author/God"; 30 a variety of selfhood which places subjective perception as 
both the source and horizon of truth and meaning. Individual interpretation, within 
this model, depends upon a practical application of thought to subjective 
experience, the goal being a secure understanding of one's relationship to the world 
of perception. What is not recognized, or named, within this matrix of meaning, is 
the system of thought, or the ordering of concepts and classifications which 
underpin its existence. Knowledge is, therefore, perceived to be a 'natural' process 
of deduction which returns to the individual the 'logical' processes of reasoning as 
absolute truths. Alternative modes of structuring perception are thus considered 
inferior, wrong-headed or dangerous in their designated 'otherness' to what 
indubitably 'is'. 
Adorno describes the essay form as the willed return of the foreign 'other' to the 
processes of knowledge. The speculative method of interpretation invited by the 
essayist is described as comparable to a foreigner who, rather than learning the 
grammatical construction of his hosts' language, becomes fluent via 
experimentation with the possible meanings contained within its vocabulary: 
Such a person will read without a dictionary. If he sees the same 
word thirty times in continually changing contexts, he will have 
ascertained its meaning better than if he had looked up all the 
meanings listed, which are usually too narrow in relation to the 
changes that occur with changing contexts and too vague in relation 
to the unmistakable nuances that the context gives rise to in every 
individual case. This kind of learning remains vulnerable to error, as 
does the essay as form; it has to pay for its affinity with open intellectual experience with a lack of security that the norm of 
established thought fears like death. 31 
The equation of the foreigner with the concept of non-identity within the bounded 
landscape of Western Enlightenment rationality is helpful in a consideration of the 
purposes to which Soyinka and Barker have subordinated their published papers 
and essays written throughout the course of their development as playwrights. The 
central focus of any study of the playwright will inevitably be that of the theatrical 
texts they have produced, but before entering into this form of analysis it may be 
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helpful to consider the framework their volumes of essays provide for the reader 
seeking a contextualized understanding of their theatrical work. 
Fidelity to the essay as form, if we are to accept Adorno's definition, requires the 
dissolution of the psychologized author in order that he may be replaced by the 
textual processes of mind in its ordering and re-ordering of concepts. The meaning 
of this text, which draws on no authority beyond its own form, is produced only 
via the reader's interpretation of the juxtaposed concepts offered as content. The 
removal of an organizing principle behind the 'I' which writes, allied to the wilful 
withdrawal of explicatory method, produces the appearance of thought as montage, 
described by Adorno thus: 
Thought does not progress in a single direction; instead, the 
moments are interwoven as in a carpet. The fruitfulness of the 
thoughts depends on the density of the texture. The thinker does not 
actually think but rather makes himself into an arena for intellectual 
experience, without unraveling it. 32 
It would be misleading to suggest that Barker and Soyinka's use of the essay form 
is a pre-meditated attempt on their part to define their function as playwrights. Nor 
would this type of 'cause and effect' reasoning do justice to Adorno's purposes in 
focusing upon the essay as a form of "non-radical radicalism". His purpose, as a 
literary critic, is not to suggest models for future utility, but rather to seek the 
means by which literary texts function to produce meaning and the significance 
they achieve culturally via this process. Thus, Adorno singles out the essay as a 
text which was willed into existence by the demands of individual processes of 
thought reflected in its form. Contemporary attitudes towards this form, and 
consideration of the conditions which gave birth to it form, therefore, the basis of a 
social critique founded upon the status of the social subject as the self-determined 
organizer of experience. 
What Soyinka and Barker do not choose to offer their readership is authoritative 
discourse based upon the psychologized experience of the author. Soyinka favours 
a mode of 'fictional' autobiography and autobiographical details are virtually absent 
in the writings of Barker. The capacity to create an identikit picture of the author in 
relation to his personalised milieu is therefore denied the reader who must instead 
consider the proper name attached to these essays to be, in the words of Gilles 
Deleuze: "... neither signifier, nor signified, rather they are designations of intensity 
inscribed upon a body". 33 Thus, the authoritative style assumed by both writers 
etches out an arena of intensity which remains unexplained by reference to 
psychological discourse. Their essays are, I would like to suggest, a form of 
intellectual biography which posits the self as an attribute of language and linguistic 
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form. The manner of its appearance becomes therefore, of central significance to 
debates concerning the nature of identity. 
Wole Soyinka as Essayist 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, in his study of African self-identification In my Father's 
House, 34 encounters Soyinka's work as a problematic, but absolutely necessary 
development in contemporary Nigerian culture; 
In taking up so passionately the heritage of the printed word, he has 
entered inevitably into the new kind of literary self that comes with 
print, a self that is the product surely, of changes in social life as 
well as the technology of the word. This novel self is more 
individualist and atomic than the self of pre-capitalist societies; it is 
a creature of modem economic relations. I do not know that this 
new conception of the self was inevitable, but it is no longer 
something that we in Africa could escape even if we wanted to. 35 
What Appiah recognizes in Soyinka's developing oeuvre - and his reference is 
particularly to the essays collected under the title Myth, Literature and the African 
World - is not the product of an elitist system of education, nor an assimilation of 
colonial values imbibed through the British University system, but rather an 
awareness on the part of the writer that the written word throws into disarray the 
stable and accommodating knowledge born of a traditional, oral culture. Appiah 
makes the point that an oral culture is, by definition, devoid of written records; it 
is therefore, absolved of the need to overcome or explain inconsistency in its 
beliefs. The words of the ancestors survive only through a living tradition which is 
perpetuated by the repetition of originary words and actions representing a form of 
truth. Knowledge, within this framework, is accumulative and eclectic, but the 
basic principles upon which it is founded must remain constant if its inherited 
authority is to retain its sacred character. It is Appiah's argument that culture's 
'image of knowledge' changes with the introduction of the written word, and that 
the growth of literacy will inevitably herald a refusal of knowledge defined by its 
self-evident 'body of truths'. Communal interpretation of knowledge, which 
prioritizes the interests of the community as a whole and invests little or no social 
effort in individual research or enquiry - which is not to say that these modes are 
nonexistent - is challenged by literacy which takes as an a priori assumption the 
individual interpretation of the written word. 
Appiah places Soyinka's essays, and Soyinka's role as writer, at the crux of this 
perceived disjuncture between written and oral culture; a disjuncture which 
challenges at root the very concept of knowledge as communal pursuit; 
The growth both of literacy and of the availability of printing... gives 
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rise to that peculiar privacy associated with a new kind of property 
in texts, a new kind of authorial authority, a new kind of creative 
persona. 36 
Thus, in the Nigerian context, the organization implicit in Western literary 
pursuits, which expects and rewards change, development and progress in both 
artistic and scientific theory, enters into a dialectical relationship with a knowledge 
born of and carried by the spoken word. Thus, abstract theory confronts as 'other' 
language, which in its relationship to the body of its carrier has become text and 
inviolable origin of historic truths. For Appiah, the dilemma now facing the 
contemporary African States is not whether or not to accept a woridview permeated 
through and through with the rational mode of enquiry - the very fact of literacy, in 
whatever language, introduces abstractions and elaborations into an oral culture 
which have been hitherto unperceived - but rather, whether traditional beliefs can 
emerge unscathed from their contact with individualistic cognitive styles if indeed 
this is perceived to be a desirable state of affairs. 
The complexities of Africa's current cultural matrix, where widespread literacy is a 
progressive aim, married to a desire for a purity of expression cleansed of the 
contamination of colonial history, are, for Appian, demonstrated by the struggles 
of the writer, Soyinka, to determine his role within transitional culture: 
Soyinka, the individual, a Nigerian outside the traditional, more 
certain world of his Yoruba ancestors, struggles with the Soyinka 
who experiences the loss of that world, of those gods of whom he 
speaks with such love and longing ... 
Once again the 'I' seeks to 
escape the persistent and engulfing 'We' . 37 
The uneasy relationship of the writer to a non-unified people is, suggests Appiah, 
highlighted in the case of Soyinka whose chosen medium is the English language. 
This choice demonstrates the impossibility of identifying his reading public, beyond 
a localised linguistic community, via any language other than that of the erstwhile 
colonial power. Thus language as a boundary marker both reinforces colonial 
boundaries imposed upon a disparate collection of peoples and signifies the 
'failure' of the Nigerian State to move beyond the homogeneity forced into being 
by the organizational principles of imperialist power. 
The contemporary historical moment of the African States is one which, asserts 
Appiah, makes impossible a systematic response to the question: "What does it 
mean to be African today? ". The necessitated use of the word 'African' signifying 
no more than a concept imposed by the colonial power in opposition to which it 
now tries to define itself. By the same token, the use of the word 'black' as a 
fundamental component of self-description can only highlight the fragmented 
nature of the identity which thus appears in print, for 'black' retains its stable 
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signification in the English language, only via its polar relationship to 'white'. 
Thus, Appiah dismisses the idea of an 'African' purity which pre-dates colonialism 
and therefore rejects the notion that the 'authentic' African may emerge in print: 
Nativist nostalgia, in short, is largely fuelled by that Western 
sentimentalism so familiar after Rousseau; few things, then, are less 
native than nativism in its current forms. 38 
The relationship a writer such as Soyinka forges with the English language is 
therefore the dramatization of an historical relationship, rather than the 'natural' 
ordering of linguistic categories. No longer the tool of 'truth' language becomes a 
collision of possible perspectives; a theatricalisation of power. 39 For the African 
writer attempting artistic expression via this medium the engagement is one of 
tensile creativity and combat. The possible 'identities' which may emerge from 
such an engagement also, within the cultural matrix of which they are a part, 
suggests a wider potential for subjective consideration of what it means to be an 
African today. 
What Appiah describes, through his chosen example of Soyinka's writing, is not a 
transition from a 'simple' culture to a 'complex' one which will leave in its wake a 
floundering, illiterate sub-class, locked into essential beliefs which have no place in 
the modem world. Rather, the transition is one which involves a questioning of 
social priorities in the face of widespread industrialization and technological 
innovation. Communities that have 'chosen' in the past to prioritize a form of 
knowledge which is accommodative and communitarian are challenged - at the 
moment of their introduction to widespread literacy - to reconsider the organization 
of their conceptual base. The historical choices which have previously defined their 
systems of knowledge stand - at this moment - in danger of being pejoratively 
described as an earlier, or more primitive stage of development, in relation to the 
complexities of mature selfhood made possible by the technological development of 
the printed word. This model of the human evolution of knowledge is based on a 
Western system of rationality which perceives the development of society to be 
linear and progressive, history becoming thus the charting of an unbroken line 
which follows the life cycle of biological development from child to mature adult. 
What Appiah exposes in Soyinka's writing is rather the transition from one system 
of thought to another with its attendant problems and possibilities in the re- 
formation of identity. 
Soyinka's relationship to the English language must therefore be considered as a 
fundamental component of his identity as a writer. His awareness of it as a 
monument hewn out of the supremacist sensibility is one which frees him from an 
intimate and unifying linkage with the system of values it upholds. He is therefore 
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liberated from the 'truth-telling' functions of its discourses, for he stands in relation 
to its meanings as the 'other' of its significations. Viewed within the broader 
sphere of contemporary Nigerian culture, his work appears as a distillation of the 
individual in struggle with the means by which he may appear in cultural discourse; 
a struggle which involves choices concerning fundamental beliefs and structures of 
cognition. The complexity of his vision, and the form in which it fords its means of 
expression, become therefore articulations of a highly individualized quest for 
'identity', defined in this instance as the relationship of the writer to an 'image of 
knowledge' negotiated with his society via literary form. Understood in these terms 
the modes of reception made possible by his work reflect the prismatic 
constellations of meaning available to a culture at a given moment. 
In an essay entitled "Aesthetic Illusions", Soyinka makes a plea for the complex 
experiencing of language in opposition to the "neo-Tarzanist" approach to African 
aesthetics: 
Is it really intelligent to demand that all poetry be simple? Not all 
experience is simple. More pertinently, not all experiencing is 
limited to a simple uni-linear activity of mind. And does any work 
which results from man's creative intelligence not become in itself a 
source of experiencing? That a poem should communicate, no one in 
his right mind would deny. But what should it communicate? The 
dictionary value of each word? Phrase? Stanza? Story-line? Or could 
it be that the mind does not always demand a literal value out of 
every image? 40 
In this essay the targets for Soyinka's ire are those critics who, in the name of 
"racial self-retrieval", fall prey to the myth-making against which Appiah warns 
when he reminds the reader of the impossibility of defining what it is to be 
African. Thus, Soyinka argues, the distorted mirror in which they frame their 
images of the African, demands of the writer the consciousness of a child. 41 Their 
contribution to the struggle for cultural identity becomes therefore subject to 
Western ideology whereby the 'difference' inscribed in traditional cultural 
aesthetics is translated as a simple functionalism derivative of the 'childlike' 
mechanisms of the primitive mind. The crime he lays at the feet of these critics is 
the desire for a literature which will return to its reader a worldview which 
perpetuates the illusion of being 'untouched' by its contact with the modem world. 
The identities offered as ideals by this literature are, he states, no more than the 
reified images offered by early Hollywood films in service to a paternalist ideology 
of imperialism. The suicidal urge expressed by neo-Tarzanist aesthetics feeds a 
pessimism which permeates Soyinka's essays throughout the 1960s: 
Sermons preached on behalf of a simple-minded poetics are a wilful 
retreat from the dynamic nature of reality and its 
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experiencing... what the neo-Tarzanists preach is a statist 
contextualism, the poetics of itemisation within narrowly defined 
areas, the separation of experience from experiencing, of matter 
from perceiving, of thought from reflecting. It is the poetics of death 
and mummification, not of life, renewal and continuity. 42 
Soyinka's attempts, as an essayist, to retrieve the complexity of thought which 
characterizes the experiencing of contemporary Nigerian culture, centre uniquely 
and unexpectedly upon a mythopoetic use of the gods of the Yoruba pantheon. 
Adorno describes the "unmethodical method" pursued by essayists as being the 
unceremonious seizing upon concepts in order to increase the density of their 
textured thought whilst refusing to define or contextualize those concepts beyond 
their juxtaposed relationship to other concepts. Thus Soyinka presses the gods into 
the service of cultural debate with a bewildering lack of reference to source and an 
apt disregard for any authoritative or anthropological discourse by which their use 
might be contextualized. 
Critics of Soyinka's work have tended to ascribe his use of the Yoruba pantheon to 
the cultural influences of his upbringing and the fidelity he maintains to the Yoruba 
people. James Gibbs draws on autobiographical data to this end: 
On one of his holiday visits to Isara, the young Soyinka went 
through a rite designed to strengthen and protect him... The pattern 
of the festival, the concern with communal purification and _the eclecticism of the celebration were important for the growing 
playwright and they provide an example of the kind of inspiration 
Soyinka found in his African background. 43 
Designed to enlighten a British readership, this is perhaps an unfair example of the 
forging of a narrative as a means of explaining an author's oeuvre. Eldred 
Durosimi Jones offers his readers a sociology-based contextualization to Soyinka's 
work which, unfortunately fares little better in its attempt to address the complexity 
to which Soyinka's naming of the gods refers: 
Traditional Yoruba life is dominated by religion. The Yoruba are 
surrounded by gods and spirits with whom the lives of mortals 
interact. In what is more an idiomatic expression for the idea of 
multiplicity than actual count, the Yoruba ascribe to themselves four 
hundred and one gods. 44 
Although Soyinka's upbringing and consequent immersion in a world 
interpenetrated by the constant presence of deities will obviously have proved 
fundamental to the formation of what he calls "the fount of my own creative 
inspiration", 45 explanations which refer the reader back to source are, as 
exemplified by Foucault's discussion of authorship, finally reductive in their return 
to the psychologizing principles of ideological authorial discourse. In contrast to 
28 
this approach, I would like to suggest that Soyinka's inclusion of the Yoruba 
pantheon in his essays be read as the seizure of a concept through which individual 
experience may be mediated without the possibility of its translation into the 
immediacy of subjective or perceptual experience. In "The Ritual Archetype", 
Soyinka challenges Jungian interpretation of the mythical consciousness as an 
attempt to counter non-understanding with a scientific discourse which uses the 
rational woridview as a measure of that which 'is' against an alternative worldview 
designated as "collective fantasy". In responding to the universalising claims of the 
Jungian (western) unconscious, Soyinka retorts: 
What we call the mythic inner world is both the psychic sub- 
structure and temporal subsidence, the cumulative history and 
empirical observations of the community. It is nonetheless primal in 
that time, in its cyclic reality, is fundamental to it. The inner world 
is not static, being constantly enriched by the moral and historic 
experience of man. 46 
Unlike Western theories of the unconscious therefore, Soyinka posits the "mythic 
inner world" as one which is knowable, subject to change, and completely 
integrated within the lives of those who carry consciousness of its very real 
existence. This is not the imagery of an unconscious which subterraneously dictates 
patterns of behaviour which may only be interpreted after the event by experts 
whose- application of scientific explanations makes understandable that which is 
arcane to the carrier of its effects. Rather, Soyinka identifies an area of mythical 
experience which, via the form of his essays - and his theatrical works - he declares 
to be co-existent with an acute awareness and application of the reasoning mind. 
Thus, the concluding paragraph of his essay in response to neo-Tarzanism, offers a 
perception which both confounds and has the possibility of exposing to critique 
very foundations upon which rationalist discourse and attendant scientific 
positivism is built: 
The aesthetic matrix is the fount of my own creative inspiration; it 
influences my critical response to the creation of other cultures and 
validates selective eclecticism as the right of every productive being, 
scientist or artist. Sango is today's god of electricity, not of white- 
man magic-light. Ogun is today's god of precision technology, oil- 
rigs and space-rockets, not a benighted rustic cowering at the "iron 
bird". 47 
The potency of Soyinka's juxtaposition between technology and myth strikes at the 
heart of a fear peculiar to Western rationality which Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer debate in their seminal work Dialectic of Enlightenment. 48 In a series 
of essays which critique the perpetuation of a worldview informed by 
Enlightenment thought, Adorno and Horkheimer posit the eruption of myth as a 
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state of consciousness in which the 'I' has not yet reached authoritative status in 
relation to the world of its perceptions. Thus man's relationship to the natural 
world, in mythological consciousness, is still one which holds in thrall that which 
is beyond understanding. The naming of objects is described as the gasp of fear 
which accompanies human existence in a world which demands accommodation 
and change as a vital principle of continued existence. Mythical consciousness is, 
therefore man in a dynamic relation to the world, where life is founded upon pain 
and the fear of destruction. The concept of the 'I' as a reflection of the inner 
ordering of perceptions - the 'I' as a promise of internalised selfhood - is obviously 
untenable to this form of consciousness and thus the very instability of self, of the 
determining 'I' becomes the promise of survival and strength 'in a world that 
demands adaptability as the sole means of survival. Citing the Homeric myths as 
their source, Adorno and Horkheimer describe the fragile state of mythical identity 
thus: 
... the 
identity of the self is so much a function of the unidentical, of 
dissociated, unarticulated myths, that it must derive itself from those 
myths. The inner organization of individuality in the form of time is 
still so weak that the external unity and sequence of adventures 
remains a spatial change of scenery, of the spots sacred to the local 
deities by whose virtue the storm drives and tosses. Whenever in 
later history the self has experienced such debilitation ... the narrative 
account of life has slipped into a sequence of adventures. 
Laboriously, revocable, in the image of voyaging, historical time is 
detached from space, the irrevocable pattern of all mythic time. 49 
The choice which Adorno and Horkheimer believe the Enlightenment to have 
exposed is that between man's subordination to nature or the subordination of 
nature to the self. Neither aspect of the choice represents 'truth' or 'reality' as the 
choice itself is premised upon the self in a relationship of power to that which it 
perceives to be the world. Neither the mythical, nor the rational worldviews 
therefore offer a definitive version of reality but they do have a central role to play 
in the determining of the autonomy of self and of the order of knowledge upon 
which selfhood is built. The progression of Enlightenment thought, defined as the 
means by which a rational explanation of the world may be arrived at via the 
cognitive processes of deduction and logic, is described by Adorno and 
Horkheimer as being dependent upon the exiling of myth from contemporary 
consciousness. Thus mythical time and space - these being designations of what 
Soyinka calls "inner space" and therefore inviolable to rational categories - are 
accommodated by their removal from individual perception and their placement 
within 'real' time as an historic moment in the development of man's process of 
maturation. Myth becomes therefore - for the Enlightened thinker - an object of 
discourse; pinned and tabulated, its exile into 'the order of things' is achieved. 
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The critique of Enlightenment offered by Horkheimer and Adorno, however, 
refuses the neatness of this procedure and, as their title suggests, they propose the 
possibility that far from having achieved the desired subjection of nature to self, 
that contemporary systems of rationality remain driven by a mythical consciousness 
which forms the antithesis to the unity and stability of the 'I': 
The strain of holding the I together adheres to the I in all stages; and 
the temptation to lose it has always been there with the blind 
determination to maintain it... The dread of losing the self and of 
abrogating together with the self the barrier between oneself and 
other life, the fear of death and destruction, is intimately associated 
with a promise of happiness which threatened civilization in every 
moment. 50 
Soyinka's insistence at the presence of a mythical consciousness coexistent with the 
rational worldview is, therefore, a radical questioning and even exposure of the 
ideological barricades erected as limits and boundary markers to the stable 
categories of the 'I' of Enlightenment thought. His wielding of the gods as 
weapons with which to confront the "self-appointed moulders of experience", 
whose armoury is precisely that upon which the rational worldview is founded, is 
no less than seizure upon the arrow which will strike home in the Achilles heel of 
that which he opposes. His placing of the gods within a language for whom their 
presence is anathema, at once issues a challenge to the concept of identity 
perpetuated by that language and makes vulnerable the alternative possibilities of 
identity it would seek to expose. The battlefield chosen by Soyinka is essentially an 
ideological one, his battle cry being the repudiation of ideological categories. The 
efficacy of his battle tactics however, is dependent upon the definition of a sphere 
of interpretation which is not itself permeated by the ideological products of 
discourse. As illustrated by the quotations from Jones and Gibbs however, the 
rational contextualization of an author's work, in service to the understanding of 
the reader, renders impotent even the essay form in its attempt to defy reified 
consciousness and offer the reader the opportunity to "reach down beyond the 
known for once". 
Howard Barker as Essayist 
The essay is the form of the critical category of the mind. For the 
person who criticizes must necessarily experiment, he must create 
conditions under which an object becomes visible anew, and do so 
still differently than an author does; above all the objects frailties 
must be tried and tested, and this is the meaning of the slight 
variation the object experiences at the hands of the critic. 51 
A favourite quotation used by critics to expose the eccentricities of Howard 
Barker's thought processes is one in which he repudiates all ideology. The source 
31 
for this quotation may be attributed - although interpretatively and not 
authoritatively - to a statement made by Theodor Adorno in a preface to his 
collection of aphorisms which appeared under the title of Minima Moralia. 52 The 
unremitting pessimism to which he subjects the potential reader of his work, is shot 
through with what Adorno describes as the one ray of hope available to 
contemporary Western man if his existence is not to be totally and irrevocably 
determined by a reified consciousness which he no longer has the power to name. 
He urgently presses the reader to an awareness of the exigencies of the present 
historical moment as one which may present the final opportunity for man to make 
decisions concerning the future direction his society should take. The action he 
proposes is total opposition to the forces of production and consumption; and thus 
he eschews the totalizing influence of ideological categories which 'produce' the 
contemporary subject and fix him in his illusory relationship to society. 
The idealism of Adorno's demand informs his valorization of the essay form. His 
own essay on the subject describes the - virtually extinct -"homme de lettres" as an 
exemplification of the refusal of the forces of production which is reflected in the 
essay form by its innate "critique of ideology". Howard Barker premises his work 
upon a belief which may prove to be no more than a leap of faith, for it is 
ultimately unprovable, that: 
The self denies social manipulation, even if self is partially - and I 
would insist only partially - socially produced. 53 
Barker's assertion that the social self does not constitute the totality of self begs the 
question: 'What is the self that is not socially produced? ' It is to this question that 
his essays address themselves whilst remaining paradoxically aware that the self 
beyond social determination is that which cannot be defined within discourse and 
therefore requires critique of that discourse in order to make an appearance. 
Adorno's description of the persona of the essayist is that of a man who, by virtue 
of his choice of form, already presents the possibility of 'being' beyond ideological 
categories. For a mind which engages in the pursuit of speculative interpretation is 
one which has already transgressed the boundaries of 'official culture' by refuting 
the logical competency which upholds "the notion that all knowledge can 
potentially be converted to science". 54 
The essay form, and its user, may therefore be defined by their attempt to expose 
to debate that which may not be converted to science; those aspects of 
consciousness which, whilst rigorous and objective in their assertions may not be 
"distributed and recategorized under the separate persons and apparatuses of 
psychology and sociology". ss Thus, the essay fragments into its diverse 
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components that which has been made whole by ideology and, with regard to the 
social individual, asks what has been rejected in order to make the social whole a 
viable possibility? The work of the essayist - states Adorno - is the illumination of 
the object from the inside, whilst that of the ideologue is the highlighting of the 
whole's external contours. 
The young writer who wants to learn what a work of art is, what 
linguistic form, aesthetic quality, and even aesthetic technique are at 
college will usually learn about them only haphazardly, or at best 
receive information taken readymade from whatever philosophy is in 
vogue and more or less arbitrarily applied to the content of the 
works in question. 56 
In contrast to the ideological approach, Barker's essays describe his journey as a 
writer from the contours of theatrical debate in the early 1970s; defined as the 
seductive 'We' of a discourse which celebrated its collective endeavour under the 
banner of 'A People's Art', through to the highly individualized search for a 
definition of the 'I' of the playwright via immanent critique of that same discourse. 
The essays which chart this journey are fragmentary - often touching upon isolated 
aspects of theatrical practice - strident in their hostility to all that is assumed to be 
'self-evident', and rigorous in their anatomising of theatrical experience. Centrally, 
however, the 'I' which writes and the theatre which is the object of its writing 
remain concepts offered to the reader for interpretation. 
In a paper entitled "Why I am no Playwright" 57 Barker examines the implicit 
assumption of craftsmanship which lies behind the linguistic designation of his 
profession. The playwright's craft, he suggests, has always been dominated by its 
close association with the craftsmanship of the shipwright or the wheelwright, as 
moulders of materials to designs ultimately serving public utility and private gain. 
The transference of the traditional values of this craft into theatrical production 
implies that the job of the playwright is the repetition of narratives, the seamless 
joining of structures, the planing of rough surfaces and the provision of linguistic 
material as fodder to the actor's craft. The danger for theatrical enterprise of the 
wholesale transference of the notion of 'craft' into all aspects of production is 
pursued by Barker in several of his essays as a possible source of contamination 
and destruction of the primary material upon which theatre is dependent; this being 
the imagination of all participants. The craftsman is not required to imagine: his 
imagination may even prove a danger to his profession. Rather the craftsman 
moulds and decorates his raw material in order to achieve mastery over inert 
matter; the aim of his enterprise is the making useful of that which, in its essence, 
was purposeless. A craft, claims Barker, exists in service to market-forces and the 
whimsical gratification of taste. 58 
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Returning to the classical definition of the theatrical creator, Barker describes a 
preference for the title of 'poet' as a means of distancing himself from the crude 
prescriptions of commodity exchange. The poet's work he defines as that of a 
singular mind and imagination in search of a language equal to the objects and 
processes of his imagining. The commitment of the poet is not to the continuance 
of an unquestioned theatrical tradition but rather to the unique creation of a theatre 
which will return its participants once again to the fundamental question of what 
theatre is. The work of the playwright/poet is described by Barker in the same 
terms used by Max Bense to illuminate the work of the essayist: "to make the 
object visible anew". 
Thus, Barker's playwright/poet offers his name to the eruption of an event which is 
innately theatrical. The central concern of his theatrical work is therefore to 
"multiply the body" which is historically represented by the playwright's craft as a 
unified tradition and to explore a specific arena of human experience which has 
found its artistic means of expression only within the framework of theatrical 
structures: 
Theatre has no business with research, and things are not 
dramatized: they are either drama or they are something else. They 
come into existence as art, or they are not art at all, and research is 
- something carried out by specialists called academics or non- 
specialists called journalists. 59 
Barker's refusal to replicate, within the theatre's walls, the material which forms 
the bedrock of social existence, or to allow the crafting of raw material to define 
his labours, suggests that the theatre to which he gives his name will be one which 
denies any sense of relevance to the prioritized issues of contemporary society. 
Before accepting this fact, however, and allowing the title of 'art for art's sake' to 
do the work of interpretation, I would like once again to consider the spectator to 
whom the work is offered: 
An honoured audience will quarrel with what it has seen, it will go 
home in a state of anger, not because it disapproves, but because it 
has been taken where it was reluctant to go. Thus morality is created 
in art, by exposure to pain and illegitimate thought. 6o 
The concept of 'honouring' the audience is one which allows Barker a freedom in 
defining its constituent parts which he finds to be lacking in conventional models of 
audience response. It also suggests the conferment of a rank or title over and above 
that which necessity requires. To go beyond the necessary, to provide the excess to 
demand is therefore, in this instance to search for the self which is surplus to 
requirement; the self beyond social determining. The "honoured" self is that which 
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appears at the limits of ideological thought and thus Barker suggests that the 
"honoured" spectator appears only when his tolerance has been stretched to the 
limits by the theatrical events to which he is witness. The most direct route to these 
limits, within theatrical experience, is the removal of efficacy from dramatic form, 
for without the blatant announcement of purpose and utility, the reified 
consciousness of productive man is unable to place itself in relation to the product. 
Adorno describes this moment as the one in which either the product is consigned 
to a metaphorical drawer marked 'I don't understand', in which case responsibility 
is finally deferred from the spectator back to the playwright, or the desire 
establishes itself to make a meeting point between that which is perceived and the 
perceiver. In the latter case the illusion of immediacy gives way to the immanence 
of creative speculation and intuitive interpretation. 
Herbert Marcuse considers art to realise its vital function in contemporary society 
only when it recognizes its own powerlessness as a tool of political change: 
Like technology, art creates another universe of thought and practice 
against and within the existing one. But in contrast to the technical 
universe, the artistic universe is one of illusion, semblance, Schein. 
However this semblance is resemblance to a reality which exists as 
the threat and promise of the established one. In various forms of 
mask and silence, the artistic universe is organized by the images of 
a life without fear... 61 
In One Dimensional Man Marcuse strips the liberal illusion from contemporary 
man and reviews the state of consciousness this mask disguises. He, in common 
with Adorno and Horkheimer, considers that the mass industrialization of the 
Western world, allied to the monopolistic economy of late capitalist development 
and the instalment of a system of cultural politics to replace the structuralist politics 
of the pre-industrial era, have combined to produce a society dependent upon the 
mobility of a large workforce whose ambitions, goals and emotional drives must be 
sublimated to the smooth-running of the economic processes of the State. The 
human being which emerges out of this historic moment is described by Adorno as 
"historically condemned"; striving under the illusion of subjecthood, modem man 
is undergoing a process of "nullity": 
To speak immediately of the immediate is to behave much as those 
novelists who drape their marionettes in imitated bygone passions like cheap jewellery, and make people who are no more than 
component parts of machinery act as if they still had the capacity to 
act as subjects, and as if something depended on their actions. 62 
Marcuse describes this "standardized" being as one whose "immediate 
identification [is with] his society and, through it, with the society as a whole". 63 
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The terrifying description which Marcuse proposes as being adequate to 
contemporary consciousness is 'man with a dimension missing', the "one 
dimensional man" of his title. Marcuse's central thesis is that man, as a subject of 
late capitalist society, has entered into a symbiotic relationship with the forces of 
production - ideologically represented as social identity - and that his consciousness 
has become identical to the standardized techniques which he employs to drive the 
mechanisms over which he believes he has mastery. Consciousness is thus defined 
as having reached a stage where experience and function have fused within a 
language of commodification; a series of speech acts which atrophy critical or 
dialectic reasoning and return emotional or intellectual thought to the speaker in a 
reified form which constitutes the basis of experience. 
The elements of autonomy, discovery, demonstration and critique 
recede before designation, assertion and imitation... Discourse is 
deprived of the mediations which are the stages of the process of 
cognition and cognitive evaluation. The concepts which comprehend 
the facts and thereby transcend the fact are losing their authentic 
linguistic representation. Without these mediations, language tends 
to express and promote the immediate identification of reason and 
fact, truth and established truth, essence and existence, the thing and 
its function. 64 
Marcuse's "one dimensional man" exists in and of a "language of total 
administration" and the-tragedy of his being lies in the illusion that he is master of 
himself and of his actions. 
The spectator to whom Barker addresses himself is one who is prepared to forego 
the administered life in order that he may be honoured as a two-dimensional human 
being. A phrase to which Barker returns again and again in his essays refers to the 
experience of "being taken out of oneself" of "not knowing oneself". The 
expression, common to practical linguistic usage, becomes, within the context of 
Barker's theatre - as outlined by his essays - redolent with meaning, for it describes 
both an awareness of the illusory capacity for knowledge we believe ourselves to 
hold over our bodies, and the moment at which the self transgresses the limits of 
social definition: 
I repeat that no one is educated by a play of this sort - no information, useful or otherwise, is communicated, nor is 
communication the essence ... The promiscuity of the imagination in the Catastrophic play, its unapologetic intimacy with the forbidden - indeed the rupturing of the forbidden as a category - evacuates the territory of values. The production must become, in essence, a 
poem, and, like a poem, not reducible to a series of statements in 
other forms. 65 
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The concept of promiscuity stands as an axis between the 'idea' which can be 'said' 
and the reflection of consciousness which refuses translation into scientific 
knowledge, or ideological discourse. On the one side of this axis stands the speaker 
who exhibits his power over language - posited as a tool of perception; a lackey to 
experience - on the other side stands he who is party to an awareness of the painful 
schism language represents in its division between the potential of man's 
consciousness as a mediation of his understanding of the world and the negotiated 
expression of that consciousness via ideologies which cement his position as a 
subject in society. 
The promise of promiscuity lies only in its juxtaposition to the monogamous 
relationship of the self to systems of ideological belief perpetuated by the State. 
There are therefore no definable prizes or perceivable goals offered as reward, only 
the possibility of experiencing the fear and anxiety which lies at the limits of 
ideological belief and may - there is no certainty - offer potential to man beyond 
reified consciousness. What Barker promises to deliver to his audience in his 
professional capacity is the imagination freed from civic constraint and its attendant 
hierarchy of liberal humanist values. In order to expose the limits of Marcuse's 
'one-dimensional man' he disrupts those categories of order and meaning which, 
for the majority of the population, form the foundation of their daily existence and 
dictate the means for the continued functioning of society as a whole. What is 
placed before the spectator is the explosion of the 'whole' revealing the diversity of 
its 'particulars' which refuse to add up and, as a consequence, discharge their 
chaotic energy to non-productive ends: 
As a form of theatre it is so overloaded, so apparently excessive in 
language, metaphor, event, diversity of form and image, so 
promiscuous in its speculation, it denies the very concept of the 
ordered life even as an ideal. 66 
Barker's 'promiscuity' flies in the face of - whilst maintaining its dialectic with - an 
ethos dedicated to economy of time and effort. At best its refusal of boundaries and 
categories of knowledge create a plethora premised upon ambiguity and doubt: 
'promiscuous' theatre is calculated to produce individualized and individualizing 
anxiety. Barker's immanent theatre devotes its energies to immanence as action. In 
place of the 'good' or 'moral' playwright who serves his society by offering 
cultural clarification, he commits the untenable sin of blasting apart the hard won 
categories of consensual wisdom and refusing to take responsibility for the mess he 
may leave behind him. The challenge he issues to the spectator, and the demand 
inherent in his honouring of him, is to pick his way through the detritus, forging as 
he goes a pathway which may only be validated by the process of its making. The 
spectator is thus charged with the responsibility for self-fashioning; no longer a 
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craftsman in the service of the state, his creation becomes that of the artist whose 
responsibility is to the imagination. 
The Playwright and Commitment 
To return to the paradox with which this chapter began is to return to Barker and 
Soyinka's speculations upon their responsibility as playwrights, both to the medium 
of their expression, and to the spectator for whom the work is played. A response 
to this specific was offered by Soyinka in the first decade of Nigerian 
Independence: 
The artist has always functioned in African society as the record of 
the mores and experience of his society and as the voice of vision in 
his own time. It is time for him to respond to this essence of 
himself. 67 
And by Barker in response to the "authoritarian politics" of the Thatcher years: 
The dramatist's obligation becomes an obligation not to a political 
position.. . but to his own 
imagination. His function becomes not to 
educate by his superior political knowledge, for who can trust that? 
but to lead into moral conflict by his superior imagination... In an 
age of unitary thought and propaganda, this is his first 
responsibility. 68 
For both playwrights the highly developed use of the imaginative faculty is an end 
in itself. The existence of the playwright's imagination, and the product which it 
engenders, is offered as a unique and vital contribution to the society which it 
serves. Whether as essence or obligation, this function is perceived to be the raison 
d'etre of the playwright, suggesting that only via his imaginative faculty may the 
playwright truly come into being. 
The primary use made by the playwright of his imagination as a tool of perception 
infers that the view of the world thus offered to the spectator will be unique. The 
faith placed in this uniqueness by both playwrights, I would like to suggest, is born 
of their absolute belief in the need for culture to cultivate, not only the appearance 
of a society in material terms, but also the 'other life' of the imagination which 
returns to each member of that society the capacity for speculation upon alternative 
modes of being, and the creative desire for continuous critique of what is in order 
that his mode of being within society may be named and evaluated as part of the 
functioning of that society rather than the whole of the individual's identity. 
A Marxist objection to this proposition would be that in a society as thoroughly 
permeated by ideological belief as that of Western Europe, the imagination is 
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unlikely to have escaped colonization by the structures of thought which support 
and maintain late capitalism. If this is so, then the products of the imagination will 
remain ideologically bound whilst masquerading as alternative forms of perception. 
The question raised, therefore, concerns the nature of the imagination proffered by 
Soyinka and Barker, and the ways in which this imagination may differ in response 
to the cultural context within which their work is to be received. 
Finally, this question returns one to the role of the playwright as distinct from the 
author and specific in its ambiguous relation to the finished product which will 
appear before the audience. As in the case of the essayist, both Barker and Soyinka 
have eschewed the ideological imperative inherent in the concept of clarity, this 
being the province of moralists and ideologues, and the production of a solution, 
this being the vocabulary of the scientist and the politician. The form which 
derives of their processes of thought is, like the essay, virtually extinct, offering no 
perceivable use-value beyond its cultural contribution to a tradition of literary 
endeavour. The very particular use made of the word playwright by Barker and 
Soyinka describes, within a culture of ideological commodification, a non-identity; 
a function without a role. This position of non-identity - in a society committed to 
the formation and stable functioning of the unifying 'I' - is the very condition 
which promises the unique capacity to imagine beyond the matrix of productive 
forces within which the 'I' of the English language lies embedded. Both Barker and 
Soyinka have, by virtue of their deep concern for their respective cultures, made 
themselves foreigners to those same cultures. Thus their work maintains an 
awareness of the chasm which separates the products of the social imagination from 
the products of the exiled imagination; in both cases it is this gap, or chasm which 
provides the arena for the worlds they choose to place upon the stage. Their 
ongoing commitment both to their form and to their audiences may therefore be 
describe as the maintenance of the possibility of non-identity as the basis of 
theatrical endeavour. 
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Chapter Two 
Barker's Extraordinary Individuals 
The theatre is without evidence, it 'makes believe', it forces belief. 
The audience of the theatre comes for what it cannot obtain 
elsewhere in any other forum. In other words, it comes for the false, 
it comes for the speculative and the unproven. 1 
When Barker arraigns his theatre of illusion and ambiguity against a society which 
has no place for these categories he is, of course, not suggesting that the theatre he 
creates has moved beyond claims to truth and is operating in an ethical vacuum. 
Rather he uses the discourse of theatre as a means by which to critique the truth 
claims upon which 'reality' builds its foundations. For this reason he insists upon 
the necessity of the four walls which designate theatrical space as being distinct and 
separate from 'real' space. In so doing he attempts to restore to theatre the artifice 
of its begetting and the paradoxes inherent in the very visible structures of belief 
which support its illusory representations. Thus, the sanctification of empirical 
proof becomes one category amongst others which must jostle for authenticity 
alongside the rest. 
In order to define theatrical discourse, Barker compares his own perceptions of 
theatre as a "black box", the walls of which act as protection against a "sea of 
morality" 2 which washes through the streets outside, to those of Bertolt Brecht for 
whom the mysteries lurking in the shadows of the black box provided an analogy 
for the ideological representations of reality wilfully imposed by capitalist 
producers upon the proletariat. The web of illusion, which for Barker provides the 
radical foundation of theatrical endeavour, became for Brecht further evidence of 
the web of falsification woven around the means of production; the sanctifying 
"aura" which precludes analysis. His revolutionary impulse was therefore to turn 
on the lights where before there was darkness; to illumine and expose the artifice 
which maintains theatrical illusion. The dazzling virtuosity of the Brechtian impulse 
has served as a metaphor for revolutionary theatre throughout the latter part of the 
twentieth century; Barker however, prizes the metaphor loose of its revolutionary 
moorings and fords: 
When Brecht commanded that the box be filled with light he was driven by the passion for enlightenment, and he knew instructions 
require light just as the imagination hates light and flees from it. 3 
Barker, in aligning Brecht's theatre with the imperative to enlightenment, is 
attempting to expose a fallacy in the analogy Brecht draws between theatrical 
illusion and ideological falsification. The seductive quality of Brecht's solution lies 
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in the simplicity of its central metaphor. Ever suspicious of simplicity, Barker 
questions the aesthetic reduction implicit in Brecht's theoretical position and 
enquires, like Theodor Adorno before him, whether or not aesthetic reduction does 
not lead to political reductionism and thus to the position whereby : "Bad politics 
becomes bad art and vice versa. " 4 
Adorno's reservations concerning the revolutionary impact of Brecht's theatrical 
innovation are helpful here because they clarify Barker's own entry into a debate 
which has - owing to its complexity - obtained small purchase in discussions 
concerning art over the past four decades. In an essay written in 1962 entitled 
"Commitment", 5 Adorno throws down the gauntlet to contemporary producers of 
art: 
Today, every phenomenon of culture... is liable to be suffocated in 
the cultivation of kitsch. Yet paradoxically in the same epoch it is to 
works of art that has fallen the burden of wordlessly asserting what 
is barred to politics... This is not a time for political works of art, 
but politics has migrated into autonomous works, and nowhere more 
so than where these seem politically dead. 6 
Adorno's argument rests upon the distance inscribed between the spectator and the 
artwork. Whilst he recognizes the attractiveness of Brecht's desire to strip away the 
'capitalist camouflage' from his theatre, he also feels the need to expose Brecht's 
innate desire to instruct via easy consumption. Thus, for Adorno, Brecht's The 
Resistable Rise of Arturo Ui 7 which represents the rise of Fascism as being no 
more terrifying in its complexity than the accidental consequences of a criminal 
mentality is a theatre which contributes to the ideological subordination of its 
audience. The central issue raised by Adorno is the nature of the act of 
consumption to which the audience member is subjected, this being prioritized over 
and above the content of the product. According to this reasoning it could be said 
that Brecht's insistence upon the collective consumption of attitudes towards 
political issues veers towards a further reification of structural response in capitalist 
society, for it denies the hazardous and complex journey an individual must make 
towards a responsible understanding of the social, cultural and political forces 
which determine - at least in part - his existence. 
The point of consumption is therefore the proof of commitment for the 
contemporary artist who, to follow Adorno's reasoning, must choose either to 
define his work according to its content - in which case it enters the marketplace 
and becomes subject to market forces - or according to the inability of the artwork 
to offer discursive identity to its content, at which point it is removed from the 
acknowledged sphere of consumption altogether. The second option retains the 
ability to critique a society based upon exchange but it is hardly pragmatic. 
43 
Brecht's pragmatism led him to make a theatre which would appeal to those same 
consumers whose desire was answered by the boxing ring. 8 Adorno questions 
whether the acknowledgement of and acquiescence to such a desire on the part of 
the theatre is not the point of entry into a capitalist ethics from which escape is 
unthinkable, purely because that theatre makes itself dependent upon the 
gratification of desires engendered by consumer-based ideology. Arguments 
countering this position would state the necessity for the re-education of the 
desiring subject who, within the Brechtian paradigm, has been corrupted by the 
wealth-driven forces of production operating in advanced society. The basic 
weakness of this position lies in the assumption that the spectator is an innocent, 
incapable of taking responsibility, and who must, therefore, be protected against 
corrupting influences by those who know better; by those who proclaim themselves 
the protectors of the soul. 
The dialectic upon which Brecht's work is premissed thus becomes the "bad 
politics" described by Adorno. The point of easy consumption at which the 
spectator enters into a relationship with the work betrays an insufficient critique of 
the society it counters, for it leaves unscathed the central proposition which renders 
the proletariat passive to the forces which define his subjecthood; that which 
declares him to be innocent in the process of historical change. 
Barker observes that the Brechtian illumination of the theatre building serves two 
functions; it strips away the artifice of theatrical illusion, thus instructing the 
spectator in the mechanics of theatrical process and simultaneously lessening the 
distance between the audience and the stage, but it also imposes a technique of 
social control upon the spectator: 
Imagination... flees its neighbours. In light you are only half- 
conscious of the stage and half-conscious of your neighbour. In all 
collective culture your neighbour controls you by his gaze. In 
darkness he is eliminated and you are alone with the actor. 9 
Barker equates the illuminated theatre with the banishment of the shadows of chaos 
and unreason which characterized the Age of Enlightenment. Developing this 
analogy, Barker roundly condemns the central thesis of Brecht's praxis; the 
development of an artform via the rigorous application of scientific method. Barker 
situates Brecht's faith in the progressive nature of technology within the context of 
Enlightenment rationality and fords theatrical discourse to be anathema to the 
controlled and controlling gaze of the scientific mind. In Adorno's Aesthetic 
Theory Lambert Zuidervaart offers to the reader a precis of Adorno and 
Horkheimer's critique of Enlightenment reason: 
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... science aims at controlling nature through reduction and 
abstraction. Scientists reduce things to their subjection to human 
control. Being controllable comes to constitute the identity and unity 
of everything in nature, which enters a correlation with the identity 
and unity of the controlling subject. The scientific symbol is merely 
the abstract sign for the object. Scientific distance is designed to 
make things universally fungible and controllable. 10 
Adorno and Horkheimer use the scientific paradigm to explore the paradox man 
fords himself confronting in the twentieth century; namely the extent to which 
control is exercised over human freedom by scientific objects which exist only 
because of their creation as an element of man's historical struggle against nature 
as a dominating force and source of fear. 
The thesis which emerges from Dialectic of Enlightenment states that human 
history is the history of man's attempted domination of nature (nature being defined 
as the forces which threaten the existence of mankind and are attributable to no 
known causes). If history is to be understood in this way then - it is Adorno and 
Horkheimer's claim - unless man can rid himself of the struggle for daily 
existence, the dialectic of domination and submission will continue to forge the 
chain of human development, and the source of fear - which lies at the heart of the 
scientific urge to objectify nature - will continue to replicate the threat against 
which freedom is defined. 
This theoretical position enmeshes man in a cyclical progression from which there 
can be no escape - given the reality that man still does have to struggle daily for his 
survival both in the natural world and in the society which shields him from it - 
and yet, paradoxically, posits escape from that cycle to be the only hope for a 
society which is headed towards inevitable destruction at its own hands. 
On the grounds of this cultural critique of Enlightenment, Barker is able to dismiss 
Brecht's theatrical praxis as being symptomatic of a misplaced faith in scientific 
progress which can lead only to further domination of the proletariat it seeks to 
emancipate. The alternative offered by Barker does not oppose Enlightenment per 
se but rather critiques the way in which rationality has come to serve as a veneer to 
techniques of domination. He thus challenges 'rational' or scientific praxis - which 
depends for its functioning upon the identification of use-value in all elements and 
areas of social life - with an 'irrational' praxis which lends identification to his 
work only insofar as it proves it devoid of use-value, and therefore lacking social 
designation. Adorno's faith in art, which in certain cases he perceives to have 
retained an autonomy from rationality, is echoed by Barker when he proposes: 
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One day a play will be written for which men and women will miss a day's 
work. 
It is likely this play will itself be experienced as work. 11 
This is the aim of the autonomous artwork so lionized by Adorno; it is the thing 'in 
itself' hich by its nature is non-discursive and contains an inherent resistance to 
any discursive translation. When Barker posits a play as an experience of work 
therefore, he offers a form of labour, or praxis, which denies the struggle for 
material existence as the basis of its rationality. According to the thesis offered by 
Adorno, the assertion of autonomy is the only means by which such a form of 
labour may continue to exist in a rational society. 
For Adorno the autonomous artwork finds its apotheosis in the Modernist 
movement. He cites Samuel Beckett's Endgame 12 as one of the few examples of 
art which fulfil the potential contained within the sphere of autonomous creation. 
The uniqueness of Endgame, he states, lies in its critique of traditional aesthetics 
which designate meaning as the unified expression of constitutive parts contained 
within the whole: 
[Beckett's plays] put meaning on trial. To do this as determinately as 
traditional artworks express positive meaning, modem artworks must 
be consistent in their negation of meaning. Consistency obligates a 
play such as Endgame to achieve the density and unity that once 
were supposed to constitute meaning. 13 
Thus Beckett's play constitutes not only the end of "meaning" as recognized by 
Enlightenment rationality, but also the end of the unified subject who is dependent 
upon the coherence of a unified and totalizing system of rational thought. The 
"meaning" which survives out of the ruins of subjectivity is necessarily non- 
discursive, thus having no function beyond the creation of theatrical form which 
achieves a consistency of rational meaninglessness. 
For Adorno then, the age of Modernism represents a full-stop at the end of man's 
cultural endeavours. Beckett's instigation of an absurd universe, in which the 
subject of the Enlightenment is dismantled, heralds an age for Adorno in which: 
The last absurdity is that the peacefulness of the void and the 
peacefulness of reconciliation cannot be distinguished from one 
another. Hope skulks out of the world, which cannot conserve it any 
more than it can pap and bon-bons, and back to where it came from, 
death. 14 
Barker however, belongs to a generation of writers and thinkers for whom Clov's 
dream of a world in which "all would be silent and still and each thing in its last 
place, under the last dust. " 15 must stand as a punctuation mark and not the final 
statement of a culture struggling with its incipient demise. For Michel Foucault, 
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writing in the 1960s, philosophical thought found itself echoing Nietzsche's 
triumphant "God is dead", but now in its secular version with man as subject of the 
Enlightenment gasping his last in order to pave the way for a new creation; man as 
a work of art. 
Foucault's essay "What is Enlightenment? " 16 proceeds from a critique of Kant's 
interrogation of Enlightenment as a concept and proposes that the import of the 
Kantian enquiry rests on the constitution of 'modernity' 17 as a conceptual 
problematization of man's subjecthood. Thus, the question 'What are we today, 
now? ' first posed by Kant in relation to the dawning modem era, offers an innate 
challenge to the 'essential' qualities of humanity which describe the humanist 
subject. For an elucidation of the humanist subject I quote Catherine Belsey: 
The ideology of liberal humanism assumes a world of non- 
contradictory (and therefore fundamentally unalterable) individuals 
whose unfettered consciousness is the origin of meaning, knowledge 
and action. It is in the interest of this ideology above all... to present 
the individual as free, unified, autonomous subjectivity. 18 
Foucault proceeds from the observation that Kant's use of "Enlightenment" refers 
not to the development of scientific reason but rather to the individual quest for 
knowledge as it exists in modem society. The particularity of this quest, for Kant, 
lies in the journey undertaken by the social individual from subjecthood, which 
holds the promise of control and responsibility whilst being inscribed through and 
through with moral dependency and submission, towards an autonomous 
individuality or selfhood in which the obligation to obey is no longer innate but 
rather the outcome of considered choice. 
Foucault moves beyond the rather conservative civil liberties envisaged by Kant 
and extends his vision to the possibility of an autonomous individual in full 
possession of ethical responsibility which facilitates the formation and mastery of 
the self. Thus, for Foucault the Kantian question 'What are we today, now? ' 
provides a schismatic moment - which has come to be known as modernity - in 
which the possibility emerged for the creation of a self beyond subjecthood; a 
horizon of 'meaning' beyond State-based morality. 
In order to develop his argument Foucault proposes the consideration of modernity 
as an 'attitude' rather than an epoch. As a means of making visible this attitude he 
focuses upon the sphere of art and particularly the role of the imagination in the 
apprehension of reality: 
For the attitude of modernity, the high value of the present is 
indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it 
47 
otherwise than it is, and to transform it not by destroying it but by 
grasping it in what it is ... modernity is an exercise in which extreme 
attention to what is real is confronted with the practice of liberty that 
simultaneously respects this reality and violates it. 19 
Foucault's perception of the challenge which modernity casts before humanism lies 
with the ability of the individual to ask of the present 'What are we today, now? ' 
and then to fashion a self out of the re-imaging of that present. Only via this 
process can Foucault conceive of a non-acculturated self, which is to say a self 
which is not 'given' by structural and psychological determinants beyond conscious 
control. Throughout Foucault's writings, the self becomes possible only because of 
the "privileging of imagination and autonomy in enlightened modernity" . 2o 
He, like Kant before him, can only propose a limited sphere within which the 
autonomous individual might find its beginnings, and the ambitious development of 
Kant's thesis leads Foucault out of the civic realm and, parallelling Adorno, into 
the sphere of art wherein the concept of autonomy already exists. Foucault is 
unable to move beyond this sphere and despite his retention of the ethics pertaining 
to self-mastery - later to be explored at length in his History of Sexuality 21- he 
finds no way of relating contemporary scientific discourse to an aesthetics of self- 
mastery. The seeds of imaginative potential which he discovered to reside in the 
concept of Enlightenment remain hermetically sealed within the structures of art, 
rendered politically impotent by discursive definition. When asked in an interview 
how one is to create the self, he replies: "From the idea that the self is not given to 
us, I think that there is only one practical consequence; we have to create ourselves 
as a work of art. " 22 
Thus Foucault pursues the autonomous individual beyond Adorno's "death of the 
subject", and of 'meaning', but retains the specificity of the 'space' of the self born 
of imagination, and this space is consistently traced back to the sphere of art which 
exists only by refusing a functional role within society. Kant referred to "public 
space" and did not feel the need to specify art; both Adorno and Foucault recognize 
the paradigm of autonomy as that which art alone has come to represent. 
The walls [of the theatre] protect the actor and the audience not only from the racket of the street but also from its morality. Inside the 
black box, the imagination is wild and tragic and its criminality 
unfettered. The unspeakable is spoken. Here alone is the audience 
trusted with the full burden of what it has witnessed and liberated from the ideology of redemption. 23 
Barker's "black box" is a theatre which recognizes its own impotence, but - after 
Foucault and in contrast to Brecht - it refuses the imperative to 'make people 
better' resounding instead with the clamour of Kant's enquiry to which it responds 
with the assertion that the impotence experienced by theatrical discourse might very 
48 
well provide the root metaphor for contemporary reality. If this is so, then the very 
structures of theatre become articulate in their ability to confront an audience with 
an 'imagined present', and further to press those same structures into the service of 
'imagining otherwise'. The importance of the collision between theatrical structures 
and social reality lies in the fertility of the imaginative spark to which theatre as a 
metaphor for social impotence becomes a stimulus to individual perception. And 
vitally, the imaginative spark precedes, and may even preclude, an understanding 
and analysis which would drive the spectator back into the scientific cycle of fear 
and destruction, described as the driving force of progress in the twentieth century 
by Adorno and Horkheimer. 
The Actor as Agent of Transgression 
Barker's delight in the ability of theatre to expose impotence and, through the 
medium of language, to project the possibilities for alternative modes of being 
beyond ideological sterility, fords a focus in the transformational qualities of the 
actor's art: 
Fat Actor 
He brought himself into the room 
With a rubbery step as if to show 
His corpulence did not preclude energy. 
In suffering heat he had expanded 
Verbally, was all compliments and 
Spilling his enthusiasm for the part 
Twirled spectacles in a soft, unpleasant hand. 
His teeth recoiled into a tiny hole 
Squirming at the tongue's lavishness 
And holding a cigarette aloft he 
Unwholesomely exhaled, a pitiful poise, 
This life so badly played. 
And then, taking the text, strolled, 
Turned and gave such a torrent of truth 
He became in acting muscular and iron 
Implacable in borrowed form, 
Only self in the imagined. 24 
The journey required by Barker of the actor is one that forgoes the safe haven of 
character with its attendent psychology, reason and explanation. For Barker, to 
charge an actor with the creation of a character is to trammel the artist within the 
realms of discourse and ideology. Rather, he counsels the actor to take language as 
his guide, believing that only the banishment of banality from the stage and the 
restoration of language to the actor may "rupture the imaginative blockade of the 
culture. "-25 The actor is required to wear the language of the Barkerian text as if it 
were a costume; the language therefore takes the place of the internalized, 
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psychologized character and dictates the shape the actor will inhabit upon the stage. 
Thus the heightened language of performance becomes both the focus and 
motivation of dramatic action; it is no longer a symptom of unconscious drives and 
motives which draw the spectator back to character - via empathy - as a source of 
the progression of the plot: 
... the language carries the momentum of the drama and the 
characters, through using language, can be seduced by their own 
articulation. So there is a sense in which perhaps the words speak 
the character rather than vice versa. 26 
Barker's use of the concept of the actor carries an innate challenge to each 
individual spectator: first to recognize and witness the danger of the self exposed as 
artifice, and second to dare to be seduced by the actor's articulation of an 'unlived 
life'; to dare - without the safeguards of judgement and moral indignation - to 
speculate upon the potential for a plurality of self built upon the foundation of a 
desire as yet unformed but willed into existence by the recognition of social and 
ideological impotence. 27 
In a passage which insists that theatre is possible only when the actor is freed from 
ideological constraint - "like a dog being let off a lead" 28- Barker describes the 
actor as being "not quite human" 29 and in this he distinguishes the spectators' 
response to the actor costumed in the language of the text as being qualitatively 
different from the responses we have to people in everyday reality. The actor's 
presence, the actor's life upon the stage, is both a concentrate and exposure of the 
'life' which is denied by social utilitarianism. The spectator, once in contact with 
the world of the actor, is invited to attend upon a potency which negatively defines 
the world outside the walls of the theatre and, safe within this womb-like structure, 
the imagination is called upon to enjoy - vicariously - the pleasure of witnessing 
actions which, if they were to be played out in social reality, would inevitably rain 
chaos and destruction upon their perpetrators. 
The audience is stirred at a subconscious level by the sheer volume 
of imagined life which the actors present ... The possibility that is unlocked in the relations between characters drags the idea of hidden 
life into the forefront of consciousness. It is an acutely painful, and a half-reluctant, experience, to which individuals frequently return. 3o 
Barker's description of the actor as "not entirely human" affords the profession the 
possibility of semi-divine status. This perception is shared by American scholar 
Michael Goldman whose book The Actor's Freedom 31 attempts an ontological 
study of the actor as a function of critique in Western society. Goldman suggests 
that the actor's ability to 'play' beyond the confines of social responsibility is a 
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central component of theatrical potency. What Barker describes as "not quite 
human", Goldman defines as "ontological subversion"; that is the ability of the 
actor to shift identity at will, to flout social taboos by embracing 'otherness' as a 
condition of freedom. This transgressional impulse, which Goldman and Barker 
place at the centre of theatrical endeavour, both privileges and transforms the space 
traversed by the actor; it makes of it a space within which the law, both natural and 
civic, may be transgressed - or imagined otherwise - without fear of intervention or 
retribution. Goldman likens the uncanny powers of the actor to the special 
privileges of the dead; they both remind us of a world beyond the grasp of reality, 
and thus throw into sharp relief the world of the living: 
The actor is beyond us because he is disguised; he both is and is not 
himself. The actor's body is possessed by something other, that is at 
once the particular object of his mimesis and a vaguer more 
numinous source... it corresponds to otherness itself in its threatening 
aspect, all that generality of terror man has tried, apparently from 
his earliest days, to enact so as to control. 32 
Actors who have worked on Barker's texts find themselves striving for a language 
which could adequately describe the process they have undergone. The actors 
interviewed by David Ian Rabey, whose responses form an appendix to his study of 
Barker's oeuvre, 33 are almost unanimous in their perception that Barker is the 
actor's playwright par excellence because his use of the actor demands a process 
whereby question are asked of the 'self' rather than of the character. The ambiguity 
of this statement arises from the fact that Barker's work strips the actor of his 
safety-net - character as function of the plot - and exposes the actor's art - self as 
function of language - to the spectator's gaze. Actor Maggie Steed describes her 
work on Barker's texts thus: 
You have to learn to let the words in, which you have to learn over 
and over again, because of the screaming defences you have to 
discard to let yourself follow the power of the language... Some 
people will be upset, some people will feel they've seen their lives 
onstage - that tells you that you exist, as very few other things tell 
you. 34 
Actor Ian McDiarmid, who throughout the eighties proclaimed his professional 
allegiance to Barker's theatrical vision and for whom Barker has written a number 
of stage roles and the poetic monologue Don't Exaggerate, 35 describes the work of 
the Barkerian actor as a process of struggle which when placed before an audience 
becomes a discourse of liberation: 
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His work liberates within people what they want, perhaps need 
expressed and is regarded with fear in an atmosphere of prescription. 
This can also be true of acting which aspires to put an audience in 
touch with its own pain. 36 
What Barker requires of the actor is not what he is but what language can make of 
him. The power he perceives to be inherent in poetic language is contained in its 
imperative to move beyond the functional towards the potential of the non- 
ideological self; the self which may not be contained within the bounds of a society 
based on reason and logic. In insisting upon the actor's leap from impotent 
subjecthood to potent self, Barker is pursuing the Foucauldian boundary marked by 
authorship as a bulwark against fear, and confirming what neither Foucault nor 
Adorno felt confident to state; that only in affirming social impotence may the self 
emerge as a response to the fearful condition of State sanctified subjecthood. 
Michael Goldman articulates the Foucauldian boundary in the following way: 
In taking on the spirit of another body, the actor leaps the gap 
between the fearful self and the frightful other ... the actor is a figure 
of power and danger, of pity and fear, because he is at once the 
otherness that threatens - now uncannily animate and strutting the 
stage in front of us - and the threatened self, daring in its exposure 
and ambition. We "identify" with the character he plays, with him- 
playing-the-character, because we respond to the energy with which 
he inhabits his new identity. 37 
Thus, the process undertaken by the actor assumes a newly-acquired eloquence 
when considered as the paradoxical affirmation of the impotent subject. The actor's 
journey acquires the potential for potency because of an historical collision between 
art and reality whereby theatre achieves its greatest power; the possibility of 
offering articulation to the lives of its spectators. 
Whilst the process undergone by the actor is antecedent to performance, the 
progress of the Barkerian text mirrors in action the actor's leap "between fearful 
self and frightful other". The terrifying gap, or chasm which Barker's language 
exposes for the actor as artist of the self also forms the content of the Barkerian 
play, allowing the spectator not only to witness the fruits of struggle via the actor's 
performance but also to participate - via the imagination - in the Kantian enquiry 
which underpins the thrust of Barker's language: 'What is it that we are today, 
now? ' For Foucault, the texts which return to the reader the questions which lie at 
the source of the writer's relationship to language belong in a specific category of 
literature and require a specific response; these texts he names as "transgressional". 
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The Transgressional Text 
The beauty of the [transgressional] text lies in the fact that it cannot 
be judged according to any existing rules, that no concept is 
adequate to it, no form of knowledge able to measure up to it. It 
opens up 'new space' of analysis or judgement demanding different 
categories, rules and strategies of interpretation. 38 
The text to which Michel Foucault is referring is the memoir of the murderer, 
Pierre Riviere: I Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and my 
brother. 39 The source of Foucault's fascination with this particular murderer - he 
does not suggest that murder per se is the pre-condition of creativity - is that 
Riviere attempted to re-create, or rather to invent himself, and further to 
immortalize the self he had invented, in the teeth of the official discourses of the 
French State. This was achieved by his terrifying - and insane - commitment to an 
action which proved indefinable within the framework of extant discursive 
subjecthood. In his memoir the French peasant, Pierre Riviere, recounts the murder 
of his mother, his sister and his brother, the sole motive for which - he claims - 
was to write an account of the murder after the event of their deaths and his 
imprisonment. Foucault ascribes to this textual voice a transgressional 'beauty' 
both by virtue of the willed unreason that brought it into being, and the resultant 
aberrational authorship which has indeed lent immortality to a voice which never 
should have existed. Pierre Riviere's text was authored outside the defining 
principles inscribed through the official discourses of the State; it was neither 
commissioned nor was it required but the foundation of legal discourse rests upon 
the collection and collation of all documents relating to the process of criminal 
enquiry and prosecution, thus Riviere's unassimilable text achieves immortality via 
the very system which should have ensured its effective non-existence. It is this 
miraculous paradox which, for Foucault, constitutes the seductive power of the 
text. The conditions of its production render the text conceptually impossible and 
therefore immune to normative categories of response. The memoir achieves the 
status of what Adorno defines as "true commodity"; 40 a thing in itself, for itself, 
utterly lacking in moral or economic utility. Riviere's text represents nothing 
beyond the struggle to create a visible self in place of the State defined impotence 
which he perceives to be the status of his subjecthood. 
[Transgression] must be detached from its questionable association to 
ethics if we want to understand it and to begin thinking from it and 
in the space it denotes... Transgression contains nothing negative, but 
affirms limited being - affirms the limitlessness into which it leaps as 
it opens up this zone to existence for the first time. 41 
Thus Foucault refuses to read Riviere's text from a position of moral superiority; a 
position which does no more than satisfy the urge to consolidate and affirm the 
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ideological self as a unified expression of the 'whole' and consign the author of the 
memoir to the ranks of the criminally insane. Instead, Foucault draws the reader's 
attention to the text which has replaced the State-sanctioned identity of its author, 
who literally dies in order that he may come into being. This authorless text he 
describes as a light which proves the illumination of the boundaries of ideology; 
the foundation of a discourse in its own right. The role of 'witness' is thus 
suggested to the reader, rather than the role of 'judge'. The complicity suggested 
by the witnessing of an event is, for Foucault, the precondition to the clearance of 
a space circumscribed by, and yet not subject to, the system of ethics which was 
the condition of its engendering. The complicity and engagement of a reader who is 
prepared to risk the loosening of ideological bonds is, therefore, essential to the 
text's achievement of its transgressional potential; this being the creation of a 
temporary silence contained within and yet beyond the civic imagination of official 
discourse. The silence allows the text to speak on its own terms; to express a 
forbidden aesthetic which renders to the reader a 'criminal' beauty, momentarily, 
before being submerged once again in the clamour of moral appropriation. 
Foucault's description of this moment as the illumination of a 'criminal' aesthetic 
which is found to be beautiful, is wholly dependent upon the futility of that 
moment and the impotence of its progenitor. The reader is unable to empathize 
with Riviere but in the place of empathy there emerges the possibility of awe or 
wonderment at that which has no place in our rational understanding of the world. 
The document produced by Riviere allows Foucault to define authorship as more 
than the production of a text; the memoir affirms the power of refusal in its 
demands to be judged according to an aesthetic based on an ethics of self-definition 
rather than State-based morality. When situated within the limits of normative 
discourse, Foucault's description of the text as "beautiful" raised - from fellow 
critics - responses steeped in moral indignation, which demanded to know whether 
it was not perversity itself to sanctify a text engendered by violence and murder. 
When the context of normative authorship/ownership is removed the text returns to 
the reader the possibility of a transgressive discursivity linked, but not 
subordinated, to the civic world of socializing ethics; the text becomes therefore, 
an invitation to test the transgressive possibilities of the imaginative impulse. 
Barker, writing on the source of his imaginative impulse as a playwright states: 
I wrote because I needed to. I wrote for myself. But that seemed 
unforgivable. Only more recently did I understand that in writing for 
myself I also served others, and that, in not serving myself, I could 
not serve others. The more self-limiting an author is, the less useful 
to his fellow human beings; the more he dares, the more he 
explores, the more immoral he is the better he serves. Then he or 
she becomes the enemy of collective lying. 42 
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The "collective lie" to which Barker refers is the unified ideological perception of 
the liberal humanist self which Riviere's text, as espoused by Foucault, 
transgresses. In order to affirm the non-ideological self, Barker defines himself 
against a normative discourse, situating his need - to write for himself - in 
transgressional opposition to the authorial function; to serve others. Barker's 
wielding of these two imperatives, which normative discourse would seek to wed 
through a process of compromise, reveals the splitting of the self from the subject 
and the self's resultant criminality which declares - as a means of survival - an 
enmity towards regimes that would limit his intent. Barker's criminality of the self 
may also be described as an act of Nietzschean "self-affirmation" which equates the 
imposition of limits with a "slave-ethics" which "begins by saying no to an 
'outside', an 'other', a non-self, and that no is its creative act". 43 
The Last Supper 
The Last Supper is beautiful in language and form ... whilst being 
wholly un-ideological. The play is no longer a proposition about 
politics at all, though it is certainly about freedom. Rather it is a 
journey without maps and without clear instructions to the audience, 
which is sometimes pained by the absence of hidden orders ('Detest 
this character', 'See the manipulation here', etc. ). 44 
Barker's The Last Supper, 45 written in 1988 and performed by The Wrestling 
School Company in the same year, takes as its central concern the emergence of 
the self in a society for whom 'the people' have become the civic and secular 
equivalent of the voice of God. In this play Barker centralizes for the first time the 
classical convention of the chorus. It is through their agency - as collective identity 
- that the extraordinary, but ultimately impotent, individual Lvov is able to emerge. 
Barker's use of classical convention as an element of the play's theatrical form is 
juxtaposed with the use of the biblical narrative which describes Jesus' initiation of 
the twelve disciples into the teachings of the Father/God, and the consummation of 
those teachings on the occasion of the Passover feast at which he is betrayed by 
Judas Iscariot. Also present in Barker's text are the parables as a form of 
illustration and clarification. The chorus, the gospels and the parables are all forms 
characterized by their didactic intent; Barker relieves them of this function and 
creates in its wake a 'people' whose verbal banality is limited to the repeated 
chanting of slogans, a Christ figure who founds a discourse based upon his 
wholesome contempt and mistrust of their chanted demands, and a series of 
parables which, far from providing imagistic clarification to the spectator, offer 
bold and startling images of unreason. Barker has written a gospel for the modem 
State; his Christ, Lvov, is the epitome of Foucault's transgressive author of the 
self. 
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The Last Supper opens with a prologue to the play which acknowledges the very 
real need to negotiate a 'mode of watching' for the spectator: 
The play contains no information 
Aren't you tired of journalists? 
Oh, aren't you tired of journalists? 
No one will hold your hand tonight 
Nor oil you with humour. 46 
In the opening moments of the play what could easily pass as a threat is offered by 
the playwright as a promise, inviting complicity with that which is normally 
dreaded: the loss of coherent meaning. Barker places the opening words in the 
mouth of a ravaged aristocrat, Ivory, matching the criminality of the author's 
desired compact with his audience with the decadent rhetoric of a figure who is 
historically wholly untrustworthy. The prologue affirms the renunciation of 'truth' 
as a precondition of the power of language. By removing its efficacy from 
trustworthy intention Barker attempts to remind the spectator that language - when 
refused as a functional unit of communication - proffers the bloom of excess and 
the dangerous possibility of seduction. Barker describes his attempted compact with 
the spectator as that of the criminal who would seduce: "the cruelty of the world 
made manifest and found to be- beautiful. " 47 
Thus, Barker charges his actors not with the task of clearly transferring the author's 
meaning from page to stage, but rather with the discovery of transgressional 
seduction proferred by the power of the spoken word. This charge is mirrored by 
the central preoccupation of the text which explores the seductive power of 
language, both in its ability to excite the listener's criminal imagination and in the 
opportunity it offers to its speaker for self-invention. 
The major action of the play is the preparation of a feast to which Lvov has 
summoned his twelve 'disciples'. Set in a war-ravaged but non-specific landscape, 
his followers are forced to traverse battlefields and expose themselves to the 
exigencies of war in order to be with him. The meal itself is an impossibility; only 
the catching, skinning and cooking of a dog makes the table replete. For Lvov, the 
invitation is an imperative to self-authorship, equating the crimes committed on the 
outward journey with each disciples need to make that journey. Of all the disciples 
the least noticed, the most easily forgotten, is Ella who, we discover in the course 
of the play, may have murdered her child in order to be able to travel to the 
gathering. As in the case of Riviere, however, the action of murder does not 
guarantee the visibility of the murderer. As Lvov suggests, the murder defines the 
need for self-authorship, it is not yet the act of self-authorship. He cautions the 
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disciples therefore against the urge to pity Ella and insists that only contempt for 
her non-visibility may open to her the possibility of self-invention; what Barker 
calls the "catastrophic" experience of self. 48 Huddled under a table, Ella tells the 
murder as a means of self-generation; although she is assured of a hearing within 
the theatrical context of the play's performance only the sustained power of her 
rhetoric in relating the 'beauty' of her criminal transgression assures her of the 
disciples' attention. The creation of Ella's 'text' - for which we have no proof or 
evidence - is received in silence, by which the playwright would seem to suggest 
that the consequences of self-authorship do not guarantee the confirmation of the 
spectator's response; rather they may negate the need for it. 
It is Ella who echoes the problems inherent in the making and practice of 
transgressive discourse. She returns the paradox to Lvov thus: 
It was obvious, Lvov, you would attract to you all those for whom 
the normal state of life was nauseating, the mad, the critical, the 
lawless, the impatient, and that this very following by its character, 
would discredit you with those who form the mass of our society. 
Can you explain how you intend to move from the minority to the 
majority? 49 
The barely concealed threat suggested by Ella's demand for explanation, which is 
couched within the normative framework of the imperative to mass-dissemination, 
raises question concerning the 'place' of transgression as a discourse. The 
disturbing 'beauty' of the transgressional aesthetic - which Lvov demands of each 
of the disciples in place of personality, or character - is dependent upon the 
demarcation of limits which define transgressional being. To 'access' transgression 
is therefore to negate its potency, for such an action will return "limitlessness" to 
the strictly defined contours of ideological, limited - and thus normative - 
subjecthood. The paradox described by disruptive or transgressive discourse is its 
dependence upon the lines or demarcations of normality which it crosses and re- 
crosses in order to exist. Foucault describes the normative/transgressive axis thus: 
... [the] constant verticality which confronts 
European culture with 
what it is not, establishes its range by its own derangement... a realm 
where what is in question is the limits rather than the identity of 
culture. 50 
In The Last Supper Barker attempts to capture the essence of this axis via the 
corporeal presence of the actors' bodies and their movement through structures 
which may be made visible only by the processes of theatrical creation within a 
bounded space. What he places before the spectator is the creative moment of 
individual recognition of limited being, and the attendant choice which such 
awareness incurs. In this way he replicates in the stage-life of the actor the moment 
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of 'immorality' he recognizes to be the condition of the author; the birth of the 
extraordinary individual who exists without the possibility of defining the nature of 
that existence beyond an awareness of the limits crossed in the process of the 
journey. One of Lvov's disciples, Ivory, articulates the privilege of aristocracy as 
being an awareness that limits are no more than lines to be crossed in the process 
of defining self; the line is the impossible confronted, and found to be entirely - 
and terrifyingly - possible. Ivory states: 
I ate a woman once, who came to picnic on the terrace. It's not 
impossible. She sat in a cloud of finery and all the time the ribbons 
on her hat went twitter, twitter. How perfect she was clothed, and 
how perfect unclothed. How perfect her skin, and how perfect her 
inside. Her exterior, and her interior ... 51 
Lvov's messianic qualities reside in his refusal of the "creative no" of Nietzsche's 
"slave ethic". In so doing he becomes a discursive space to which those are drawn 
for whom subjecthood denies life. Thus the space of the stage becomes a sphere 
within which critique of Enlightenment ideals becomes possible: 'freedom' is 
recognized as a thin disguise for the willing forbearance of the captive, and 
'kindness' as a mute expression of shame. Both freedom and kindness are exposed 
as effects of Nietzsche's 'no'; limits which bar the self to imaginings beyond the 
known. Paradoxically, however, the space which Lvov creates for his disciples 
concomitantly ties him incontrovertibly to those limits he would seek to transcend 
but must constantly traverse. Those limits are as necessary to the formation of his 
transgressive credo as his invitations are to the self-formative instincts of his 
followers. Barker has Lvov dream "terrible truths" therefore, echoes of Foucault's 
"regimes of truth" which take shape upon the stage in the form of a chorus 
mouthing the platitudes of compromise and consolation. This is the "majority" of 
which Ella speaks, and its power is that of a secular and civic God, emerging from 
the detritus of State sanctified religion. The Chorus is built on the certainty of 
collective truths and declares its credo triumphant by virtue of its affirmation of 
'the people' : 
Lvov 
We are the people 
And the people see your slipping self 
Give us a slogan 
We love a slogan 
We will carve your slogan on the bridge 
Why don't you give us a slogan you snob 
(A cloud of laughter) 
Are you afraid? 
We also are afraid 
We stand behind our doors with pokers (A cloud of laughter) 
You knock the weak aside 
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We can't have that! 
You ridicule the masses 
We can't have that! 
(Pause. A sound of desolation) 52 
The disembodied laughter, which hovers above the action of The Last Supper like 
a cloud, scatters its totalitarian impulse to conformity by refusing the silence of 
incomprehension which is so necessary to transgressive discourse. The laughter, 
like a bray of fear seeks to destroy or negate that which it cannot understand. 
Lvov, as the creator of a space within which the beauty of the transgressive 
aesthetic may appear, must remain umbilically linked to the people; he dreams 
their discourses in order to deny them in his waking state. He is as utterly 
dependent upon them as was Riviere upon the systems of administration which 
circumscribed and defined his limited state of being. Like Riviere, who wrote his 
memoir whilst awaiting execution, Lvov knows that the condition of his being, of 
his self-affirming knowingness, exists only upon the pre-condition of his death. 
Sadly he observes in his followers an urge towards homogeneity parading as an 
intensification of faith and sustained by their confidence in an ability to outdo Lvov 
in 'Lvovness'. Barker describes Lvov's condition thus: 
... a charisma at the end of 
its tether. Lvov has a household of 
'servants', all of whom have renounced or try to renounce their egos 
in the interests of service to another. 53 
The love which the disciples demonstrate for their Messiah stops short of taking 
responsibility for the individual urge to 'otherness', by piling up servitude in the 
form of slavish imitation. The founding gesture of discursivity - in this case Lvov's 
denial of eternal truths as the fundamental basis for human activity - is now 
threatened by the creation of a canon. Forjacks, the torturer, has written down 
every 'teaching' uttered by Lvov and is now in the process of noting and 
obliterating contradiction. Apollo, the poet, has learnt Lvov by heart and recites his 
utterances as a form of doggerel. Lvov recognizes these actions to be a desire for 
his death; the action which will enshrine 'Lvovness' and make of his teachings a 
monument to the alter-ego, a pilgrimage for the weary at heart. He resolves, 
therefore, to die at the hands of those who would 'be' him and, in a parody of the 
scriptural text, to provide the sustenance of his body to those gathered in his name. 
This final action refuses the possibility of the disciples' identification with their 
Saviour and insists instead upon complicity with the crime his body represents. 
In the moments following the communal cannibalism a silence is called for in the 
stage directions, followed by a cacophony which once again reverts to silence. 
Their moment of transgression confounds their presumed 'understanding' of Lvov's 
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words - which is revealed to be no more than a parroting of his style - and they 
face the terror of becoming authors in their own right. The weight of individual 
responsibility hangs heavy upon each of the criminals; Lvov's final invitation to 
transgressional discourse. The doubting disciple, Sloman, whose need for Lvov is 
demonstrated through the tortured juxtaposition of a slavish devotion to the master 
and a shame-ridden diatribe on democracy, offers a solution to their despair: he 
insists that they hold hands, thus subsuming individual rupture in the formation of a 
chorus of self-abrogating fear. The play closes with an expression of what Barker 
calls, "both a cry of solidarity but also of mutual enslavement". 54 Roped in their 
formation of choral oneness by a triumphant Officer in search of dissidents, and 
within earshot of celebrations announcing the war's end, the disciples conclude 
thus: 
Susannah: He had the flavour of - 
All: Don't mention it! 
Susannah: He had the texture of - 
All: Don't dare describe it! 
(Pause. The knot of Disciples drifts, first one way, and then another. The 
cloud passes overhead. ) 55 
The birth of transgressive potential is thus denied by the refusal of each of the 
disciples to initiate the painful process of extraordinary individuality in their own 
right. They, like the cloud of laughter, drift aimlessly and mutually co-operative in 
their confirmation of hopeless impotence. 
The desired effect of this final image of the play is described by Barker as the 
imposition of "anxiety" or "loss" upon the spectator 56 who is in his/her turn 
offered the choice between an assimilation of the play's meaning within the safe 
boundaries of choral appreciation (the spectator identifies with the audience as a 
whole or mass), or an individual grappling with the potential for transgression and 
ambiguity which forms the fabric of the play's theatrical structure. The purgation 
of emotions and the catharsis which accompanies it - this being the resolution of the 
classical text which allows the spectator to experience himself at once as 
identifiable with both the hero and the chorus in more or less equal parts - is what 
Barker's text attempts to refuse the spectator. Neither the actions of the stage, nor 
the emotions they have engendered, find any satisfying resolution within the 
boundaries of the theatrical event. Rather, the questions through and by which 
Barker has created lives 'other' to the norms of ideological subjecthood, and with 
which the actors have wrestled in order to find shapes within which to house them, 
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are finally returned to the spectator who, in turn, is invited to grapple with the self 
that is non-identical with the whole: 
Transgressive writing... claims to clear an ideological space: a space 
for action, experimentation, chance, freedom, mobility. It also 
breaks with the notion that writing is the product of a single and 
simple self. The self may be dispersed by transgressive writing 
because such writing provides its readers with no stable and 'realist' 
linguistic codes by which to position themselves, no author or 
characters to be identified with. 57 
The Transgressive Reader 
What Foucault's writings on transgression expose is the need for the transgressive 
reader/spectator as a vital component of the transgressive text. Thus, the possibility 
for transgressive readings of texts is dependent upon an individual effort of will to 
clear an ideological space; what one might call the willed creation of a meeting 
point between the text and the reader/spectator's perception of the text. The 
absence or refusal of this willed effort allows the reader/spectator no choice but to 
return to systems of classification which offer judgement in place of interpretation. 
Adorno describes the will-less reader or spectator as a dupe to the benign 
imperialism exercised by the State upon the soul: 
Cultivated Philistines are in the habit of requiring that a work of art 
'give' them something. They no longer take umbrage at works that 
are radical, but fall back on the shamelessly modest assertion that 
they do not understand. This eliminates even opposition, their last 
negative relationship to truth, and the offending object is smilingly 
catalogued among its kind, consumer commodities that can be 
chosen or refused without even having to take responsibility for 
doing so. S8 
This abrogation of responsibility is, for Adorno, both a symptom of the Culture 
Industry's totalitarian impulse to a rubber-stamping of culture 'for all' (which is 
pre-packaged and comes 'ready-to-use'), and the victory of the 'whole', fuelled by 
forces of production, over the generation and recognition of the 'particular'. 
Throughout Adorno's writings, the 'will' may be described as the force of the 
dialectic which refuses the 'progress' towards synthesis. Rather, the dialectic 
repeatedly splits and refracts offering a multiplicity of possibilities in place of 
resolution. The force which drives the perverse or "negative dialectic" is the 
individual responsibility to interpret; the risking of the annihilation of certainty and 
subjecthood via combative entry into the text. The force of production, with regard 
interpretation, is individual and played for the highest stakes of subjecthood and 
self, whilst the forces of production which fuel the well-oiled machinery of the 
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Culture Industry are mass-oriented and the stakes are the anonymous demographic 
grouping of a people as a 'population' or 'public'. 
To interpret is to run a risk, to risk a wager ... The act of 
interpreting 
is the surge of life. Interpretation is not an operation added onto the 
will to live; it is not an accessory operation that the subject resigns 
himself to after having acquitted himself of his immediate and 
mundane tasks; for him to be and to interpret are one and the 
same. s9 
Jean Granier, in his discussion of Nietzsche's use of the concept of interpretation, 
offers an abrupt volte face on the arguments pressed by critics in pursuit of 'access' 
and 'simplification'. He suggests that an urge to life, a hunger for growth, actually 
defines the the modem social being who requires the ambiguous or provocative text 
as sustenance, whether that text be social, political or literary. The 'text' is here 
being defined as the growth, development and condition of language; language 
being the medium through which we 'will' our 'selves' into existence. To deny or 
negate the ambiguous nature of language - to follow Granier's argument - and the 
complexity it continually returns to the speaker, reader or listener, is therefore to 
deny the "will to live" which its usage continually strives to affirm. Without the 
striving, without the constant battle for interpretation which defines the speaker as 
more than a medium or channel for information, both language and the subject 
positioned within language first cease to generate and then become functional only 
in the generation of greater productive forces. To return to Marcuse's argument, 
they become one with the machines they believe themselves to have mastery over. 
Granier's interpretation of Nietzsche thus suggests that it is an integral condition of 
modem humanity, as reflected by their medium of expression, to require 
complexity over and above the imparting of information. Denial of this need is also 
the expression of a will which requires discipline and fortitude in its progress 
through linguistic codes and forms of communication. The call for clarity and 
simplicity could, to follow Granier's proposition, be described as the assertion of a 
counter-will, an inverted desire to negate that which gives life to the excessive, 
non-ideological self. Given this possibility, for the playwright, poet or author to 
offer anything less than the full onslaught of language pressed into the service of 
the human imagination - these professions having sole responsibility to language as 
the raw material through which they create - is to be the bearer of death, not to the 
corporeal being who encounters his work but rather to the social being for whom 
language provides the sole entry into selfhood. 
The cultural anthropologist Victor Turner focuses upon man's need for symbolic 
representation as a means of expressing the cultural complexity of his condition. In 
considering the role of ritual in the development of linguistic and cultural 
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expression, he notes that the use of symbol in ritual enactment is always 'multi- 
vocal', consisting of two poles of meaning: "the ideological (socio-moral) and the 
sensory". 60 To each of these poles he attributes clusters of meaning, the former 
being concerned with the regulation of social life and the development of moral 
sensibility, and the latter being concerned with the life which is denied by the needs 
of society; the non-ideological elements of being. The enactment of ritual he 
describes as "an exchange of properties between the two poles, flooding the 
ideological with emotional (and therefore motivational) elements and thus 
transforming coercive social control into felt desire". 61 Turner emphasizes the 
danger involved in ritual exchange of properties, its social resolution being 
dependent upon a solid belief in the need for social and ideological restraint. This 
'dangerous' moment Turner has labelled as liminal, which he defines thus: 
The 'subjunctive mood' of culture, the mood of maybe, might be, 
as-if, hypothesis, fantasy, conjecture, desire, depending upon which 
of the trinity, cognition, affect and connotation (thought, feeling, or 
intention) is situally dominant ... Liminality can perhaps be described 
as fructile chaos, a fertile nothingness, a storehouse of possibilities, 
not by any means a random assemblage, but a striving after new 
forms and structure. 62 
The liminal is dependent upon the blurring of boundaries and the erasure of stable 
categories of meaning. It is a state of transition which requires of its participants 
the ability to take responsibility for changes of perception and the attendant moral 
chaos which these may incur. The participant shares the authorship of the liminal 
moment and barters, in the process, authoritative truths for a chaotic testing and 
exploration of those truths. Liminality is then, a suspension of social boundaries in 
the interest of individual apprehension and transgression. It is a temporary state 
which challenges the existing order but does not necessarily promote wholesale 
changes in that structure. Rather the liminal moment allows participants to view 
their society from a different perspective; to take responsibility for the decisions 
effected by the processes of communal decision making. Liminality restores a 
balance whereby the communal aspects of social organization are informed by an 
individual understanding of the need which underpins their emergence. 
In A Sociology of Contemporary Cultural Change, Bernice Martin suggests that 
access to liminal forms in complex industrial societies is usually limited and policed 
by institutional control. Sex, sacred worship and art all allow the potential- for 
liminal experience but only within the recognized limits of social tolerance. In the 
mainly secular societies of twentieth century Western Europe, Martin cites art as an 
important provider of individual liminal experience, she also, however, recognizes 
that the importance attached to group definitions - national, familial, professional - 
painfully raises the stakes for the individual who risks, in the liminal moment, the 
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free-fall of original interpretation without the safety-net of assured communal re- 
integration: 
Liminality is an inherently unstable and precarious condition. It 
entails embracing anomie for the sake of the expanded creative 
possibilities it can offer and for the experience of existential 
communitas - the pure brotherhood of the 'high', the drunk and the inspired. Real and painful anomie without compensating alternative 
'group' solidarity is always a risk. 63 
The level of risk incurred by the individual who embraces liminality ensures an 
efficient system of border-controls kept in place, not only by the regulators of 
social thought but also by the individual him/herself. Martin considers one of the 
most effective controls to be the concept of the 'Enlightenment' text; a concept 
which carries the assumption that every text requires a key to its understanding 
which, once acquired, will unlock the door to its mysteries and allow the full 
educational impact to flood the receiver. This relationship to the text as 'educator' 
and the reader's reliance upon a master interpreter to illumine the way to 
knowledge, ensures firstly that any boundaries transgressed have been tested for 
safety beforehand, and secondly, that with the acknowledgement of a master-key a 
community of readership is established which will act as safeguard to the lone 
explorer. The goal of the 'enlightened' reader is an understanding of the text; the 
goal of the interpretative - or transgressive - reader is the potential of the text to 
excavate meaning, to feed the excesses of the self. This latter reader, in his/her 
desire to forge a meeting place with the text, is described by Martin as "a time- 
bomb in the system". 64 
Barker's Uncle Vanya. 
In rescuing Vanya from resentment I lent him no solution, since 
there is no solution to a life. My Vanya is however, cleansed of bad 
blood, his actions liberated from the sterile calculations of the 
pleasure-principle, and his will to self creation triumphant over 
guilt. In making him anew, I seized on the single instrument 
Chekhov had, as it were, left lying idly in his own text. 65 
Written in 1992 and as yet unperformed, Howard Barker's Uncle Vanya attempts 
to rescue Vanya - the man of anomie, the bearer of liminal impulse - from the 
murderous invitation to pity which Barker perceives to characterize the Chekhovian 
text. Barker's Introduction to his version is strident in its hostility to the original 
and yet offers no authority of approach beyond the violent creative urge occasioned 
by a personal interpretation of Chekhov's play. Thus, speculation upon the cultural 
accretions amassed by the text in the process of translation and assimilation into the 
Western literary canon are absent. Research into the historical context from which 
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the work emerged is shunned. Biographical details which may have informed the 
formal structure of the play and the configuration of its characters are ignored. 
Barker makes Vanya anew by refusing the critical key to the Enlightenment 
sanctum of understanding. The 'key' he affirms is no more than the apology for 
murder; the murder not only of the angry man, or man of anomie as dramatic 
character, but also of the spectator who is invited to 'learn' - via the actions of the 
play - that the quelling of 'irrational' rage, and the acceptance of the futility of the 
human will may well be the best that we can hope for on the earthly plane. Barker 
offers a personal interpretation of Chekhov's characters as beings willed into 
submission by their Author/God; their own wills having been subordinated to the 
extent that 'peace' becomes a weary assimilation into the brotherhood of death. 
Thus the final speech given to Sonya by Chekhov becomes a renunciation of the 
will to interpret; a martyr's paean to the mysterious calm of the soul engendered by 
passivity. 
We reverence him because 
We reverence Chekhov 
Because in such a confined space the melancholy of 
Not tragedy 
The melancholy of 
Our unlived life is exquisitely redeemed 
We are forgiven 
We are forgiven 66 
The "confined space" has, for Barker, profound theatrical implications. The 
dramatic malaise occasioned by the realist convention of the 'fourth wall' which 
imprisons characters, confining dramatic expression to bourgeois taste and 
sensibility, is a theme which is revisited throughout Barker's dramatic works of the 
eighties and nineties. The room, being also the locus of the family, favours a 
humanistic discourse which is underwritten by the bourgeois pre-occupation with 
ownership and consumption, thus forcing language in the role of reconciliation and 
social compromise. What Barker rejects is the stage representation of a totality 
existing within the bounds of the familial sphere, a sphere which finds its unifying 
principle in the bourgeois desire that life should continue unchanged. 67 The wall- 
papered battlements which encase the 'unlived life' of the Chekhovian milieu also 
provide a place of incubation for "the man of ressentiment"; the Nietzschean 
archetype for whom suffering born of the weakness of the will provides a 
foundation for moral superiority: 
His soul squints; his mind loves hide-outs, secret paths, and back 
doors; everything that is hidden seems to him his own world, his 
security, his comfort; he is expert in silence, in long memory, in 
waiting, in provisional self-deprecation, and in self-humiliation.. 68 
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Thus Chekhov's theatrical structures, which Barker determines to excavate, are 
perceived as structures of confinement; fortifications behind which shelter what 
Nietzsche has called: "a shrunken, almost ludicrous species, a herd animal, 
something full of good will, sickly and mediocre ... the European of today... " 69 
Barker's stated aim is to rescue Vanya from his state of ludicrous self-immolation; 
from the Chekhovian cult of failure. The figure of Vanya as such is, of course, 
only a chimera but for Barker the savagery which has hewn this human mould 
invades not only the dramatis personae but also the spectator of the work. The play 
is therefore described as a "danse macabre"; an invitation to partake in a sickness 
unto death: 
By the power of his pity Chekhov subdues our innate sense of other 
life and innoculates us against the desire to become ourselves. 
Vanya, the greatest of his characterizations, is the apotheosis of self- 
denial. In this broken soul the audience is enabled to pity itself. It is 
necessary for our own spiritual health to know Vanya need not be 
Vanya. 70 
In this passage, extracted from Barker's short Introduction to his version of Uncle 
Vanya which he titles: "Notes on the Necessity for a Version of Chekhov's Uncle 
Vanya", the playwright uses two conflicting concepts of theatrical structure in 
order to invite interrogation of the organizing principles which form the foundation 
of the Chekhovian text. Thus, the Classical structuring of tragic form, as defined 
by Aristotle in The Poetics 71 (and susequently revised and refined by the process 
of its translation into the European languages), is challenged by the Nietzschean 
concept of the 'aesthetic' (echoing Nietzsche's own assault upon the development 
of Classical form in The Birth of Tragedy), 72 upon which is founded the concept of 
the will to interpretation. 
Both the writings of Aristotle and Nietzsche return to the reader fundamental 
questions concerning the relationship of the 'human' nature to the creative arts, and 
the means by which art may illumine and influence, the relationship man has to the 
world of his perceptions. For Aristotle, the world presented upon the stage offers 
the means by which the chaos of stimuli - occasioned by the perceiving and 
interpreting faculties of man - may be contained within frameworks of crafted 
organization. The 'divine' perspective, or 'grand' interpretation of chaotic stimuli 
and events, which the playwright is able to place before the spectator, stands as a 
blueprint for reasoned understanding of life's exigencies. It is an experiment tested 
upon the actions of man and conducted within carefully controlled conditions. The 
'beauty' of the theatrical text - as defined in The Poetics - lies in the 'perfection' of 
the theatrical form: the organizing of chaotic material in such a way as to produce 
patterns of logic and pathways of reason indiscenable to the protagonist but 
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revealed in perfect clarity for the audience. The 'successful' tragedy will therefore 
produce for the spectator an illusory - but nevertheless wholly convincing - 'whole' 
in place of a mass of particulars. This effect is achieved by the structuring of a 
linear progression of events hermetically sealed in terms of action and meaning. 
The 'meaning' of the Tragedy is visited upon the spectator via both emotion and 
intellect, thus proving the truths espoused through the actions of the stage by the 
effects of those actions creating resonances with the lived experiences of their 
audience. At the end of the theatrical event the illusory 'husk' of the stage action is 
safely discarded but the kernel of 'truth' assimilated into the subjective responses of 
the spectator, travels with the audience into the 'reality' of their lives beyond the 
theatrical parameters of the auditorium. 
The Nietzschean 'aesthetic' refuses the Aristotelian distinction between an illusory 
life of the stage and the reality which circumscribes it. Rather life, like art, is 
perceived by Nietzsche (after Schopenhauer) 73 to be a systematic pursuance of 
illusory order. Any order which might be achieved in the course of this endeavour 
must therefore be recognized to be no more than a seductive respite from the chaos 
which fundamentally affirms man's existence. 'Being' is thus a framework which 
lends temporary boundaries to that chaos, described by Jean Granier in the 
following terms: 
The phenomenon of being is a 'text' and not a painting (which 
would display its contents to naive perception or to the philosopher's 
intelligence), it is essentially ambiguous: it witholds as much as it 
shows, it is an opaque revalation, a blurred sense - in short, an 
enigma. Because of this quality of ambiguity, Nietzsche will call the 
phenomenon a mask or veil. 74 
'Being' provides the supreme paradox for Nietzsche, for the mask is not a device 
with which to disguise reality, it is reality insofar as reality may be achieved via 
the perceptive faculties. And yet it is also illusion; man's defence against the 
"wisdom of Silenus" which counsels: "What would be best for you is quite beyond 
your reach: not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best is 
to die soon. " 75 The pessimism which underpins Nietzsche's philosophy thus leads 
him to the assertion that only via the aesthetic may life find its justification in the 
mind of men, and only via art may the terror of life's chaotic indifference to the 
well-being of man be overcome. 
From Schopenhauer, Nietzsche borrows the concept of "principiuni 
individuationis" in order to inscribe, in archetypal form, his imagery of man's 
relation to the natural world. The principium is a state of consciousness which 
recognizes the horror of existence and in an ultimate act of defiance hews out a 
shape or boundary from within which the sense-making faculties may begin to 
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operate successfully. Thus the individual is born by the creation of limits to 
consciousness which deny knowledge of that which lies outside, outside being 
defined as 'the abyss', or terrifying 'other'. Nietzsche, in The Birth of Tragedy, 
borrows from Schopenhauer the following metaphor as an apt description of man's 
illusory perception of the world: 
Even as on an immense, raging sea, assailed by huge wave crests, a 
man sits in a little rowboat trusting his frail craft, so, amidst the 
furious torments of this world, the individual sits tranquilly, 
supported by the principium individuationis and relying on it. 76 
Julian Young comments upon this passage, suggesting that its allure for Nietzsche 
lies in "the metaphysical certainty that history is a cycle of creation and 
destruction. It is guaranteed that whatever happiness and security an individual 
achieves will, in the end, be smashed. " 77 The Nietzschean pessimism of the 
creative/destructive circle thus confronts the illusory 'progess' of the Aristotelian 
linear structure and denounces as self-delusion the concept that models or 
frameworks of provisional meaning can produce a healthy society or a creative 
context within which man may realize his potential. The dialectic which Barker 
places in his Introduction is therefore one which interrogates the comer-stone of 
thought to which theatre - as an art form - must constantly address itself, namely 
'What is Being? ' The structure of the play reflects this dialectic in that the source 
of Barker's Uncle Vanya is a 'text': man represented as character (mask, veil), the 
actions of man entrapped within the framework of language and form, and the 
world represented as a totality which is bounded and given its limits by the moulder 
or maker of illusion - Chekhov himself. 
Barker inserts his interpretative wedge into the smoothly crafted surfaces of 
Chekhov's play by allowing the characters to speak the name of their original 
creator. The effect is startling and serves to shatter their potential to inspire 
empathic response. Empathy is defined here as the charging of emotional impulses 
founded on the spectator's 'recognition' of him/herself within the play, thus 
achieving a state of 'forgetfulness' whereby the spectator's imagination makes 
'real' that which would be unbearable were it to occur in reality. Barker's 
Chekhovian characters, aspiring to be no more 'real' than 'text' and therefore - in 
Nietzschean terms, reality itself - require interpretation rather than empathy in 
order to exist. The 'recognition' factor involved in empathic response requires the 
remembering and reassertion of what is already known. Interpretation however 
requires a propulsion of the mind's faculties driven by a realization - often 
shocking or startling - that one does not 'know' or 'recognize' that which is being 
presented. The willed immersion of both actor and spectator in the fiction of the 
stage event is replaced in Barker's text by exposure of the fiction's construction: 
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Maryia: Forgive me for saying so, Jean, but you have changed so 
much in the last year I positively don't recognize you - 
Vanya: I have a gun 
Maryia: You were a man of positive convictions, an inspiring 
personality and now - 
Vanya: This gun 
Astrov: Oh, shut up about your silly gun - 
Vanya: Was given me by Chekhov. (Pause) And having given it to 
me, he was profoundly sorry... (He sobs) 78 
The spectators of Barker's Uncle Vanya are invited to partake - via their 
interpretative faculty - in the process of Vanya becoming other than Chekhov made 
him. This process begins with Vanya's discovery of the gun, this being analogous 
to Bernice Martin's "time-bomb in the system"; it is what Barker "seizes on" where 
Chekhov left it "lying idly in his own text". Vanya's retrieval, and subsequent use 
of the gun is significant because, in the Chekhovian original, it is the 'particular' 
which refuses to return to the 'whole'. Chekhov's gun is a stage-property 
belonging to the conventions of melodrama and thus robbed of its articulation in 
the delicate weblike Chekhovian structure. It is interesting to note that Vanya's 
entrance wielding a gun, in the original, is a moment of tragi-comedy; a moment 
beyond which the dignity of Vanya's rage cannot survive. Barker returns the gun to 
Vanya but lends him, in addition, the power of interpretation with regard the 
object. The powerful conjunction of object and interpretation transforms the gun 
into Turner's "multi-vocal" ritual object which has the power to facilitate the 
liminal flooding and exchange of meanings which drives Chekhov's characters one 
by one over and through the boundaries of delimitation set firmly in place by their 
original creator. 
The gun passes like a charge of energy between the characters making possible that 
which the linear Chekhovian structure denied. The audience is invited to witness 
the collapse of linear logic and with it the chaotic emergence of 'potential' as 
extraordinary texts overflow the boundaries of naturalistic character. Vanya shoots 
Serebryakov, Astrov fucks Helena, Sonya strangles Astrov because he will not 
comply with her need for a child. These actions - however extreme - do not 
achieve resolution; the dead refuse to die and return to mouth platitudes with a 
swelling choral conviction. Rather, the extremity of the stage action serves to 
expose hidden possibilities and shatter the naturalistic conventions of the 
Chekhovian text. The emergence of the liminal produces a multiplicity of structures 
in place of the schematic wholeness of the 'authored' text. Thus the walls of the 
family home become identical with the normally invisible structure of theatrical 
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form; their illusory solidity crumbles - literally - as the power of the liminal state is 
realized successively by the characters exposing the fragility of the foundations 
upon which their 'hopelessness' is built. 
By removing empathy as a possible response Barker attempts to display the power 
of consensual imagination in colluding to build self-limiting fortifications. The 
harnessing of individual interpretation as a force by which to topple those same 
structures carries in its wake the terror of an unleashed, chaotic energy, but at the 
same time provides material for textual re-invention and self-fashioning; a concept 
which returns to the individual the responsibility formerly attributed - in an act of 
self-denial - to an author or creator. 
As the Chekhovian text splits at the seams, Chekhov himself is drawn into the 
world of his imaginings; an image which recalls the Foucauldian notion that the 
author as a discourse acts as an adhesive to the cracks and absences of the literary 
text. His entrance is preceded by the surging of (Nietzschean) waves onto the 
stage: 
(A sudden sound of further collapse, both masonry and splintering wood. 
Telyeghin ducks. This shock is followed by a surge of sound as waves break 
and flow with the appearance of the sea. Telyeghin points, in dumb 
astonishment, to the spectacle. ) 
Maryia: Oh, look, a view! 
Sonya: The sea! 
Vanya: The sea! The sea! (They gawp, rejoice. ) Chekhov won't 
come now... 
Marina: (entering) The tea urn's gone! Look, the tea urn's in the sea! 
(They laugh. Marina picks up random small objects and pelts the urn. 
Sonya joins her. ) 79 
Their certainty that the sea will be their salvation from Chekhov is founded upon 
their newly-found freedom from his controlling reins. Their confidence is born of 
their exuberance at being able to confront catastrophe and make themselves anew in 
the wake of its devastating effects. The liminal state is a temporary one however, 
and the counteracting force of social boundary-making, Nietzsche's principium 
individuationis, is not underestimated by Barker who makes the sea the herald of 
the "frail bark" which both protects and enslaves Chekhov in his limited being.. 
Maryia is the first to sight the boat and, seeing that its passenger is in danger of 
drowning, rushes to urge the others to retrieve him from the murderous waves: 
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Sonya: The sea is so - 
Maryia: Even the swimmers drown ... (Vanya looks at her. ) 
Vanya: We must guard our lives. Having made our lives, we must be 
on guard for them. We must stand guard over 
our creations. 
Maryia: Yes... 
Vanya: Let him drown, therefore. 
Mother. 
Can you do that? 
Watch? 
Just watch? (Pause) 
Maryia: My instinct - my whole instinct is to - 
Vanya: No, that is not your instinct. (Pause) 
Maryia: Isn't it? 
Vanya: No. You no longer know the difference between you instinct 
and your culture. It is your culture that impels you to rescue 
someone who might perhaps, who knows, be your worst 
enemy. 80 
It is Maryia's 'culture' however which wins out; for it is culture which harnesses 
her directionless desire and gives it purpose. In this instance she seizes upon the 
opportunity to channel her excessive energies into a possible martyrdom in order to 
save an unknown man's life. The lure of utility proves stronger for Maryia than 
Vanya's invitation to interpret the event. Her 'culture' insists that the emotional 
response must be the 'truth' of the event. Vanya - remade by Barker as an open 
text - stands in the action of the play as an 'invitation to speculation'; through him 
the spectator too is invited to loose the bonds of culture and stand before events as 
witness rather than social subject. As Maryia rushes joyfully to her cultural 
summons, Vanya suddenly realizes the identity of the drowning man and searches 
frantically for the gun which has fallen into the hands of Telyeghin, Chekhov's 
faithful servant and self-appointed policeman of the naturalistic soul. The first act 
of the play ends with Maryia's triumphant cry of "He's alive! "; a frantic and near 
hysterical affirmation of life - any life - no matter the nature of the carrier. 
Chekhov is indeed alive but Barker makes his life a blighted one. The Chekhov 
who parades before his cowering creations knows he is a dying man. In contrast to 
Maryia's celebration of life, he carries the physician's awareness of life as co- 
existence with the blight of disease. Chekhov becomes therefore the carrier of 
death which is reborn in each of his creations and transmitted to all with whom 
they come into contact. This process of diseased creation is self-conscious, fed by 
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the desire to create a community of sufferers, to "pour [himself] like liquid from a 
jug into the void of another" 81: 
(Chekhov goes to Maryia, and unbuttons her dress at the breast. He 
exposes her breasts. Others watch... ) 
Chekhov: Her breasts.. . are not without their power.. . like birds in an 
abandoned nest ... they shan't be - and that's the beauty of it - 
shan't ever be touched... and if they were ... how swiftly they 
would rise and fill like - they shan't however, shan't be, 
shan't be... ! (Maryia nods, weeping. ) 82 
The power exerted by Chekhov over his characters resides in his insistence that 
they share his impotence; that they even find beauty and comfort in their impotent 
states. The burden of pain which each of these characters has to bear is finely 
measured out by Chekhov to produce no more than a dull ache, the sharpness of 
the occasional spasm being tempered with resignation. Barker makes of Chekhov a 
murderer because he refuses the charge of art to assert the potency of the 
imagination in fording potential beyond the impotence of subjecthood. Only in 
Vanya does Barker perceive the possibility of a pain that may burst the boundaries 
of pity and kindness which perpetuate and nurture self-destructive power. For 
Barker the martyr is not a worthy subject for the drama. It is amor fati which 
transfigures the suffering of the martyr and makes of their resignation a mask of 
beauty. In refusing the martyr Barker refuses pain as an end in itself in drama; 
rather he embraces pain as the birth of the created self; the stimulus which drives 
the individual towards an irrational raging at the conditions of his existence. Thus 
Barker describes his creations as being born out of "the search for a reason not to 
commit suicide". 83 
Barker describes the creation of character as 'text' as "the refusal of the individual 
to leave the personality unexcavated, the eruption of will into areas of social 
piety"; 84 in so doing he makes active a relationship with anguish which he believes 
to have been muted and deadened by centuries of State-bound Christian culture. 
Barker's Vanya becomes a redeemer of pain via his irrational ragings against 'the 
way things are'. He also accompanies Chekhov to the moment of his death, forced 
into the role of confessor by his fading creator. Chekhov confides: 
One day I hoped I would reach out and tell myself, pour myself like 
a liquid from a jug into the void of another, all, entire, to the last 
drop, how I struggled with this dream to pour myself into another 
man! A woman! To be drained...! (Pause. There are sounds on the beach of voices. ) And in abandoning that dream, I found something like freedom. In discarding all that was arguably, the best in me, I found a peace of sorts. 85 
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As the author dies the sea recedes leaving his wracked creations drifting amongst 
the wreckage of the Naturalistic stage. As the tide ebbs so too does the liminal 
state; the gun becomes a gun once more and the trappings of the familial home are 
returned to their habitual positions. Barker offers no false hope, nor does he 
fashion ready-made pathways to freedom. Rather the 'texts' or aspects of being 
which populate the stage, must now be responsible for the continuance or otherwise 
of the drama. Like Lvov's disciples they must undergo the severest test of their 
unleashed potential by becoming one with the criminal passion which engendered 
their new-found selves; they must feed on the transgressional substance of the 
crime in order to generate. 
In the closing moments of the play Vanya alone displays the Nietzschean will to 
overcome a weary passivity which has spread once again across the stage. The 
Chekhovian/Aristotelian text survives liminal onslaught but the absences - once 
veiled by the authorial name - are now voids; the walls are now in ruins. The death 
of Chekhov proves the death of so much that was treasured by his creations that 
they now attempt, through the effort of willed memory, to make themselves 
monuments to his craft: the winding of wool, the making of tea, the ticking of the 
clock - these actions achieve once more their uni-vocal status as symbols of a life 
muted by compliant despair. A doorway stands open upon the stage, however, 
beckoning the inhabitants of the room towards the possibility of an 'other' life 
which has been glimpsed and shunned. Where once Chekhov stood guard there is 
now an exit for those whose wills are equal to its challenge. 
The Chekhovian wrecks - these remnants of character - may be likened to what 
Gilles Deleuze, after Nietzsche has described as "deterritorialized" passengers on a 
raft: 
[They] row together, they are not supposed to like one another, they 
fight with one another, they eat one another. To row together is to 
share, to share something beyond the law, contract or institution. It 
is a period of drifting. 86 
Like Lvov's disciples the Chekhovian remnants drift, unable to retrace their steps 
back to the solid structures of their original world - for they have known the 
potency of the interpretative text - but with no promise, or hope, to guide them 
through the open door. Only Vanya finds the strength to leave, quietly walking into 
the darkness beyond the door because there is nowhere else to go and no life to be 
gained by remaining. Vanya's quitting of the "Chekhovian madhouse" achieves 
what Lvov's disciples could not; textual discourse is let loose from its contextual 
moorings thus placing before the spectator the final imperative to interpretation. 
The new Vanya, having confounded the Chekhovian codes, conventions and 
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systems of thought, passes the threshold beyond which the spectator, like the 
characters left upon the stage, cannot follow, except with the aid of the 
transgressive imagination. As time passes both Maryia and Sonya assert "He'll be 
back"; time passes and he does not return. The lights fade. 
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Chapter Three 
Art and the Revolutionary Individual 
The State is a mass of fictions held together by superior power. I 
believe this has been the case as long as the State existed. The 
problem is to judge which fictions are necessary ones. ' 
When Wole Soyinka returned to his native Nigeria on January 1st 1960,2 he was 
neither returning to the Africa of his ancestors, nor to the colonized State which he 
had left five years previously. Rather, he returned as a stranger to the newly 
liberated Nation-State of Nigeria; a curious historical mutation which had 
maintained the shape and administrative structures characterizing colonial rule, but 
with the addition of an ideological impulse to national self-determination which 
gave the stamp of ownership to structures which nevertheless remained, as Chinua 
Achebe was five years later to remind his fellow Nigerians, "the arbitrary creation 
of the British. " 3 
The first chapter of Wole Soyinka's fictional autobiography Ibadan: The 
Penkelemes Years recounts the author's return to a Nigeria anticipating 
Independence. Details concerning the years spent as a student in Leeds and his 
subsequent employment with the Royal Court Theatre in London are woven 
effortlessly into the easy flow of a conversation between old friends following the 
progression of a car journey between Lagos airport and Ibadan. The lightness of 
tone effected by the narrative is, however, occasionally punctured in order to allow 
the eruption of an altogether different timbre: 
Did you have to sneak home like a thief in the night? 4 
This interrogative is posed by Soyinka's authorial self to the fictional self which 
replaces him within the parameters of the text. The Soyinkian self which makes its 
appearance in language is not therefore identical with the Soyinka that writes, and 
the fictional product - as if to emphasize its status as fiction - carries a bewildering 
multiplicity of familial and familiar names, thus suggesting to the reader that no 
one Soyinka may bear the narrative of the political and cultural turmoil which 
characterized the first decade of Nigerian Independence. The authorial question 
does not intrude directly into the narrative but it inserts itself into the interstices of 
the text, in-between paragraphs and accentuated absences which occasionally sear 
the conversational tone. At such moments the reader is left stranded in the void 
which gapes between the question and the flow of the self-assured badinage which 
insistently fails to answer it. The refusal of the narrative to supply answers and the 
re-iteration of the unanswered question leaves an opening in the text which, 
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Soginka would seem to imply, may represent a space which he, as a stranger to 
national self-determination in Nigeria, was able to occupy on his return to Britain. 
This is the space of individual enquiry, posited in response to nationalist 
development, which erupts into his autobiography as a gap, forced in the narrative 
of subjective experience, serving to replace the certainty of the self positioned 
within language with a sense of unresolved history, and the echo of narratives 
which might otherwise be subdued in the interests of linear development. 
Soyinka's choice to create a fictional version of himself through which his 
"Penkelemes Years" will be explored, provides his readership with a paradox. 
Whilst autobiography would normally offer a self-reflexive journey through the 
certainties of linear temporal/spatial categories, offering the digressions of self- 
discovery only as an addendum to the form, Soyinka offers an alternative formal 
device whereby the effect of history upon the author is recounted as the wholly 
partisan fictionalising of the self; a process which asserts that only the fictionalizing 
or doubling of the self as a subject of discourse allows for the exposure of absence, 
or schism, which is the space of self-production or regeneration. Thus, Soyinka the 
author writes the non-identical Maren (this being his most frequent form of 
address) as a means of making visible both the fiction and the discourses which 
bound and confirm the shapes that fiction assumes. Foucault reminds us that it is 
the function of discourse to produce objects of knowledge as a form of proof or 
evidence to support its claims to authority. 5 Soyinka would seem to share this 
perspective on the historical production of subjecthood. By exposing the discourses 
through which the self becomes visible and exposing the frames of those discourses 
as a boundary beyond which the questions proliferate the possibilities of selfhood, 
Soyinka indicates to his readership the possibility of a self which lies outside the 
realm of discourse, a self which cannot be named - but is nevertheless present - and 
must therefore hover between the author and his fictional creation. 
The reader needs no method of analysis to discern this narrative disjuncture, its 
appearance is very much the intention of the writer and as the chapters unfold 
Soyinka uses the ill-fitting suit of Nigerian nationhood to allow himself an 
objectivity more suited to the exile than the citizen, whilst maintaining the citizen's 
intimate and subjective knowledge of the developing society which he, as author, 
seeks to objectify. Literary critic, Homi K. Bhabha, in an essay which debates the 
location of individual identity within national discourse, offers the example of the 
"ethnographer" as a social role which exposes for the subject/citizen of the Nation- 
State the possibility of a creative potential within the ideological framework of 
which he is a part: 
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The ethnographic demands that the observer himself is a part of his 
observation and this requires that the field of knowledge - the total 
social fact - must be appropriated from the outside like a thing, but 
like a thing which comprises within itself the subjective 
understanding of the indigenous. 6 
The 'inside' and 'outside' of Bhabha's "ethnographer" are non-identical; the 
collision of the two modes of being is an act of violence enacted upon the object in 
the process of attempting a cultural articulation of the subject. The discourse 
represented by the ethnographer 'knows' and imposes the framework by which the 
object may become visible - as a product of discourse - and yet is also aware, by 
virtue of being subject to the discourse, of the supplementary, or excess which 
resists naming and is therefore 'forgotten' in the pursuit of progressive discursive 
development. 
Soyinka's use of the concept of fractured identity, or rather, the fracturing of 
identity as a response to nationalist discourse, is reiterated in a comment offered 
during the course of an interview for Spear magazine in 1966: 
... every nation tries to believe something about 
itself which is never 
true. The image is always different from the reality.? 
In likening the discursive creation of the nation to the fictionalizing of reality, 
Soyinka once again exposes both the discourse which confers visibility and, by 
negative definition, that which is supplementary to the progression of the discourse 
and therefore unnameable. This time it is the Kantian imperative, 'What are we 
today, now? ', that hdvers between the duelling identities which Soyinka attempts to 
demonstrate, and any response to that question must now be located within the gap 
of indeterminacy which Soyinka's exposure of the national proclivity to fictional 
realities reveals. This positioning of the Enlightenment question par excellence 
between what we would like to believe ourselves to be and the knowledge that we 
are 'other' to that version of ourselves, offers - rather in the same vein as Bhabha's 
"ethnographer" - the creative possibility inherent in the imposition of national 
discourse. This possibility is, however, dependent upon a recognition of the 
constructed nature of nationalist 'reality'; a reality which historians continually feel 
the need to remind their readers is no way 'natural': 
Nationalism is not what it seems, and above all not it is what it 
seems to itself. -The cultural shreds and patches used by nationalism 
are often arbitrary historical inventions. Any old shred would have 
served as well. But in no way does it follow that the principle of 
nationalism... is itself in the least contingent and accidental. 8 
What Ernest Gellner would seem to suggest is that the extraordinary power of 
nationalism as a discourse lies not in its content, which repeatedly reveals itself - 
80 
once placed within the context of its source of visibility - to be arbitrary, but rather 
in the form it assumes as a structural framework of perception through which its 
subjects are invited to view a constructed representation of the world which - owing 
to the fixed perspective offered by the frame - achieves the illusory capacity to 
appear as a total, all-encompassing, and above all, natural perspective on reality. If 
this is so, then it follows that an integral part of the development of nationalist 
movements must be the disguising of the frame which holds the illusion in place, 
or the invisibility of the discourse which maintains the illusion. For to reveal the 
totalizing reality offered by nationalism to be nothing more than a trick of 
perspective would be to loosen the subjective hold it undoubtedly has upon the 
civic imagination. 
Ernest Renan, one of the major architects of nationalist discourse in Europe, 
defined, in an address entitled "What is a Nation? " 9 which was offered at the 
Sorbonne in 1882, the twin principles upon which the formation of the nation is 
dependent: 
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth 
are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the 
past, one in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich 
legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to 
live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one 
has received in an undivided form. '° 
Renan's address focusses not upon the nation as a political structure, but rather 
upon the "soul" of the nation as a "spiritual principle". Thus, the nation replicates 
on a grand scale, all that is best in man; it is offered as an opportunity to dramatize 
the nobility of the European races upon a world stage which will henceforth define 
as 'other' all that does not reflect the moral supremacy of the major Nation-State 
protagonists. Renan saw in nationalism the opportunity to rewrite history from the 
perspective of those who held the balance of power. Although one might argue that 
the origins of history as a discourse lie in this very goal, the radical aspect of 
Renan's address lay in his inclusion of 'the people' as prime movers in the 
development of the will to nationhood. Thus, 'the people' were to be invited to 
partake for the first time in the realm of power, described by Renan as the constant 
reiteration of "a daily plebiscite". " That is to say, that the people were to play a 
major role in the fictionalizing of their history and the reformations of identity 
which this would necessarily involve. In return they would share the reflected glory 
of their nation and be intimately identified with that which defined the supremacy 
of their race. Renan articulates as central to the formation of this "clearly expressed 
desire to continue a common life"12 the need, on a national scale, to 'forget' 
historical events which may "constitute a danger for [the principle of] 
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nationality. "13 The defining characteristics of the race therefore, must include the 
affirmation of a common need to purge itself of those aspects of historical 
circumstance that might make questionable its claim to power as a 'natural' 
attribute of the pure in soul. Thus, the people become the willing accomplices to 
processes which allow them common identification with a nobility and stature 
which had hitherto passed through the bloodlines of the ruling families. The final 
measure of the success of nationalist discourse would be, inevitably, the ability of " 
its progenitors to 'forget' the constructed nature of the perspective offered, thus 
treating as 'natural' a wholly fictionalized and perspectivized worldview. 
Karl W. Deutsch, writing on the processes of social communication in the early 
1960s offers the following definition of nationalism as an antidote to Renan's 
national "soul": 
In the age of nationalism, a nationality is a people pressing to 
acquire a measure of effective control over the behaviour of its 
members. It is a people striving to equip itself with power, with 
some machinery of compulsion strong enough to make the 
enforcement of its commands sufficiently probable to aid in the 
spread of habits of voluntary compliance with them. '4 
The "effective control" achieved by the architects of nationalist discourse is 
undeniable, and its ideological power, which constitutes a morality based on the 
rags and patches of selected historical glories, continues to seduce emergent 
'peoples' using exactly the same strategies of identification as those outlined just 
over a century ago by Renan. The cultural drive of nationalism is, however, only a 
symptom of the force which underpins its appearance in world politics, this being 
the transition of established dynastic States to competitive industrial powers. The 
establishment of industrial trade in an expanding world market necessitated the 
creation of a workforce who could be depended upon to serve the interests of the 
nation's economy before their own; thus, the nation - as an abstract concept - and 
the invisible force of the economy had to be placed within a structure which would 
prove accessible to the imaginative impulses of those whose lives it would 
determine. Anthony D. Smith has described the subsequent development of 
nationalist discourse as the creation of a 'faith': 
Nationalism as a 'civic religion', in the sense that Rousseau 
recommended, is really a secular rival and replacement for 
traditional world religions, even though in practice it may enter into 
alliances with them or utilise some of their motifs for its own ends. It is an urban secular vision and movement parading and feeding off 
some of the Tatter's symbols and emotions. 15 
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The adoption of national discourse by the African States could be viewed almost as 
an inevitability given the historical circumstances of the continent by the 1950s. 
The colonization of Africa had been effected by the creation of States where before 
there had been a tribal territorialization of the land-mass. The nationalist wars of 
the 1950s, whether fought physically or ideologically, strove to assert ownership 
not only of the land which had been seized by foreign powers but also of the 
concept of state-nationhood which had given economic stability - within the context 
of an expanding world market - to the disparate tribal structures of the African 
continent. The wars of Independence were not therefore wars which asserted the 
right of the tribes to retrieve their land and their political structures, but rather the 
right of a newly formed 'people' to reap and administer the benefits and 
opportunities for trade made possible by the industrial organization and production 
of raw materials. The demand for a withdrawal of an occupying force was, of 
course, a 'natural' one, but the discursive demand for a return to the purity of the 
African race - which in many cases fuelled the unity of purpose with which the 
wars of the 1950s were fought - was complicated by the fact that what was actually 
being fought over was a structure of political intent - of European origin - which 
would irretrievably condition the lives of those who were to live within its bounds. 
Clifford Geertz in The Interpretation of Cultures 16 states unequivocally that the 
imposition of nationhood-upon a people - often effected in the name of purity - 
actually forces them into a process of change which leads ever further away from a 
'traditional' perception of reality: 
The granular images into which individuals' view of who they are 
and who they aren't, so intensely bound in traditional society, [are] 
challenged by the more general, vaguer but no less charged 
conceptions of collective identity based on a diffuse sense of 
common destiny, that tends to characterize industrialized states. The 
men who raised this challenge, the nationalist intellectuals, were thus 
launching a revolution as much cultural as it was political. They 
were attempting to transform the symbolic framework through which 
the people experienced social reality and thus, to the extent that life 
is what we make of it all, that reality itself. '7 
In the same essay, Geertz isolates Nigeria as an example of the complicated 
processes through which national discourse must work if it is to achieve the status 
of a reality for those living under its aegis. Geertz observes that whilst other 
African States, simultaneously involved in the struggle against an occupying force, 
"saw a progressive unification of diverse elements into an intensely solidaryopposition", 
18 Nigeria was virtually unique in its schismatic power-broking. The 
artificial boundaries which defined the modem State of Nigeria soon became 
secondary as the more ancient boundaries between the Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani and 
the Igbo re-emerged. These older boundaries highlighted the scramble for a share 
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of the power and their hasty internal ratification displayed an urgent need to 
dissipate hostilities in the crucial years preceding British withdrawal. Nationalism, 
in its early stages in Nigeria, did not therefore succeed in uniting the disparate 
tribal peoples of the State. Rather, the excessive energy and fervour, induced by 
the call to self-determination, fuelled the fierce growth of localized nation-building, 
each faction fighting for the lion-share of a power which would eventually fall to a 
Nigerian State unified by nothing more than territorial boundaries. 
The mis-firing of the nationalist charge in Nigeria meant that the framework within 
which the unified perspective of communal intent becomes possible was exposed as 
a structure of political expediency. In National Self-Determination in Post- 
Colonial Africa, 19 Benjamin Neuberger argues that the call for self-determination 
in colonial Africa posed no problems so long as nationalism could be defined by 
the short-term aim of ousting the colonial power. Thus, the 'natural' aspects of the 
movement had to be emphasized and the immediacy of the struggle for liberation, 
with little or no priority being given to the political structures which would replace 
colonial rule. Neuberger's suggestion is that for self-determination to succeed as a 
concept which would unify disparate peoples it had to be seen as an eruption of an 
instinct, rather than an episode in the consolidation of political structures which 
would inform the future of the African States. 20 The failure of this ideological loop 
exposes nationalism as a political mechanism which is wholly un-natural in its 
progress towards unity and social cohesion, what Bhabha describes as the founding 
of "the progressive metaphor of modern social cohesion - the many as one". 21 
When Wole Soyinka returned to Nigeria in 1960, therefore, he was returning to a 
State which was in the process of redoubling its attempts to 'naturalize' the fiction 
of nationhood in the teeth of a reality riven with disjuncture and disparity. In the 
latter half of Nigeria's first decade of Independence, in an essay entitled "The 
Writer in a Modem African State", 22 Soyinka provided the readership of 
Transition magazine with a precise analysis of the effects of nationalist discourse 
upon the divided peoples of the Nigerian State, taking as his metaphor the 
ideological construction of the nationalist writer whose state-defined morality 
replaces the ethics of the non-ideological 'artist': 
In the modern African state especially, the position of the writer has 
been such that he is in fact the very prop of state-machinery. 
Independence in every instance has meant an emergency pooling of 
every mental resource. The writer must, for the moment at least (he 
persuades himself) postpone that unique reflection on experience and 
events which is what makes a writer - and constitute himself into a 
part of that machinery that will actually shape events. 23 
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Soyinka continues by charting, with precision, the three phases which constitute at 
once the consolidation of the Nation-State and the - concomitant - decline of the 
artist's autonomy in relation to that state. The first phase is described by Soyinka as 
the sacrifice of the artist's 'visionary' role in the name of cultural unification and 
stability. (Here are echoes of Neuberger's warning that only the de-historicized, 
instinctual, call to anti-colonial arms will serve the true aims of nationalism. ) The 
individual artistic 're-creative consciousness' is subsumed under the burden of 
responsibility placed upon the artist to engender and create a unified people. Thus 
the temptation to play a part in the shaping of epochal events is held out as lure to 
the artist, who is invited to perceive art as integral to social determination; as an 
educational force through which the people may be enlightened. The title of 
cultural definer is offered, in return for self denial, couched in the comforting, if 
ultimately compromising, framework of social altruism. 
The second phase celebrates the freedom of the newly-emerged state from the 
tyranny of an oppressive colonial regime, and requires of the writer a commitment 
to the maintenance of stability and the sacrifice of any counter-ideological stances 
which might endanger the still fragile unity. The 'monolithic stresses' which 
accompany political transition thus necessitate the writer's continued adherence to a 
clearly defined cultural policy in the name of social coherence. Soyinka cites this 
second phase as the dawning of the writer's realization that, far from serving his 
society, he is in fact being called upon to create rigid ideological tram-lines from 
which the only escape is total derailment. At this stage in his analysis, Soyinka 
separates the role of the artist, described as "The record of the mores and 
experience of his society and as the voice of vision in his own time" 24 from that of 
the writer whose assimilation into the cultural project of nation-building has by 
now compromised his work with little or no hope of negotiation or future 
objectivity. In this second phase, Soyinka ruefully and bitterly echoes Renan as he 
likens 'the future of the state' to a web which binds the writer to a hastily convened 
body, or fictionalized 'people' who will henceforth constitute his readership or 
audience and whose continued adherence to the national fiction will become his 
aim. 
The third phase outlined is the bleakest and one which would appear to be 
irreversible; he describes this phase as disillusionment. The lack of vision 
demonstrated by the majority of Nigerian writers has, writes Soyinka, left them no 
means by which to define themselves except within the framework of state- 
regulating mechanisms which now alone provide them, and their readership, with 
their raison d'etre. Their future is thus described by Soyinka as being entrenched 
within a dichotomy of assimilation and denial, with no means of positioning their 
work outside the aspirations of national culture, and the politics of state progress. 
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The choice he perceives to confront the writer at this stage in national development 
is significantly one which denies 'choice' as a concept encompassing freedom, 
rather choice is placed within the context of capitulation and defeat: 
When the writer in his own society can no longer function as 
conscience, he must recognize that his choice lies between denying 
himself totally or withdrawing to the position of chronicler and post- 
mortem surgeon. But there can be no further distractions with 
universal concerns whose balm is spread on abstract wounds, not on 
the gaping yaws of black humanity-25 
Thus, the choice of the writer is to have no choice at all with regard his 
relationship to his society, or rather his choice is one which is predetermined as 
soon as his aims become conjoined with the political structures which define his 
society. The process outlined by Soyinka may be described as the progress of the 
individual towards full citizenship; the citizen being defined in this instance as a 
partner in marriage to the political structures inherent in nationalist discourse. The 
marriage contract demands a monogamous relationship with the state conditional 
upon which is an enjoyment of the fruits and comforts of a national culture which 
offers choice, diversity and a stake in the power-base, in return for a self-willed 
fidelity to the status quo. The offspring of this union is a new form of identity 
which links each to each in a parody of social equality. The ambiguous ideals of 
the Enlightenment - truth, freedom and justice - which had at least held out the 
promise of ethical interpretations are replaced with the moral solidity of a system 
of state regulated 'rights', the acquisition of which defines one's status as a fully 
qualified member of society. 
Homi Bhabha, in considering how one may unpick the binding narratives which 
describe the union of the citizen with the state, suggests: 
We may begin by questioning that progressive metaphor of modem 
social cohesion - the many as the one - shared by organic theories of 
the holism of culture and community, and by theorists who treat 
gender, class, or race as radically 'expressive' social totalities. 26 
Soyinka's refusal of the "progressive metaphor" and all that inclusion within its 
bounds would entail, allows him to stand outside his exposition of national 
monogamy, placing a distance between the writer and himself. The position he 
occupies is designated as that of the artist and by terms of his own definition this 
makes him an exile and stranger to the national fiction which binds its citizens. The 
fictional 'Maren' who passes - in the course of Soyinka's Ibadan - through the 
early years of Nigerian Independence is the fruit of a choice Soyinka - as artist - 
has retained. Maren is not Soyinka, rather he is the autonomous creation of 
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Soginka, and as such he is defined as much by the absences which surround him as 
by the discourses which give shape and visibility to his actions. 
The gap which Soyinka places between the author and his fictional creation - the 
gap being characterized by the interrogative - is replicated in his description of the 
artist who stands as a question mark to his readership/audience, proclaiming an 
ethical relationship to his society in place of the ready-made morals inscribed in 
national identity. 
Theatre and National Culture 
In a recent essay, included in a collection published to celebrate Wole Soyinka's 
sixtieth birthday, 27 the Nigerian playwright Femi Osofisan recalls his early 
admiration of Soyinka's work, culminating in his presence, as a young spectator, at 
the playwright's own production of Kongi's Harvest 28 at The Arts Theatre in 
Ibadan. 
I had never seen anything like this. It brought back to sight the 
splendour of a world that was once ours but which we had lost; it 
recalled even to my young and fragile mind the poetry of my 
people's original essence. I felt transported, ennobled; I was 
thoroughly soaked in the play's spectacular universe; I didn't want it 
to end. 29 
The recollected response of Osofisan as a schoolboy in awe of the great Nigerian 
playwright continues untainted until, as a young man considering a career in 
playwrighting himself, he was given a small role in the first production of Madmen 
and Specialists 30 directed by Soyinka himself at Ibadan in 1971. Osofisan ruefully 
recalls the first ebbing of his admiration when, at the initial readthrough of the 
play, one of the actors asked, on behalf of the whole cast, if Soyinka would be so 
good as to offer an explanation of the play's meaning, and was met with the retort 
that "they should be patient, and let the meaning come to them. " 31 The rehearsal 
period which followed is described by Osofisan as "nothing less than sheer 
torment" as the collected group of actors worked self-sufficiently towards a style of 
playing which would articulate the dense form of Soyinka's written text. Osofisan 
gives no indication that Soyinka's direction guided them in any way towards 
performance but he does emphasize the power one of the lead actors drew from the 
script by building his role, not on the rational basis of characterization, but rather 
upon a series of unrelated metamorphoses, or transformations, which parallelled 
the irrational leaps of logic made by the text itself. 
Almost with a breath of relief, Osofisan admits that the meaning of the play was 
made clear by the process of fording a way to play it. His attempted description of 
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what that meaning was however, stumbles and stutters in its attempts to find a 
language equal to the comprehension achieved by the actors: 
Madmen ... does not narrate a story as such; 
its main purpose, 
instead, is to narrate a historical situation, one that is macabre, and 
immensely frightening, by animating it with graphic and telling 
illustrations. Its goal is not catharsis therefore, but rather, shock and 
psychic wounding... Hence you could not say what the play was 
about, only what it did to your psyche and to your mind. You could 
not summarise it; you could only experience it! 32 
Osofisan continues by considering what effect Soyinka had hoped that the play 
would have upon his audience. In answering this enquiry Osofisan displays a 
curious lapse of memory concerning his own - earlier - response to Kongi's 
Harvest, and chooses to concentrate instead upon the possibility of social 
amelioration. Thus, he hypothesizes the possibility of a "collective guilt" arising 
from the chastening experience of watching the play and a subsequent atonement 
for the very recent realities of war which Nigeria had experienced on the occasion 
of Biafra's attempted secession and the bloody civil war which had ensued. 
Osofisan's attempts to 'justify' Soyinka's work as theatre occur on behalf of the 
mass audience watching a performance; the effects and possibilities inherent in this 
process are considered to be quite different from those which he, as an individual, 
had experienced both as spectator and as actor. Thus, his own triumphant 
understanding that one could not summarise Soyinka's work, rather one could 
"only experience it! " becomes, a prelude to defeat when placed before the insistent 
imperative of the spectator's perceived need for clarity and explanation: 
As actors we had had a privileged access no doubt into the play's 
disturbing universe, since we had had weeks to grow into it, grow 
with it, and ingest it. But the audience which comes to Soyinka's 
play, without the benefit of such long contemplation, cannot but 
leave confused. And the question is, why should such a consummate 
artist, with such a mastery of the theatre's resources, be content to 
leave this swampy distance between himself and his audience? 33 
Interestingly, Osofisan concludes by acknowledging the fulfilment Soyinka's work 
offers him as an actor, but insists that the intensely creative engagement which 
characterizes this fulfilment is not possible in its relationship to the spectators, 
perceived here in a passive role to the artistic product. Thus, the active, creative 
principle is offered as an attribute of the 'I' by Osofisan, but not of the 'We' or. 
'They' which characterizes his descriptions of the audience as a mass. As a 
playwright he articulates his felt responsibility to be to the production of 
"information and lucidity" which are considered to be essential 
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... because our people were at a crucial juncture of history, at which 
all the options must be stripped naked, for decisions were waiting to 
be taken on whether we would forever remain victims, or recover, 
in Cabral's words, 'the upward paths of our history'. In fulfilment 
of such objectives, it seemed to me, although still only fleetingly, a 
new aesthetic, different from Soyinka's, would have to be created. 34 
Kenyan playwright and novelist Ngugi wa Thiong'o also considers theatre to be a 
vital tool in the creation and maintenance of an 'educated' audience. For him, the 
specific possibilities for education, offered by theatre, supply the antidote to 
decades of imperialist education. In a series of critical essays, which appeared 
under the collective title of Decolonising the Mind, 35 Ngügi pursues the argument 
that the all-pervasive system of colonial education had as its goal the creation of a 
mutant race; Africans who had thoroughly imbibed the ideals and values of the 
Western worldview. What he considers more damaging however are the implanted 
seeds of self-hatred which he perceives to be an integral part of colonial education 
policies. Thus, any aspects of African culture which had refused assimiliation into 
the practices and perceptions of the colonial masters were - according to Ngü i's 
argument - defined only by their 'otherness' in relation to civilization and its 
benefits. The 'other' self which identified itself through such practices had 
therefore to be rejected as part of the educational process. For Ngügi, the hope of 
African national culture lay with those who had been untouched by literary 
contamination; the peasantry, whose historical and cultural identification had 
remained embedded within the oral tradition: 
It was imperialism that had stopped the free development of the 
national traditions of theatre rooted in the ritual and ceremonial 
practices of the peasantry. The real language of African theatre 
could only be found among the people - the peasantry in particular - in their life, history and struggles. 36 
Ngugi uses the concept of a 'national' culture with which to imply the undisturbed 
continuance of a unified history and cultural tradition in Africa. The words 
'peasantry' and 'people' are used interchangeably as a means of fortifying the 
notion of a social structure which existed prior to colonial rule thus claiming the 
authority of precedence with regard to racial purity and authenticity. His insertion 
of 'the people' as a concept linked to the assertion of a 'national' culture pre-dating 
colonialism is problematic precisely because these signifiers of nationalist discourse 
serve to fictionalize the historical narrative which Ngügi claims to be unearthing in 
the name of authenticity. The discourse used by Ngügi therefore, has as its real aim 
an historical transformation of the object it describes. Homi Bhabha, in critiquing 
Renan's strategic use of the 'people' to political ends, offers a definition of 'the 
people' as a concept: 
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The people are the historical 'objects' of a nationalist pedagogy, 
giving the discourse an authority that is based on the pre-given or 
constituted historical origin or event; the people are also the 
'subjects' of a process of signification that must erase any prior or 
originary presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the 
prodigious, living principle of the people as that continual process 
by which the national life is redeemed and signified as a repeating 
and reproductive process. 37 
The 'people' to whom Ngüug apparently gives supreme authority are, therefore, by 
virtue of the nationalist discourse to which they are subjected, in reality no more 
than signifiers serving the purposes of a political agenda quite alien to the 
'experiences' which that agenda would appear to invoke. Without the definition of 
the 'people' however, Ngügi could not pursue his argument, for adherence to the 
letter of his aims would, far from promoting a culturally unified future for the 
African states, actually dissolve both the concept of the State and the administrative 
processes by which it maintains it arbitrarily imposed shape. 
The disjuncture in Ngügi's argument occurs between the project of retrieving 
traditional forms of communication and expression, and the overwriting of the 
tribal structures, which gave birth to those forms, with a national discourse of 
Western origin. The theatre stands in relation to this discourse as a carrier of 
cultural artefacts which have essentially to be annexed in the interests of industrial 
modernization and economic development. The effect of this amputation is to make 
impotent but visible the products of a once potent and dynamic form of artistic 
expression. Within Ngügi's discourse, visibility is conditional upon the application 
of a frame through which the object may be viewed. The frame which endows 
visibility also ensures the clarity of a sharp focus for the perceptions of the viewer. 
The particular frame offered by the nationalist playwright is social utility but the 
caption which accompanies the landscape suggests authenticity and freedom. Thus 
reality is fictionalized causing the "swampy distance", which Soyinka maintains to 
be the location of the artist, to give way to the firmer terrain offered by the clearly 
etched horizons of a national culture. 
The artist who has decided to illustrate the truths of the nation turns 
paradoxically towards the past and away from actual events. What 
he ultimately intends to embrace are in fact the cast-offs of thought, its shells and corpses, a knowledge which has been stabilised once 
and for all. But the native intellectual who wishes to create an 
authentic work of art must realise that the truths of the nation are in 
the first place its realities. He must go on until he has found the 
seething pot out of which the learning of the future will emerge. 38 
Franz Fanon, in his essay on "National Culture", accepts the fact of the nation as 
an historic structure which is inescapable for the African continent. He also 
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recognizes national culture to be the adhesive which will hold together the disparate 
peoples of the African nations, but he refuses the numbing stasis that such a culture 
may impose upon the subjective consciousness of its objects. The fictionalization of 
the frameworks of identity which characterized European national identity are 
therefore used by Fanon as possible sources of critique and creative regeneration 
once applied to the contemporary African condition. Thus he defines national 
culture as an articulation of the process of nationhood rather than the purely 
pragmatic - and inevitable - product of its imposition. History, 
for Fanon, is not 
the fictional narrative which produces a linear progression of events leading 
incontrovertibly to the present moment, rather it occurs in the present moment and 
is therefore in a constant state of flux, reflecting not only the present but also the 
possibility of future configurations. History, according to Fanon's definition, 
becomes both the form and content of culture, but it is a history which cannot yet 
be named for it exists only in the moment of its telling; it is history as presence 
rather than history as mastered narrative. What Fanon proposes is a truly 
revolutionary refusal - in nationalist terms - of history as a solution to present ills; 
in its place he counsels the retrieval of history as "the seething pot" which bubbles 
with the paradoxical assertion of being and to which man must constantly return in 
order to feed the fount of his particular existence: 
A national culture is the whole body of efforts made by a people in 
the sphere of thought to describe, justify and praise the action 
through which that people created itself and keeps itself in 
existence. 39 
The charge Fanon sets before the artist, and by extension to the people he serves, is 
to refuse the vicarious national identity offered as a short cut to the glorious future 
progress of the unified State. He thus cautions against the creation of a population, 
or mass work-force and urges that culture retain the dignifying proportions of art in 
its ability to hold up to its spectators, not a mirror of state perceptions, but rather a 
mirror which allows each individual to place and define himself as a unique 
'particular' within the framework of the whole. 
Soyinka's Play for Independence 
A number of Soyinka's commentators have made the - almost inevitable - link 
between A Dance of the Forests, 40 which was first performed during the period of 
the Nigerian Independence celebrations in 1960, and the state of the nascent nation 
at that time. Many of them note the dense symbolism of Soyinka's text and attempt 
to effect a clearing in the eponymous forest for their readers by offering a series of 
equations as a 'key' to the meaning of what has been described as "the kind of 
unsuccessful early work out of which several successes can be carved. " 41 
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Critics tend to remain frustrated however, in their attempts to decode the work as 
an analogy to nation formation, finding that symbols which would initially seem to 
offer a rich vein of meaning, ultimately implode, denying the facility of uni-vocal 
utterance to their interpreter. Derek Wright, the most recent writer to join the ever 
growing army of critics who have done battle with Soyinka's texts, suggests, in 
Wole Soyinka Revisited, 42 that the 'meaning' of A Dance of the Forests may lie, 
not in the clarification of the playwright's purpose, but may rather reside in the 
impossibility of producing uni-vocal symbols at a time of national transition. 
Wright uses Victor Turner's concept of "liminal space" as a designated arena of 
activity within which both dramatic action and national transition coincide. Thus, 
for Wright, Soyinka's play becomes analogous to the ritual rite of passage during 
which an individual - or in this case a people - passes from one state of being to 
another. 43 The liminal state, which occurs midway between the two stable 
categories of being - for example, between adolescence and adulthood - he 
perceives to equate with the process Nigeria was undergoing at this particular 
moment in her history. Wright uses this mode of interpretation to consider the 
climactic events of Soyinka's work, central to which is the release of a "Half- 
Child" - which many critics have considered to be a symbol representing the 
Nation-State - from centuries of incubation in his dead mother's womb, and an 
- ensuing battle over ownership of the child, fought between gods and humans. It is 
Demoke, the mortal artist, to whom responsibility finally falls concerning the 
future of the mutant being. Wright comments: 
The business of the Half-Child is tantalizingly elliptical, operating 
on too many and too tenuously abstract levels, at which the different 
possibilities and permutations - historical, mythological, 
metaphysical - tend to cancel one another out and dissolve meaning, 
as if there were some basic, insurmountable ambivalence, or 
ultimate aporia at the core of symbolism. At transitional stages, 
whether in the personal or national context, human decisions are 
bound to be hedged around with qualifications and dilemmas; no 
'correct' choice is possible. 44 
Wright proceeds to demonstrate that the problem presented to the spectator in the 
form of the Half-Child remains dramaturgically unsatisfying as, at a crucial 
moment in the play, both spectator and protagonist share the experience of moral 
vertigo: "It is simply not clear from the dramatic symbolism what the alternative 
choices to Demoke would be and what they would signify... or whether there is 
really any choice at all. " 45 For Wright, Soyinka's choice of symbol fails 
dramatically because it is unable to achieve, at a decisive moment, the symbolic 
framework within which the concepts of 'choice' and 'progress' would allow for 
movement towards a recognizable, and unified goal. According to Wright's 
interpretation, symbolic failure disallows the movement of transition and in its 
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place emerges a condition of weary stasis in which the chaotic and cataclysmic 
events of the play, involving gods, humans and ancestral spirits, return one finally 
to where one began with little hope of change or cause for celebration. 
Alternatively Gerald Moore, writing in 1978,46 suggests that Demoke's return of 
the Half-Child to its mother's dead womb signifies a rejection, on the part of the 
playwright, of political solutions and the "collective salvation" which they would 
appear to offer: 
It is the very profundity of the play's meaning which makes me a 
little sceptical of interpretations which would see the Half-Child 
simply as representing the destiny of Nigeria, now to be saved at 
Independence by a change in the hearts of men, of which Demoke's 
action is symbolic. My feeling is rather that Soyinka does not 
believe in collective salvations at all; it lies in the breast of every 
man to find his particular god and strive towards unity with him. 47 
Moore concludes his analysis of the play with a comment which is shared by 
Eldred Durosmi Jones in his book The Writings of Wole Soyinka, 48 namely that 
nationalist readings of the play offer a limited interpretation for the critic, but a 
consideration of the play as a discourse upon 'man' taps a more fertile vein, 
rendering up to the reader a profound debate concerning "the regeneration of man 
rather than to any temporal political concept which ignores man's immemorial 
nature. " 49 
In adding my voice to the already swollen ranks of commentary upon Soyinka's 
play, I would like to suggest that A Dance of the Forests, rather than trying to 
articulate, or reflect the process of national transition, actually attempts an 
articulation of nationalism's 'other' face; the reality which is constituted by its 
exile from the fiction of nationalism in its attempts to achieve its long term goals of 
rapid industrial growth and economic stability. Thus, I am in agreement with Jones 
and Moore in their exposure of a layered textual discourse on the condition of 
'man', or 'being' in Soyinka's play, but I would like to propose, in addition to 
this, that A Dance of the Forests actually critiques nationalism as a concept by 
gathering up the remnants discarded by the streamlining processes of its discourse 
and builds out of these fragments a storehouse of cultural possibility which will 
stake its claim on the imaginative faculties of its spectators; the creative 
imagination also being an exile to the civic processes of State-Nationalism, it 
having been replaced by its pale shadow in the form of racial glorification. 
In the opening section of this chapter a quotation from Clifford Geertz suggested 
that nationalist discourse attempts the revolutionary task of transforming the 
symbolic framework through which its constructed 'people' will perceive the 
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world. The nature of this symbolic framework is likely to derive from Western 
origin, this being the source of nationalist structures, and it is feasible therefore to 
presume that the meanings attached to symbolic representation in a pre-nationalist 
state will differ radically from those of the post-Independence phase. In discussing 
Soyinka's theatrical output I would suggest that consideration of symbolic 
'meaning' is essential if one is to allow the text to generate the possibilities for 
individual interpretation which - as I shall propose - were intended by its author. 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, in In My Father's House, suggests that the application 
of symbolic meaning arises as a need of the industrialized worldview to confirm the 
central tenets of its rational, truth-defining doctrine of first principles founded on a 
system of logical deduction. He first describes the use of symbolism in traditional 
societies as a process of equivalence which is self-conscious and pragmatic in its 
honouring of deities or elders. Thus a propitiation to the gods may involve the 
'symbolic' gift of gold-dust as a measure of respect equivalent to that which would 
be shown to a fellow human being. The gold-dust - as a symbol - does not stand in 
for, it is not doubled in the practice of the ceremonial, rather it is a gesture which 
recognizes the essential difference between the material and spiritual; the gods do 
not need gold-dust but the offering reflects a material order and the transcendence 
of that order through the processes of ritual or the ceremonial. Essentially 
however, the gold-dust remains gold-dust although the content (monetary worth) is 
overwhelmed by the articulation of its form (respect and honour). 
By comparison Appiah offers the following anecdote as an example of the 
conscious application of symbolic meaning as a test of 'truth': 
The basic symbolist thought is neatly (if ironically) captured in this 
formulation of the Cameroonian philosopher M. Hegba: 'One 
approach to the phenomena of magic and sorcery would be to 
suppose that we find ourselves facing a symbolic language.. .A man 
who flies through the air, who changes himself into an animal, or 
who makes himself invisible at will ... cannot be anything but a coded language whose key we have simply to discover. We would then be 
reassured. ' Simply put, the symbolists are able to treat traditional 
believers as reassuringly rational only because they deny that 
traditional people mean what they say. so 
The basic difference between the two applications of symbolic meaning involves 
therefore a contestation of the truth value attributed to different perceptions of the 
world which emerge via the medium of language. Thus the Western application of, 
symbolism provides the framework for a discursive colonialism whereby 
perceptions not immediately comprehensible to rational logic undergo a process of 
translation and interpretation, only to reappear in comfortingly familiar terms 
whilst simultaneously assimilating the speaker into a new framework of meaning. 
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In this instance power is demonstrated via its ability to accommodate even the most 
outrageous assaults on its defining rationale. 
The opening lines of A Dance of the Forests, spoken for the first time during the 
Nigerian Independence celebrations in 1960, are offered as an overt challenge to 
the new symbolic order operating within the boundaries of the Nigerian state: 
I know who the Dead Ones are. They are the guests of the Human 
Community who are neighbours to us of the Forest. It is their Feast, 
the Gathering of the Tribes. Their councillors met and said, Our 
forefathers must be present at this Feast. They asked us for 
ancestors, for illustrious ancestors, and I said to Forest Head, let me 
answer their request. And I sent two spirits of the restless dead ... 51 
This speech is addressed to the spectators by Aroni, the Lame One, who, as Oyin 
Ogunba has pointed out, 52 is a spirit existing outside human conceptions of time. 
His knowledge of the Dead is not therefore contingent upon political agenda which 
seek to press the dead into the service of the living, rather - for Aroni - the Dead 
are what they are; stinking corpses whose untimely resurrection fills all who look 
upon them with dread and loathing. In passing language through the non-temporal 
head of Aroni, Soyinka achieves the revelation of a reality which the symbolic 
framework of nationalist discourse has sought to disguise; thus Independence 
reverts to7the "Gathering of the Tribes", "Community" describes nothing more 
specific than the Humans who live alongside the spirits in the forest, and the more 
ambiguous title of "Feast" replaces the celebrations of national unity. What 
Soyinka achieves in these opening moments of the play is what Bhabha has 
described as "the minus in the origin": 
... the anteriority of signification as a position of social and cultural knowledge, this time of the 'before' of signification, which will not 
issue harmoniously into the present like the continuity of tradition - invented or otherwise. 53 
Put at its simplest, Soyinka confronts his audience with the challenge to remember 
before the symbolic framework of nationalism makes remembering redundant in 
the face of a new set of citizen-based priorities which counsel forgetting as a 
necessary precursor to progress. To impose a symbolic interpretation upon these 
opening words, which many critics have attempted, would be to make analogous 
the "Gathering of the Tribes" with the Independence celebrations. This would in 
fact be a falsification of Soyinka's purpose for it would remove the gap - Bhabha's 
minus - and return the particular, which Soyinka is attempting to articulate, back to 
the illusory confines of the all-encompassing whole. 
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The play's location in the Forest has been likened to Shakespeare's A Midsummer 
Night's Dream 54 but easy comparisons are as likely to mislead as are symbolic 
impositions made upon the text. The three mortals who traverse the forest groves 
are not lovers, nor are they fleeing the law in pursuit of love's irrational essence. 
Demoke the Carver, Rola the Courtesan and Adenebi the Council Orator know the 
world of the forest and do not for one moment succumb to the belief that they have 
lived through nothing more than a dream. Nor does Soyinka offer any 
representations of civilization against which the chimera of the forest must battle 
for its status as reality, rather the forest is the only framework within which the 
spectator is invited to lodge his perceptions. The gap the audience has to leap in an 
apprehension of the play's logic may be great but the defining framework offered 
by Shakespeare's Athens is absent as an integral element of the stage world. 
Soyinka's forest is essentially a place without boundaries, either spatial or temporal 
and in this way it avoids what Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities SS has 
described as the novelistic representation of nationhood: 
The movement of the solitary hero through a sociological landscape 
of a fixity that fuses the world inside the novel with the world 
outside. The picaresque tour d'horizon - hospitals, prisons, remote 
villages, monasteries, Indians, Negroes - is nonetheless not a tour de 
monde. The horizon is clearly bounded. 56 -. 
Anderson compares the temporal and spatial representations of the novel - which he 
considers to be the national form par excellence - with the production of legends, 
chronicles and sacred texts, and finds the naturalism of novelistic narrative to be 
the articulation of " homogeneous, empty time", a phrase which he acknowledges 
as Walter Benjamin's. It is Anderson's suggestion that the novel exists outside the 
movement of history and places the actions of its characters in an eternal 
'meanwhile' which is measured not by a genealogical relationship to the source or 
origin of the thought processes which define a people, but rather by "transverse, 
cross-time, marked.. . by temporal co-incidence, and measured by clock and 
calendar". 57 Thus, the characters of a novel progress through a time and space 
bounded on all sides by a history which defines their state of being in the world 
and yet remain annexed from that history by the protective 'limits' or horizons of 
national discourse which shields them by putting on 'hold' all that would prove a 
distraction or digression to the moral progress of the citizen. 
In designating the forest as the space of dramatic action, Soyinka is attempting to 
return his spectators to a place of imaginative signification which exists as anterior 
to novelistic, nationalist, empty space. This forest is specific in its origins, being 
peopled with ancestors, spirits, gods, and mortals of the Yoruba Tribe. The forest 
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is not conceptual in its origins therefore, rather it is a place within which Fanon's 
present history may manifest itself; it is the fount of Yoruba thought - as perceived 
by the playwright - and as such it carries the possibility for transformation of all 
who enter its sphere. Upon entering the forest the mortals find themselves subject 
to a shifting temporal and spatial logic which allows for the eruption of history into 
their present lives thus confounding any sense of history as a 'point of arrival'. 
'Ropo Sekoni, in his essay "Metaphor as a Basis of Form in Soyinka's Drama" 58 
describes the time which operates in the forest as follows: 
... the playwright's effort 
in intensifying the spatialized dramatic 
event is subtly objectified by his use of three different dimensions of 
time: ancestral, social-historical, and transitional. Essentially, these 
three temporal dimensions refer to three distinct points on the 
Yoruba cosmological space-time continuum. 59 
The time through which the action of the play passes has a distinct origin which 
may be understood only as a means of perceiving the world from a particular 
viewpoint with particular priorities held in place by the demands its looped 
convolutions makes upon those who are defined by its bounds. The "Yoruba 
cosmological space-time continuum" to which Sekoni refers is a process of cyclical 
repetition which ensures that Yoruba thought never escapes the origins which gave 
birth to that thought. The three designations offered by Sekoni correspond to the 
Yoruba description of time and space as articulated by Soyinka in his essay "The 
Fourth Stage": 
The Yoruba is not, like European man, concerned with the purely 
conceptual aspects of time; they are too concretely realised in his 
own life religion, sensitivity, to be mere tags for explaining the 
metaphysical order of his world. If we may put the same thing in 
fleshed-out cognitions, life, present life, contains within it 
manifestations of the ancestral, the living and the unborn. All are 
vitally within the intimations and affectiveness of life, beyond mere 
abstract conceptualisation. 
As Soyinka clearly states, the time of the forest is not time subject to symbolic 
translation, which in this case is described as abstract conceptualization, rather time 
carries within it the imperative to remember, in sharp distinction to Ernest Renan's 
national imperative to collective forgetting. Thus A Dance of the Forests quite 
simply offers its spectators a framework through which to perceive the world which 
patently cannot co-exist with the nationalist framework and must therefore be 
sacrificed if the Nation-State is to achieve fulfilment. 
Given the anteriority of Soyinka's framework, the frustration of critics who would 
try to overlay the events of the play with symbolic representations of national 
origin becomes an historic event in itself, for the inefficacy of the process proves 
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the falsity of the nationalist equation. To return to Derek Wright's proposition that 
a time of national transition is marked by the impossibility of producing "uni-vocal 
symbols", we may now replace this with a counter proposition which states that a 
time of national transition is marked by a plethora of uni-vocal symbols which 
actually seek to negate the reality of a people's transitional state. What is offered in 
its place is an abstract, conceptual time which short-cuts the process by offering in 
its stead a rubber-stamped, ready-made, cultural product which, owing to its status 
as a doubling, or falsification of reality, can only make sense if it is considered 
symbolically. Dorothy Rowe, in Wanting Everything, 61 offers an apt description of 
the transitional individual, subject to the processes of nationalist discourse: 
Power is the right to define how others should define reality. We all 
want this right, but we do not want the hard work of working out the 
definitions of everything. So we accept other people's definitions for 
some areas of our experience, but mark out other areas on our 
own. 62 
Soyinka's A Dance of the Forests overtly refuses the moral 'We' which informs 
and naturalizes Rowe's discourse and states that the rejection of "the hard work of 
working out the definitions of everything" actually signals the death of the 'people' 
nationalism pretends to glorify. For what are 'We', Soyinka would seem to ask, if 
not the eternal return to the questions which define our origins as a people? 
If one applies the Yoruba conception of time to the events which occur in A Dance 
of the Forests, the interlinking of the three different cyclical patternings, described 
as the time of the ancestors, of the living and of the unborn, are shown to be 
integral to the space of ethical questioning which this chapter has again and again 
found to be also the space which Soyinka desires to occupy. The play begins with 
the three spheres shown to be co-existant but separate, with points of contact 
between them proving ineffectual in terms of historical articulation. Thus, the three 
mortals flee the onslaught of the "Gathering", but have no means of knowing why 
they experience a growing distaste for the excesses of feasting. Both Rola and 
Adenebi attribute their flight to a need to escape from houses full of unwanted 
relatives whose arrival marks the beginning of the festivities. Demoke, the carver 
has fled from the unveiling of his own work; a large totem which was 
commissioned to mark the importance of the event. When faced with the 
incredulity of his companions at the carver's desire to shun the mass adoration 
which his work has provoked, Demoke replies: 
For one thing, I did not know what it was all about. The council met 
and decided that they wanted it done. In secret. The tree was in a 
grove of Oro, so it was possible to keep it hidden. Later I learnt it 
was meant for the gathering of the tribes. When I finished it, the 
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grove was cleared of all the other trees, the bush was razed and a 
motor road built right up to it. It looked different. It was no longer 
my work. I fled from it. 63 
Demoke's work is shown to have undergone a transformation akin to that of a 
'people' in the process of nationalism. As Una Maclean has pointed out, the totem 
was "carved from the living trunk of a tree" 64 just as the Nation-State is hewn 
from the essential characteristics of divers peoples, but once the surrounding trees 
and bushes have been obliterated and a "motor road" put in their place, the totem 
(as living emblem of family or tribe) is no longer what it was; it has become the 
product of political motivation, subject to a new set of symbolic signification. Just 
as Demoke has no means of 'knowing' what it is that he has created, so his 
companions have no means of 'knowing' what the forces are that have driven them 
to the quietness of the forest clearing. It is this state of 'not knowing' which is 
important to their journey through the forest and their entry into Soyinka's 
'interrogative space' is aided by the presence of a disguised Forest Head who offers 
them no solutions but rather urges them to a questioning of their present condition. 
The ancestral time of the play is inhabited by forest spirits, gods, and the two 
animate corpses to whom Aroni has extended the official invitation issued by the 
same committees which commissioned Demoke's totem. One might expect that the 
lack of understanding and knowledge exhibited by the mortals would find its 
compensating factor in the cycle of ancestral life, but then that would be to fall 
prey to a nationalist discourse which attempts to disguise the makeshift nature of 
the present by obeisance to a more certain past. Soyinka bestows upon the 
ancestors an ignorance and impotence which at the very least rivals that of the 
mortals in its inability to recognize, understand or change the cycles of history 
which they must repeatedly encounter. The sprawl of ignorance which gapes in the 
gap between the living and the dead is exposed by Soyinka within moments of the 
corpses emergence from the floor of the forest: 
Dead W'man: The world is big but the dead are bigger. We've been dying 
since the beginning; the living try but the gap always widens. 
What is it to them from whom I descended! 
Dead Man: It was a mistake from the beginning. It is a long way to 
travel the understreams to be present where the living make 
merry. What is it to me? I want nothing more. Nothing at 
all. 
Dead W'man: I have been a fool. It is a hard thing to carry this child for a hundred generations. And I thought.. . when I was asked, I thought.. . here was a chance to return the living to the living that I may sleep lighter. 65 
The desire of the Dead Woman to rid herself of the life which ruins her sleep, and 
of the Dead Man to "want nothing more", suggests an absolute schism between the 
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those who inhabit the past and their counterparts in the present. This is not the gap 
of creative questioning but rather the absence of thought and the abdication of a 
responsibility to interpret the repetitive patterns of their multiple lives. Both the 
Councillors' invitation and the Dead Woman's acceptance are misjudged, for in 
each case responsibility is being effectively denied in an attempt to shift the burden 
of knowledge onto the shoulders of another. 
The two gods which inhabit the ancestral time of the play are Ogun and Eshuoro, 66 
both of whom sanction violence but with the distinction that Ogun's urge to 
destruction is defined within the context of the creative act and thus is visited upon 
the innocent and the guilty alike, whilst Eshuoro's vengeance is meted out to those 
he perceives to be guilty, as an act of punishment. These warlike and warring 
deities choose their mortal advocates and enact their rivalry, via them, upon the 
earthly plane of the living. For those mortals who are championed by Ogun and 
Eshuoro however, the power which visits itself upon them is autocratic, unchosen 
and unknowable. 
Demoke, who Ogun claims as his own and under his protection, is given two 
opportunities by Soyinka to describe the carving of the totem, and in particular the 
crucial moment at which he, possessed by Ogun, threw to his death a young 
apprentice - and advocate to- Eshuoro - who, knowing his master's fear of heights, 
had climbed above him to the top of the tree to carve amongst the uppermost 
branches. I shall quote first from the second of the two descriptions; an 
extraordinary eruption of poetic language which is completely uncharacteristic of 
the Demoke who has thus far sheltered behind a prosaic derogation of his 
individual art in the carving of the totem: 
My axe was executioner at Oro's neck. Alone, 
Alone I cut the strands that mocked me, till head 
And boastful slave lay side by side, and I 
Demoke, sat in the shoulders of the tree, 
My spirit set free and singing, my hands, 
My father's hands possessed by demons of blood 
And I carved three days and nights till tools 
Were blunted, and these hands, my father's hands 
Swelled big as the tree-trunk. 67 
Demoke's confession of his crime, and its resultant creativity, is occasioned by his 
terror at encountering the Dead and the possibility of retribution from beyond the 
grave. The long verse monologue which gives form to his confession, however, is 
akin to the act of possession which drives his creativity, for the crime is made to 
transcend its earthly consequences by shifting the responsibility to Ogun and 
Eshuoro, thus making Demoke innocent; a vessel to the warring factions. This is in 
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stark contrast to the other description offered by Demoke, this time in prose and 
entirely lacking reference to the gods: 
I watched it. I took part in it. There is nothing ignoble in a fall from 
that height. The wind cleaned him as he fell. And it goes further. I 
mean, for me, it goes further. Perhaps it is because I am a slave to 
heights. You see, I can go so far, so high, but one step further than 
that and I am seized with dizziness. Where my hands are burning to 
work, where my hands are trembling to mould, my body will not 
take me. Is that not a lack of fulfilment? If I can pull my body up 
further than it will go, I would willingly fall to my death after. 68 
In the poetic version of the death, Demoke is ennobled as Ogun's carver whose 
triumph over the slave Oremole is celebrated by a creative frenzy guided by the 
possessing force of the god. In the prose however, we learn of Demoke's will, as a 
mortal, to overcome the fear of the highest branches of the araba tree in order to 
fulfil the desire his own craft has created in him. The meeting point which Ogun 
makes between the carver and the god is that of a violent possession which makes 
the totem complete but at the cost of Demoke's human will; the top portion of the 
tree is lopped off at the same time as Oremole falls to the ground. Thus, the act 
which would have brought Demoke closer to the divine realm, in its overcoming of 
human frailty, is pre-empted by a jealous god whose warlike instincts refuse to 
recognize Demoke's incipient will, pursuing instead a divine will to autocracy. 
Paradoxically, Ogun's act of possession drives the chasm between the gods and 
men deeper, leaving both factions impotent in the face of events which shape, or 
rather distort, the spatio/temporal time of the present. 
Oyin Ogunba has suggested that in A Dance of the Forests Soyinka has 
"discovered his god, Ogun" 69 referring to the Yoruba belief that each individual 
member of society has a responsibility to take upon himself the worship of a 
chosen god plucked from the Yoruba pantheon. Ulli Beier, in an article which 
appeared in the Independence issue of Black Orpheus describes the nature of this 
worship: 
Each orisha represents a different archetypal personality and each 
worshipper must create a harmonious relationship between himself 
and his orisha that is most congenial to him. Each group of 
worshippers is also responsible to the community as a whole, to see 
that the divine force with which they have established 
communication shall not be harmful to the community. 7° 
From Beier's description we may see that the early events of Soyinka's play offer a 
stark contrast to Yoruba belief rather than an exposition of its tenets. Choice is 
once more absent as the earthly vessels to divinity are no more than pawns to 
power struggles occurring in a realm of which they are largely ignorant. An 
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alternative reading of the relationship Soyinka draws between the gods and mortals 
might suggest that the violent visitation of the gods acts as an illumination or 
enlightenment to latent desires which, in the case of Demoke, find their fulfilment 
in the paradoxically destructive act of creation. I would argue, however, that this is 
a weaker option given the description of the two gods offered by the figure of the 
meta-creator, Forest Head: 
Soon, I will not tell you from the humans, so closely have their 
habits grown on you. Did I summon this welcoming for your 
prowess or for ends of my own? Take care how you tempt my 
vanity. Eshuoro, you came here to bathe in blood, Ogun, you to 
defend the foibles of your ward. Let this night alone, when I lay out 
the rites of the dead or my anger will surpass your spleen. 71 
The inference of this speech would seem to suggest that the gods, far from offering 
inspiration to mortals to reach beyond the human to a greater potential, have rather 
succumbed to the petty rivalries of the human realm and threaten destruction to the 
community by playing out those rivalries on the grand scale allotted to divine 
action. The assertion, made by Ogunba, therefore, that in A Dance of the Forests 
Soyinka has discovered his god, Ogun, bears little fruit upon close examination of 
the text. In its place I would suggest that Soyinka has made the discovery that the 
gods become more than mere reflections of life on the human plane only when a 
meeting point is forged by mortals and gods alike, beyond the mundane but still 
within the farthest reaches of the human will. Only an assertion of the will makes 
the union of god and man a fruitful one, and only through this aspiration is society 
saved from the naked blood-lust of the gods untempered by human mediation. 
The final sphere of the triumvirate named by Soyinka and Sekoni is that of the 
"unborn"; the cycle of time and space which describes future events. In A Dance 
of the Forests the unborn child lives but paradoxically the sustenance of its life is 
death; it is nurtured in the womb of its mother's corpse. The child's genealogy is 
offered to the spectator via an eruption of historical time effected by the two 
timeless entities, Aroni and Forest Father. Soyinka is specific in his definition of 
historical time, and he puts into the mouth of the Forest Crier the nature of the 
summons and the patternings of time its retrieval represents: 
When spells are cast 
And the dead invoked by the living, only such 
May resume their body corporeal as are summoned 
When the understreams that whirl them endlessly 
Complete a circle. Only such may regain 
Voice auditorial as are summoned when their link 
With the living has fully repeated its nature, has 
Re-impressed fully on the tapestry of Igbehinadun 
In approximate duplicate of actions, be they 
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Of good, or of evil, of violence or carelessness; 
In approximate duplicate of motives, be they 
Illusory, tangible, commendable or danmable. 72 
The Crier continues by insisting that the dead are being invoked at request of the 
living; that the eruption of historical time into the present is the fruit of a 
genealogical link between past protagonists and their present counterparts. The 
inference contained within the Crier's speech is that the desire to call up the dead, 
on the part of the living, is always conditional upon the links already forged in the 
historical development of specific societies. The replication of those links makes 
the chain which binds a people to a specific history, and inscribes a patterning of 
repetitious cycles which would appear to be inescapable. Soyinka places in the 
mouth of the Crier, not an explanation of history, but rather a warning that 
societies calling up their past will inevitably call up pre-images of that which exists 
in the present (owing to the particular perspective they bring to the exercise). In 
"The Writer in the Modern African State" Soyinka repeats this warning but with 
the rider that the use of history is absolutely "dependent upon the sensibility that 
recalls it". 73 The society, therefore, that wishes history to serve the projects and 
ambitions of the present, without a thorough investigation of the linkages which 
have made that present, is likely to shun that which fails to offer the desired mirror 
image and, as in the case of nationalist discourse, retain only those aspects best 
suited to what are perceived as contemporary needs. There is, however, always the 
possibility, when the spirits of the dead are invoked, of the concomitant appearance 
of a sensibility which first recognizes the link which binds the past to the present 
and then refuses the apparent inevitability of the link's continued progress through 
the present and into the future. Thus, the eruption of the "court of Mata Kharibu" 
into the present, in which we see the three mortals playing out the roles which they 
have repeated throughout eight centuries, signifies as both a savage indictment on 
the society which has built itself on such foundations, and a hope that the 
sensibility may be present which could have the courage to break the link of 
cyclical repetition. 
The link itself is contextualized by a court ruled by the autocracy of Mata 
Kharibu's leadership. The crisis which offers specificity to the events enacted, is 
the outbreak of war occasioned by Kharibu's desire for the infamous Madame 
Tortoise who, like Helen of Troy, may be obtained only as a result of 
extraordinary human sacrifice. As the Court Historian elucidates, the magnitude of 
the sacrifice offers a measure of Kharibu's power and desire, it is not therefore the 
place of the foot-soldier to question the nature of that sacrifice, but rather to 
celebrate the glorious destiny in which he has been given a part to play. History, 
the historian suggests is built not by him who questions but rather by he who 
recognizes the potential of the past for the consolidation of future glory: 
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Historian: War is the only consistency that past ages afford us. It is the 
legacy which new nations seek to perpetuate. Patriots are 
grateful for wars. Soldiers have never questioned bloodshed. 
The cause is always the accident your Majesty, and war is the 
Destiny. This man is a traitor. He must be in the enemy's 
pay. 
Kharibu: He has taken sixty of my best soldiers with him. 
Historian: Your Highness has been to lenient. Is the nation to ignore the 
challenge of greatness because of the petty-mindedness of a 
few cowards and traitors. 74 
The "traitor" to whom they refer is none other than the Dead Man whose corpse 
has stumbled in search of recognition through the forest glades. He is the man who 
refuses the fiction imposed upon his actions by those who write the narrative -of 
national glory. His confrontation with power does no more than to consolidate the 
nature of that power which - through his own questioning - he has come to 
understand, holds in absolute contempt those who, within the context of Kharibu's 
call to arms, would be described as national heroes. The exclusion of questioning 
from the nation's narrative translates the Dead Man as Warrior into the traitor, 
coward and slave. What national discourse cannot support, without endangering the 
exposure of its fictional limitations, it must translate -a process which Soyinka has 
described as the 'cannibalism' which appears to underpin human development. 75 
The Warrior is condemned by Kharibu to be sold as a slave, an apt punishment for 
one who has come to the knowledge that this is the condition upon which his 
loyalty is founded. Madame Tortoise, whose understanding of power is based upon 
the promotion of desire for that which will always remain out of reach, adds her 
own punishment in response to his refusal of that desire; the Warrior is to be 
castrated and offered as a eunuch to prospective buyers. His wife, the Dead 
Woman, who witnesses this terrifying transformation of her husband under the 
onslaught of naked and exposed power calls first for mercy and then for pity, both 
exhortations being those of the slave who has understood the gaping chasm between 
power and its objects. 
Thus the genealogy of the child, who continued to live in the womb of his mother 
after her suicide, is shown to be the repetition of a moment which perpetuates war 
and power as a link in the human cannibalistic continuum, but also a moment 
which instigates questioning as the fracturing of national narrative and the 
subsequent exposure of the frame which holds them in place. The spectator learns 
from Forest Father that this same sequence of events has visited itself upon 
countless generations, and he himself has been witness to its inevitable 
consequences as time after time the 'major' figures of the drama have been 
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celebrated in preference to the 'minor' players whose counter-narrative awaits the 
conditions for its fashioning; the child did not die but lay in a dead womb awaiting 
the midwife equal to the its historical birth. 
I have attempted, thus far, to demonstrate the separation - within the parameters of 
Soyinka's text - of the three cycles which constitute Yoruba time. The re- 
integration of these three separate loops would, I suggest, constitute a state of 
transition in which the structures defining Yoruba belief, and the nature of time 
which articulates that belief, offer the opportunity for self-reflexivity and an 
historical perception which would counter frameworks competing for the symbolic 
representation of human existence. 
The state of transition is called into existence by Forest Father. Significantly the 
changes to the play's setting - as demanded by Soyinka's stage-directions - 
accompany the entrance for the first time of the figure of the Questioner: 
... a dark, wet, atmosphere, 
dripping moisture, and soft, moist soil. 
A palm-tree sways at a low angle, broken but still alive. Seemingly 
lightning-reduced stumps. Rotting wood all over the ground. A 
mound or two here and there. Footfalls are muffled. First, there is 
total stillness, emphasized by the sound of moisture dripping to the 
ground. Forest Head is sitting on a large stone, statuesque, The 
Questioner stands beside him. -76 
Here is the swamp which Osofisan perceived to be the measure of the distance 
Soyinka placed between himself and his spectators. The swamp, as an image of 
transition is something that had already exercised Soyinka's imagination in the 
writing of his play The Swamp Dwellers 77 and was to return again and again in his 
work throughout the next ten years. In its context of A Dance of the Forests the 
moisture-laden mediation of the stage space certainly heralds the most theatrically 
challenging portion of the play both for the performers and for their audience. 
Soyinka uses the process of transition to allow an explosion of cultural and 
theatrical diversity. There is a bewildering sequence of disguise and revelation, the 
appearance of visions, a terrifying dance performed with knives by child acrobats; 
central use is made of the child's game ampe and, for the first time in Soyinka's 
work, possession is enacted upon the stage. The Master of Ceremonies is Forest 
Head; the swamp is the domain of the creator and his drawing of the disparate 
protagonists, who had, until this moment been unaware of the creative possibilities 
inherent in the intertwining of the separate loops, suggests the potential for change. - 
Having been rejected by the mortal organizers of the Feast, the Dead Man and 
Woman are now welcomed by Forest Head and invited to witness an alternative 
celebration; one which begins with the figure of the Questioner. Urged gently to 
answer to the spirit of enquiry, we learn from the Dead Man's mouth that he did 
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not die as a result of his castration, but rather lived to experience a "new 
beginning" after his years of slavery, a new peace followed the acceptance of 
castration. As the Questioner reminds him that his final years found him "sleek and 
fat" the Dead Man spits out the bitter retort that the peace he found was that of the 
"gelded pig". At this decisive moment, as the corpse of history begins to articulate 
that which he knows to be the bitter fruit of one who turns accomplice to power, 
the Questioner turns accuser, stemming the narrative which has begun to unfold 
and reviving the discourse which would once again make the slave the mute witness 
to his own destruction. Aroni intervenes and Eshuoro is discovered beneath the 
Questioner's mask. Forest Head refuses to let his willed subversion of the rite 
destroy the dance of transition and the Interpreter is called upon to take his place. 
The three mortals, led by the Interpreter enter the space in a state of "resigned 
passivity" as the order is given by Forest Head for the Half-Child to be released 
from his mother's womb. The Child's entry into the world is accompanied by "A 
Figure in Red" who dogs his footsteps and engages him in a game of sesan which 
he ultimately loses. The momentous moment of his birth is effected in the 
explosion of language issuing forth from the possessed bodies of the mortals. In 
them animate and inanimate is joined as the spirits of the elements blast forth in a 
recognition of the future which may yet be born. The full terror of the natural 
world, which Soyinka attempts to achieve via a juxtaposition of the passive bodies 
of the possessed and the vibrant power of the language which passes through them, 
suggests the possibility of a different order to that which reigned in the court of 
Mata Kharibu. The unleashed elements may inspire fear and awe in those who are 
subject to their might but they do not share the ambition of man, nor do they glory 
in the blood that might be shed as a consequence of that might. The power that 
accompanies the Half-Child's birth is one without human traits; it is the antecedent 
to approximations of power attempted in the human realm and shows itself, in 
Soyinka's theatrical representation, as a force which passes through man without 
attempting to bend man to its will. With these forces the Forest Head encompasses 
his timeless world and welcomes the Half Child to the potential which is held 
there, as yet unrecognized. 
The first order of natural elements then gives way to a species unrecognized by 
their creator. In a cloud of dust the army of Ants traverses the stage, answering 
questions and bewilderment with the resignation of the forgotten: 
Ant Leader: We are the ones remembered 
When nations build... 
Another: ... with tombstones. 
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Another: We are the dried leaves, impaled 
On one-eyed broom. 
Another: We are the headless bodies when 
The spade of progress delves. 
Another: The ones that never looked up when 
The wind turned suddenly, erupting 
In our heads. 
Another: Down the axis of the world, from 
The whirlwind to the frozen drifts, 
We are the ever legion of the world, 
Smitten, for - 'the good to come'. 78 
It may be worth noting at this stage that in the original production, which was 
directed by Soyinka, the playwright also took the role of Forest Head. This seems 
particularly apt when considering the nature of the realm of creation over which he 
holds sway. Again and again the "forgotten" take the stage in order to pursue an 
eloquence denied them by a discourse of power which finds its definition, not 
through symbols which take a central position on the stage, but rather through 
definitions which define a world 'out there'; a world which has been forcibly 
ejected in order that they might find a visibility denied them elsewhere. Thus the 
Leader of the Ants is able to articulate the violence to which concepts such as 
freedom and choice are subject only because he is encompassed by a frame which 
has as its purpose the questioning of what it is that speaks, rather than the 
determination of identity via function and subjectification to discourse. The radical 
possibility for change which Soyinka posits in A Dance of the Forests is the 
potential for discursive creation lying latent in the discarded remnants of official 
discourse; what he asks of his audience is to refuse to 'forget' and by so doing to 
reject their position in the ranks of the forgotten: 
The aim of cultural difference is to re-articulate the sum of 
knowledge from the perspective of the signifying singularity of the 
'other' that resists totalization - the repetition that will not return to 
the same, the minus-in-origin that results in political and discursive 
strategies where adding-to does not add-up but serves to disturb the 
calculation of power and knowledge, producing other spaces of 
subaltern signification. 79 
The insertion of the Forest Head's swamp of transition within which the alternative 
feast of welcome for the dead may take place, halts the progress of the repetitious 
cycles of history - certainly for an audience stumbling upon Soyinka's play in the. 
midst of the official Independence celebrations - and produces an incarnation-in- 
the-flesh of the minus-in-origin; the child which refuses the death of its parents. 
The irrationality of this image is, of course, its safeguard; in its very essence it 
refuses all the laws of logic which drive the discourses of the Nation-State. As 
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such, it confounds the reasoning faculties of the mind and demands interpretation 
which, as we have already seen will not be answered in this case by the short-cut of 
symbolism. The Half-Child will not, therefore, be assimilated into the sum of 
existing knowledge; in this way it points towards a future which is not yet 
determined, towards the possibility of a different order of knowledge which 
confounds the linear progression of nationalist discourse. 
The dance of the Half-Child involves the repetitious use of two motifs which 
articulate the forces which threaten to stunt his potential presence in the world. 
Both are performed by the hideous incarnations named as the Triplets, and both 
impose rhythms of a continuity which prove life-threatening, in very different 
ways, to the fragile 'otherness' of the new force upon the stage. The first is the 
game of ampe which punctuates the actions of the Triplets and, as Ogunba 
explains, carries the refrain of "Do as I do. We are the same". 8° The second is the 
acrobatic dance which is described in the stage-directions as a series of 'throws' 
which involve the catching of that which is thrown - in this case, the Half-Child - 
upon the point of two knives. The totalitarian impulse described by the first game, 
and the potential for murderous violence upon which the acrobatic dance is 
premised are qualities further charged by the grotesque appearance and savagely 
threatening discourse which the Triplets carry with them onto the stage. Soyinka 
describes their entrances thus: 
Enter the first of the Triplets. It is the lower trunk of a body, with arms. 
Loose, uncontrolled manner. 
First Triplet: Has anyone found the Means? I am the End that will justify 
it. 
Enter Second Triplet. An over-blown head, drooling. 
Second Triplet: I am the Greater Cause, standing ever ready, excusing the 
crimes of today for tomorrow's mirage. Hungry I come, 
hearing there was a feast for the dead ... Am I expected? 
Enter the Third Triplet, fanged and bloody. 
Third Triplet: I find I am Posterity. Can no one see on what milk I have 
been nourished? 81 
The three ghastly mutations suggest the future which awaits if the Half-Child does 
not grow to maturity; they are his mirror image within the discourse of 
nationalism. They also parallel, with a precision which suggests the absence of co-. 
incidence, the three stages outlined by Soyinka in "The Writer in the Modem 
African State". In the furious climax of the dance, into which are drawn the 
ancestors, the mortals and the unborn, only Forest Head and Aroni remain aloof 
from the action, reflecting for the spectators a point of observation from which 
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they may observe the strategies of a game which, if the Half-child fails to survive, 
could prove chillingly predictive of their lives beyond the theatre's walls. 
It is Demoke who successfully intercepts the deadly games and finally holds the 
Half-Child in his arms. The responsibility which he carries at this moment is to 
bring the child to maturity in the teeth of forces which have not been banished from 
the stage, even though their object has been seized from them: 
All eyes are intent upon Demoke until he makes up his mind; he 
gives the child to the Dead Woman. Immediately, Aroni leads out 
the Dead Woman with the Half-Child. Forest Head takes a final 
look at the gathering, goes off. Eshuoro gives a loud yell of 
triumph, rushes offstage, ... The Triplets 
follow gleefully. 82 
This decision has baffled those critics who require a triumph for Demoke, over the 
evil forces of the Triplets and the bloodthirsty Eshuoro. As the stage-directions 
demonstrate, however, there is no solution to be found in Demoke's action and no 
certainty as to the future he has in some way helped to mould. I may only add my 
suggestion to the numerous interpretations which have already been offered, but I 
think that the exiling of the Nation-State from this equation in particular offers a 
context which is helpful in considering the implications of Soyinka's text. The 
Half-Child, the fragile future, dependent upon the articulation of a cultural 
difference which fords its sustenance in questioning official discourse, is returned 
to the womb of its dead mother, within whose bounds it has achieved the 
continuance of its half-life, by Demoke the carver, who recognizes his present 
inability to take responsibility for the growth and maturation of its nascent 
potential. The disappearance from the stage of this threat is perceived as a triumph 
by the carriers of official discourse, but the promise - integral to the child's return 
to the womb - is that the cycle which brought it forth will bring it forth again. 
Thus, Demoke's unwillingness to expose the child to forces against which he is 
incapable of defending himself or his potential ward, is indicative of another birth; 
the carver's realization that an individual journey must be made before one takes 
upon oneself the responsibility of a people's future. Thus, the birth of the 
'revolutionary' individual in Soyinka's work is offered as a paradox via two 
images: first, the Half-Child is returned to his Dead mother's womb to await the 
possibility of rebirth, and secondly, Demoke the carver - who held the Child in his 
arms - returns to his new society to attempt his journey from craftsman to artist. 
In the closing moments of the play, Demoke revisits the totem and having passed 
through the now silent crowd of celebrants that cluster around its base, he begins to 
climb. On his head Eshuoro places a sacrificial basket, and Soyinka announces the 
final dance in a stage-direction which reads: "Dance of the Unwilling Sacrifice. " 
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Certain that Demoke will not achieve his purpose, Eshuoro celebrates his second 
triumph, but the figure continues out of sight and, enraged, the god sets the araba 
tree alight in order that the presumptuous mortal will at last be defeated. His fall is 
broken, however, by Ogun who now shows a gentler aspect, though tempered by 
the retention of his weaponry. 
In order to follow through the line of my interpretation I need to turn now to the 
earliest version of the play which is published by Robert Fraser in a collection of 
critical essays entitled Research on Wole Soyinka. 83 In this version, the dialogue 
allowed the mortals on the dawning of the day after the celebrations is lengthier 
than in the later version, and the development of the relationship between Demoke 
and Ogun is more clearly drawn. Carrying the weapons -a gun and a cutlass - 
which Ogun has left by his sleeping figure, and dressed now as a hunter, Demoke 
states: 
Ogun warned me. 
Showing his weapons and apparel 
He prepared me. 
And I... I find it is within my nature. 84 
Demoke has made his meeting place with Ogun, by testing the imaginative impulse 
which willed him to create beyond his own limitations. -In carving out this meeting- 
place, Ogun has become the protector of Demoke, rather than the dictator who 
ignores human endeavour in order to perpetuate his divine will. The inference is 
that by the end of the play the possibility has emerged for the cojoining of human 
and divine will, thus securing future potential founded upon a structure of Yoruba 
belief which may retain its status only as anteriority to a dominant discourse, but 
nevertheless has survived - at least in the space made by Soyinka's play - the will 
to forget which is so central to the endorsement of that discourse. 
In his introduction to the collected essays of Wole Soyinka, Biodun Jeyifo exposes 
what appears to be a contradiction in the last paragraph of "The Writer in a 
Modem African State". 85 The sentence in question reads: "A concern with culture 
strengthens society, but not a concern with mythology. " Placing this statement in 
the context of later works, in which Soyinka pursues a mythopoeic origin for 
Yoruba tragedy this does indeed present the reader with a dilemma. Soyinka's 
radical revision of Yoruba mythology, however, serves a very different purpose 
from the practice he yokes together with the ambiguous concept of 'culture'. A 
culture which uses racial myths as a curative to present ills is a society which 
empties myth of its content and smothers its form by forcing it to signify 'Truth 
and Authenticity'. For Soyinka, this usage of myth, offered in its reified form, 
must be rejected if the radical aspect of its narrative structure is to retain any hold 
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on the creative imagination. Myth must therefore find a new structure, and a new 
nominal designation in order to avoid the reification of the imagination in response 
to its flattened narrative form. In his later works, Soyinka was to yoke myth with 
tragedy in order to achieve the maturation of the fragile Half-Child - Soyinka's 
revolutionary individual - born of a space of questioning, situated between the 
Creator/Author and the combative arena, within which fictions battle for 
precedence in the imaginative matrix out of which the potential for numerous 
futures may be formed. 
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Chapter Four 
How Do We Escape From History? 
I Must Create a System or be Enslav'd by another Man's. 
I Will not Reason & Compare: My Business is to Create. 
William Blake. Jerusalem. Plate 10, Line 20. 
In the theatrical texts considered thus far, both Barker's 'extraordinary' and 
Soyinka's 'revolutionary' individuals emerge as reactive forces in response to 
ideological bodies of discourse manifesting themselves as the motor of a society 
committed to the production of subject/citizens. Vanya rejects an existence 
conditional upon an authored aesthetic of defeat; Demoke refuses a final 
capitulation to forces essentially antithetical to the artistic will, and Lvov urges the 
eruption of transgressional identity in order to deny the redemptive promise of 'the 
people' as the mask of God. In each of these instances, that which is denied by the 
individual is a language which would seek to make the 'I' of the speaker identical 
with a body of knowledge, historically constituted and consensually recognized to 
be the 'truth' of social being. The historical 'I', the 'I' which is the product of 
history, is therefore tested in these plays and found to be incomplete in its 
representation of human life: 
Historical 'data' is [sic] permanently, irretrievably and irrevocably, 
incomplete. (Dedicated materialists of the ideological paradise - take 
note! ) Which is why the creative (or re-creative) imagination has any 
function in the world. 'Systems' may be elicited from the incomplete 
data, naturally at the expense of regarding the missing, the distorted, 
the incomplete as non-existent or irrelevant. Not so, says the 
creative originator.. "1 
The inference of Wole Soyinka's statement is that the 'I' constituted by historical 
discourse is wrought at the expense of that which would problematize or retard its 
stable and laborious progression through linear time. To refer to oneself as 'I' 
therefore, without making the statement conditional upon immanent critique, is to 
render the subject that speaks a system constituted upon, and redeemed by, the 
illusory progress of scientific rationalism. 
Where Vanya, Lvov, and Demoke succeed in their resistance of both the historical 
'I' and the reified culture which is its mode of subjective expression, is in their 
discovery of the limits of rational thought; in their traversing of the fear-encrusted 
boundaries which offer the illusion of security to those who find a home within its 
bounds. They remain however, umbilically linked to that against which they react, 
stranded in the 'outside' of society's bounds, with no apparent choice beyond a 
reluctant return - as foreigners - to that which has ceased to define them. 
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Victor Turner's "liminal" space has already been discussed in reference to Barker's 
Uncle Vanya and Soyinka's A Dance of the Forests. This designation of a space 
"betwixt and between" which describes the "neither/nor" of its inhabitants, posits a 
ritual affirmation of faith on the part of a society to which its journeymen will 
return. This 'rite of passage' recognizes the need to identify the foreigner within 
the bounds of social experience, and determines that the growth of the individual 
actually requires confrontation with 'otherness' in order that adulthood may reflect 
the responsibility to a balancing of communal and individual desires which is 
believed to be inherent in the mutual maintenance of social order. When however - 
as in the case of Vanya, Lvov and Demoke - the return from the liminal state 
signifies a departure from the human in order to embrace a society which has failed 
in its balancing of individual will with the communal assertion of social 
organization, then the limited function of the liminal accorded within the 
framework of social life undergoes a radical translation. Where the liminal has 
been defined as the terror of a chaos from which the individual will gladly return, 
with a renewed commitment to the social order which shields him from it, the work 
of Barker and Soyinka would seem to suggest that - for the artist - the liminal 
offers a potential which is denied by society and that the temporary release afforded 
by its eradication of categorical boundaries may prove - on the whole - less 
terrifying than the bloodless fraternity of despair which proffers social redemption. 
The relationship of the liminal to the society for which it provides release is, 
however, ultimately dialectical, having as its goal the reunion of the individual with 
the communal; the synthesis of the particular with the whole. The goal of the 
liminal is therefore the progress of the social whole, suggesting that any alternative 
definitions of reality which may emerge from the experience will find a limited 
articulation only in the process of their re-integration into the totalizing framework 
of social belief. 
Whilst Victor Turner's liminal state finds its origins in tribal structures, French 
philosopher Julia Kristeva contextualizes its processes within the framework of 
national discourse and identity. Thus, the dialectical relationship experienced by the 
individual in the liminal state is defined by Kristeva as a space of "anxiety" in 
which the sense of self as foreigner and native to one's own society causes a tremor 
in the solid foundations of the 'I' which normally depends for its functioning upon 
being identical with that which speaks: 
Before the foreigner, the native recalls her own incompleteness; she becomes anxious. The body that becomes anxious is both the 
personal body of the native and the political body of the nation. The foreigner threatens the borders of the symbolic - and national - order. 2 
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Kristeva's concern is to demonstrate that the constitution of national boundaries as 
the markers of a native identity are actually a projection of the means by which we 
designate the otherness from which the historical 'I' shields the speaker. The 
discovery of "the stranger within", 3 or the foreigner who defies the 'truth' at the 
basis of identity is therefore a radical challenge to the 'I' and the beginnings of a 
resistance to that which it articulates. This initial blurring of the boundary, with its 
concomitant swelling of anxiety at the recognition that what had appeared to be a 
fortification is in fact an abyss, a nowhere, a nothing, is described by Kristeva as 
the state of "not yet"; 4 a mirroring of Bhabha's "eternal meanwhile" through which 
the citizen/subject traverses waiting for the changes which historical progress 
continually promises and eternally refuses to honour. Both spaces reflect the other's 
impotence; both spaces treat the 'I' as a fetish, and cling to its contours in 
desperation at the possibility of non-being -a being without inherent meaning - 
which its absence would proclaim. The difference between the two spaces lies in 
the journeys they inspire: the "meanwhile" signposts the triumph of man as a 
concept - historical man - whilst the "not yet" points towards a retrieval of the 
chaotic debris which history has discarded - cultural becoming. 
The existence of the liminal, or the state of anxiety, is premised upon the growth 
and development of society; it answers the negative of that which is communally 
posited as positive. The problem for the artist, and for the textual creations which 
issue from his work, is to break the dialectic which continually confirms that which 
he is attempting to critique and therefore offer back to society images of itself 
which resist the categorical codifications of the rational mind: 
I use history not for nostalgia, but to hack away at comforting 
images of the past in order to evoke, or unlock, feelings about the 
present. I don't do this for a political purpose, I do it to subvert 
conventions of thought. It's what theatre does supremely well. 5 
Barker's recognition of history as a means by which to escape dialectical thought, 
shares with Soyinka the perception that history is essentially incomplete, and that 
contemporary systems of thought are founded upon an illusory mechanism which 
suggests that the genealogy of man has unswervingly progressed towards his 
contemporary manifestation. Thus, the narrative runs, a complete knowledge of 
man is entirely possible because he has never, at any moment in history, desired 
anything other than what we have actually achieved in our present state. 
Manifestations of man in history are therefore perceived to be gestatory forms 
which prefigure that which we are now. The use of history, in Barker's and 
Soyinka's work, suggests - to the contrary - that the systematized product of the 
historical dialectic reflects rather an incompleteness; a human being denuded of 
countless discarded historical begettings: 
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This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned 
towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one 
single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and 
hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the 
dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is 
blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such 
violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm 
irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, 
while the pile of debris before him grows heavenward. This storm is 
what we call progress. 6 
Walter Benjamin's description of history, inspired by Paul Klee's "Angelus 
Novalus" aptly describes the terror from which "the storm of progress" both 
delivers man and ultimately re-turns him. Benjamin's interpretation makes of 
history a redemptive disguise by which man attempts to flee the catastrophic debris 
of human culture to which he, nevertheless, remains obsessively inclined. The 
storm blowing up from Paradise is none other than the 'I' which both precludes 
return and tangles itself within the angel's wings, making impossible the soaring 
and autonomous flight which was their original promise. Thus, the half-man, half- 
god finds himself propelled towards a future he may not contemplate without losing 
sight of a past he finds he cannot, after all, redeem or make whole. 
It is precisely that which is not redeemed which provides the material for the plays 
with which this chapter is concerned. Whilst the 'liminal', or 'not yet' requires an 
artistic transgression of the boundaries of contemporary thought, the space of the 
historical provides the artist with his raison d'etre; an imaginative system of 
creation wrought out of the debris of the unredeemed in the human chain of 
progress. Both playwrights therefore attempt that which Benjamin's "angel" finds 
impossible, precisely because they do not share with the angel the desire to make 
whole, or heal that which is broken or catastrophic. Rather, they renege upon the 
responsibilities the historical 'I' proffers and determine to joyfully affirm that 
which holds history in thrall; that in ourselves which is beyond the designation of 
boundaries and 'otherness', that which is literally unrecognizable as a manifestation 
of the human procession through history. 
For Michel Foucault, the pile of debris, the space of catastrophe to which 
historicized man may not return, is a sphere of silence which proves the habitat of 
the poet. It is also a space unmarked by the cartographer's skills, for it lacks the 
discursive boundaries which have furnished the bodily contours of contemporary 
man. What body is it, he enquires, that could people this space? What is it that 
grows on the sustenance of that which the State has forgotten?: 
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The space, at once empty and populated, of all those words without 
a language which allow the person who lends an ear to hear a 
muffled noise from below history, the stubborn murmuring of a 
language which seems to speak quite by itself, without a speaking 
subject and without an interlocutor, huddled in on itself, breaking 
down before it has reached any formulation and lapsing back without 
any fuss into the silence from which it was never separated.? 
Foucault's stratification which suggests a space below history is translated by 
Herbert Marcuse into the designation of a space before or after history. He posits, 
in response to the body which may be described only by reference to social 
classifications such as race, gender and class, a roll-call of the "disruptive 
characters" which peopled the literature of a pre-technological culture. The ranks, 
he notes, are spearheaded by those whose existence was not premised upon the 
pursuit of a 'living'; the world they inhabit is not yet defined by the instrumentality 
of their existence in relation to the known world of defined objects: 
... the artist, the prostitute, 
the adultress, the great criminal and 
outcast, the warrior, the rebel-poet, the devil, the fool... To be sure, 
these characters have not disappeared from the literature of advanced 
industrial society, but they survive essentially transformed... They 
are no longer images of another way of life but rather freaks or 
types of the same life, serving as an affirmation rather than negation 
of the established world. 8 
Marcuse continues by asserting that the accommodation of the outcast into a system 
which affirms established reality is not, however, complete. In these characters - 
which read like a cast list to the majority of Barker and Soyinka's plays - there 
remains the echo of a promise which both pre-dates and, Marcuse suggests, post- 
dates the political collapse of culture which characterizes the industrial age. He 
insists that these characters continue to haunt our consciousness, and to promise the 
potential of a life beyond the society which relies upon reification as its only means 
of cultural reproduction. 
Speaking from a similar position, Theodor Adorno recognizes in art the possibility 
of an aesthetic sphere which would be subject to a system of laws and practices 
evolved, not in opposition to the progress of reason, but rather in resistance to the 
bloodless abstractions an historically constituted system of logical reasoning could 
be predicted to produce. The aesthetic is a system which mirrors Enlightenment 
reason but finds its logic in creative reason, thus committing itself to the production 
of that which is uselessly beautiful in man; in that which resists reification because 
it cannot produce, its only function being to affirm its own existence: 
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[At the end of the 18th century] the various arts were removed from 
the context of everyday life and conceived of as something that 
could be treated as a whole... As the realm of non-purposive 
creation and disinterested pleasure, this whole was contrasted with 
the life of society which it seemed the task of the future to order 
rationally, in strict adaptation to definable ends. 9 
For Adorno, the space of art and its autonomous aesthetic constitutes a safe haven 
for prolonged cultural hibernation, given that this chimerical sphere is defined only 
by its uselessness and therefore remains beyond the grasp of utilitarian imaginings. 
Adorno, like Nietzsche, 10 places his hope in the preservation of that which is 
useless in culture in order to await the listener, or spectator that may, once again, 
respond to an imagination forged in resistance to the concept of man's usefulness. 
The commitment of the artist is, therefore, to an aesthetic born of a vigilant critical 
resistance to the forces of reification which threaten constantly to flush out the 
hiding-places of bodies defined by their process of becoming non-identical with 
historical representation 
For both Adorno and Marcuse, the creation of an aesthetic is the forging of a space 
of historical critique. This space both pre-dates and promises a post-dating of 
historical man for it is the prizing loose of pain and terror from social utility in 
order to create an image of man overcoming the horror of existence through a will 
unmediated by society, precisely because it occurs where society is not; in the 
debris which could not be made whole. Aesthetic creation trails the movement of 
identity from an historically constituted position - the systematized' 'I' - to a 
culturally regulated sphere within which the 'I', rather than designating a fixed 
position within the law, itself constitutes the law upon which activity is founded. 
Most important, the aesthetic is a sphere which refuses the social concept of 
communal responsibility; its sole function is to maintain itself within its 
contemporary historical context and the product - that which, were it not 
recognized as beautiful would disappear completely - is utterly useless as an 
inducement to the continuation of purposive life: 
Art amends conceptual knowledge in that [art] attains, on its own 
and in complete isolation, what conceptual knowledge vainly expects 
to learn from its focus on the... subject-object relation, which is that 
an objective quality discloses itself through subjective effort. it 
The separation of art from society at the end of the eighteenth century offers, for 
Adorno, the promise that bodies uncodified by State practices may still find the 
possibility of appearance so long as the artist recognizes his potential as the creator 
of that which resists the definition of thought as a model for practical application. 
Processes of reason posit thought as the precursor to action; the artist produces 
thought as action thus reproducing an imaginative realm which presents the 
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spectator with the potential for a critical distance from the systems which seek to 
translate its impulses. Adorno's assertion is therefore that the "muffled noise from 
below history" which Foucault perceives to be clothed in silence, may have a body 
and that its appearance is dependent upon the artist who attempts the excavation of 
the aesthetic. 
The Forging of the Aesthetic in Howard Barker's Victory. 
Victory: Choices in Reaction 12- first staged at the Royal Court in 1983 - was not 
the first of Barker's plays to take historical event as its subject matter, but it was 
the first in which he determined that his relationship to the audience was henceforth 
to be that of resistance rather than acquiescence: 
Because the audience dominates the playwright, he is unlikely to be 
the instrument by which the theatre undergoes profound changes of 
function. The poet on the other hand, may lead the audience, albeit 
unwillingly, into new relations with the stage quite simply because 
he does not care about them, but regards them as privileged 
witnesses to a rare event. 13 
Barker distinguishes himself from the playwright, not only by refusing the 
playwright's craft, but also by resisting his function as being that of a man "who 
thinks in his time. " Barker suggests that the poet, once freed from the need to 
gratify the social and familial concerns of his spectators, may discover the oxygen 
inherent in an obligation to discordancy, a word which shares a close proximity 
with Nietzsche's "untimeliness". To be untimely is to breathe a different air to that 
which clings about the stifled larynx of 'timely' duty and responsible citizenship. It 
is to lend appearance and articulation to that which the historical present cannot 
sustain: that which - in man - stands testament to a defiance of the worldview 
gainfully preferred by contemporary discourse. Thus, the untimely man recognizes 
as perspective that which his contemporaries believe to be the limits of their 
horizon. By taking up his position on that horizon he may therefore both discern 
the nature of the perspective and employ his vision to seek out the origins of the 
skewed fore and hind sight which have produced present reality. The untimely man 
is one who does not believe in the present, nor does he aspire to belong to the 
present. Rather, he defines the present as that which he is not, seeking in its place a 
body which will clothe the difference his being asserts; that which will make him 
unrecognisable to the perspective he critiques. Only by being that to which no 
name may be attached may the untimely man alter the sense of historical 
perspective; only by seizing upon that which it is impossible to comprehend may he 
bear witness to change. The discordant poet, Barker states, requires of the theatre 
that which it - as an institution - perceives to be impossible, from scenes which 
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cannot be staged, to stage-directions which defy the imagination, 14 to characters 
one cannot comprehend. It is possible, Barker continues that the poet that requires 
the impossible will be perceived to be a bad playwright, for he refuses the limits of 
the craftsman's practical imagination, but only by refusing the reality of those 
limits and demanding thought that goes beyond practical application will the theatre 
discover both the potential and the essential laws of self-assertion which govern its 
appearance as more than a scion of State-based culture. 
In citing his relationship to Victory as being that of the poet, Barker is, therefore, 
making his claim upon the artist's right to excavate the aesthetic of his age. He 
takes as his tools the existing theatre, defined as a systematic codification of art, 
and history, as the subject matter with which his play concerns itself. He, like 
William Blake in the quotation which opens this chapter, resists enslavement by the 
act of creating; an artistic labour which has no comparative paradigm in the 
reasoned logic of production and therefore constitutes a system in its own right. 
The events of Victory take as their setting the restoration of Charles II to the 
English throne following the degeneration of Oliver Cromwell's Republic. The 
structure of the play places the spectator on the periphery, or horizon, of a 
radically unstable social configuration which nevertheless does contain the seeds of 
a rationalized and ordered worldview but visible only as if viewed through the 
wrong end of a telescope. The administered world of historical reality sits at the 
centre of Barker's play, straddling the gap in the two-act structure. The all- 
encompassing Enlightenment logic with which contemporary Western man is 
familiar finds its framed appearance as "An Interlude", thus reversing the 
perspective which would suggest the omnipresence of the historical viewpoint. The 
Interlude, which satirizes the origins of the capitalist economic base is certainly the 
most confidently crafted of the episodes which make up Barker's text; a fact which 
he debates in an interview given shortly after the first production of the play at the 
Royal Court: 
Watching rehearsals of Victory I recognized that I most enjoyed the 
scenes that were quite bereft of satire - the scenes on the Thames 
estuary for example - but that for sheer effect the Banker's scene 
carried most weight. I am for passion in the theatre and satire is at 
the opposite pole. It's a matter of finding the courage. is 
Despite the fact that it is only via the alienating tropes of passion that Barker allows 
his spectators the respite of his satirical lampoon, his recognition of its power to 
outweigh passion upon the stage became a prelude to his rejection of its form 
within his work. Henceforth it was to be regarded as a remnant of the playwright's 
desire to gratify and is therefore finally discarded. What Barker mistrusts in satire 
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is the ease with which it denudes of terror that of which the spectator perhaps has 
most need to be terrified. In an article published in 1986 in the Guardian, 16 Barker 
was unequivocal in his damning of satire as a form which he perceives to aid the 
progress of the authoritarian state: "It is culture reduced to playing the spoons. The 
stockbroker laughs, and the satirist plays the spoons. " 17 
If the Interlude could be relied upon, in the original production, to induce a sense 
of comfort and relief in its spectators, the first scene of the play is celebrated for its 
ability to cause the exeunt of a sizeable minority of the audience. The cause of 
offence is the repeated use of the word 'cunt' by Gaukroger, an agent of the king 
whose function it is to locate and supervise the exhumation of traitorous corpses. 
Barker's re-iteration of the word is - of course - intended to shock, but the desire is 
not to expose the audience to gratuitous verbal violence. Rather 'cunt' is used to 
introduce language as an historicized object rather than a timeless mode of 
expression. Language, in Victory, designates character as an outside, an exterior, 
which trumpets perspective as the active contestation of forces which, for the most 
part, resist synthesis in their desire to own, or impose their will upon, the bodies of 
others. Barker returns rhetoric to the theatre, in place of the psychologized 
character, thus allowing language to retrieve its verbal richness as an agency by 
which the speaker may pronounce a view of the world which asserts its right to 
exist, not as a truth, but rather as the manifestation of a will which has the ability 
to impose its reality upon others: 
It is not for nothing that the word 'cunt' operates both as the most 
extreme notation of abuse and also the furtherest reach of desire, and 
not only in male speech, and in attempting to eliminate the word the 
thing itself is eliminated, since nothing can stand in for it. Since 
what cannot be expressed cannot exist dramatically, the attempt to 
abolish the word becomes an attack on the body itself -a veiled 
attempt to remove the body from dramatic space. 18 
In an essay which responds to accusations of obscenity levelled at his work, Barker 
asks 'What is the will that articulates itself? ' when the question "Do you really 
need those words? " is asked. The issue, he suggests, has nothing to do with 
obscenity, but rather concerns the ownership of the body and the proprietorship of 
the means by which the body may make an appearance in discourse. The question, 
for Barker, exposes the process of colonization by which the body has become both 
the subject and object of scientific discourse. Barker asserts - after Adorno - that 
the artist must resist the discursive persuasion of the colonizers, and maintain an 
artistic ownership of the body in the faith that the aestheticized object would prove 
a source of resistance to the reified consciousness which "return[s] the body to the 
biology class where eroticism is displaced and desire corrupted into a squalid 
fetishism. " 19 
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The alienation to which Barker subjects the spectator in the opening moments of 
Victory is akin, therefore, to a moral vertigo produced by the destabilization of 
categories which hold both the idea of the audience 'body', and the positioning of 
the individual body - as subject - in discourse, in place. This de-centring of 
meaning and jumbling of categories imposed upon an audience without warning or 
introduction offers a 'sense' of history which far exceeds the researched detail of 
the costume drama. It is interesting to note that a number of newspaper critics were 
careful to point out to their readers that Victory in fact had nothing to do with 
history, but was rather a historical peg upon which Barker could hang his love of 
dramatic excess. Anthony Curtiss of the Financial Times offers a fairly 
representative voice: 
Mr Barker is jolly careful not to say that his play is intended to be 
historical. The history emerges throwaway fashion from the 
dialogue. History is the basis for a dramatic fable about the 
condition of England in a post-revolutionary period. The moral is 
obscure ... 20 
The need for critics to distinguish 'history' as other to that which Barker portrays 
upon the stage, negatively defines the official version as that which centralizes the 
known and the recognizable, leaving to the imagination only the task of fleshing 
out the characters that furnish the illustrative events. Barker, in resistance to this 
version, offers a history which is Unrecognizable by virtue of the fact that it is 
shorn of the dialectic, thus replacing the forged chains of reason, truth and 
meaning, with eruptions of desire manifesting themselves upon the site of the body. 
He fractures contemporary historical discourse, therefore, in order to glimpse the 
blood and guts of a language which was discarded in order that 'We' might exist. 
That which has greatest proximity to the spectators at the beginning of Barker's 
Victory is that which proves least recognizable from the perspectives offered by the 
ideological frameworks of the late twentieth century. The device is simple; Barker 
examines first that which is furthest away, both temporally and spatially, from the 
administrative heartbeat of a society which is already awakening to the potential of 
property-ownership as the basis of economic power. The first images of the play 
are concerned with a very different image of power which is negotiated as a form 
of transaction executed over an open grave. The corpse of the Republican Idealist, 
Bradshaw is disclosed, in a moment of shameful defeat, by his secretary, Scrope, 
and passes into the ownership of his enemies; the recently returned loyalists to the 
monarchy. The transaction is marked physically by the removal of the corpse in 
order that it may be exhibited, and verbally in the imposition of corporeality upon 
the skeleton which had previously received a fleshless sanctification offered by 
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Scrope in memory of his betrayed mentor. Bradshaw has died a saint and is now 
resurrected as a traitor: 
Gaukroger: We never had one out of a field. Under the whispering cow 
shit and adulterous hips. Gob open to clay and the 
milkmaid's hot little puddle. But in sight of church steeple, I 
notice. How picturesque he was and diligent. Was he, Mr 
Scrope? Cunt picturesque your master? 21 
Here is a rationality which has as its motor the appearance of power as visited upon 
the fleshy contours of the body. This power is an overt force which above all 
desires to be seen, to be public, to make a spectacle of its ability to transform that 
which passes into its hands. It is, above all, the visiting of the imaginative impulse 
upon corporeal reality; thus, the restoration of the flesh of the monarch is 
celebrated by the exhibition of the fleshless corpses of his enemies. The gain is a 
forced re-entry into the popular imagination; the return of the exiled body. 
The closer the actions of the play take the audience to the secret meeting of the 
Bankers in the vaults of the Bank of England the more ambivalent becomes this 
particular manifestation of power. For the Bankers, the chaos inflicted on the 
countryside by rampaging cavaliers has no symbolic power, the status accorded to 
it being its use as a means of distracting the monarchists from the real business of 
State which involves a wholesale confiscation of their property for the benefit of 
the new economic order. The Bankers are history minus the flesh; their progress 
depends upon the abstraction of power from matter and the conceptualizing of the 
relationship man has to the world of his perceptions. For Charles, the force their 
bodies carry is an alien one, impervious and secret. It is a power which refuses to 
acknowledge itself, thus confounding the imagination of the newly restored 
monarch: 
Hambro: I prefer not to imagine - 
Charles: Billy won't imagine! Billy won't! (He goes close to him. ) Or 
don't it really matter any more? (Pause) Billy, I do not like 
you awfully. You have such cold grey eyes and never fuck 
nobody. I wish I was cleverer, I would follow your tricks 
like the dog to the bitch's arse. I think you entertain some 
sort of treason. 
Hambro: Treason? 
Charles: (mocking) What! Treason! What! (He smiles. ) No, Billy, darling, I mean I don't think you love me, do you, my flesh, 
the bone and blood of Charlie? Do you? Really love me? 22 
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The return of Charles to England is heralded by Ball, a cavalier, as "the restoration 
of old lewdness and the reign of fucking. " 23 For him, 'old' England is carried in 
the body as unmediated desire, furnishing his imagination with the imposition of 
sovereign power upon those he designates as victims, whose bodies may be split 
asunder by the naked force of a sexual will. Love, for Ball, lies in the image of 
that which he is not; in puritan women who excite his imagination to a devastation 
of their willed order. In his first encounter with Susan Bradshaw, widow to the 
exhumed corpse - and carrier of the major narrative of the play - Ball takes the 
opportunity to display a vibrant corporeality which recognizes power as the chaos 
of the body at war with the limits of the flesh: 
Oh, breathe on me your English breath, sweeter than roses, but then 
you have had English gardens to wipe your rump against, I have not 
but I am not angry, no, I'm not, I have licked Frenchmen's bums 
for nourishment and Spaniards' crotches! Breathe on me, breathe on 
me, do, when you stand there icy in your purity I could really 
dagger you with my old cavalier dick, that or murder, carry on 
informing Billy. 24 
By contrast, the first image Barker offers of Susan Bradshaw is that of a woman 
drenched in the puritanical will of her husband's memory. She is visited in her 
home by Ball and Roast, an erstwhile supporter of the republic and now a civil 
servant, in order that she might be informed of her husband's fate. Three versions 
of England converge at this early stage in the play, each forged in language and 
intimating, via the scope of its discourse, the choices offered to those subjugated to 
its linguistically defined boundaries. Ball, the agent of bodily chaos is contrasted to 
Roast who heralds a 'new world' born in the teeth of imaginative failure; a world 
in which the systematic pragmatism of progress necessitates the ideological 
mediation of desire. Bradshaw, locked into the memory of an abandoned ideal, 
trapped by her own will within the stranglehold of her husband's utopian stasis, 
finds herself subject to actions over which she has no control. She is therefore 
propelled towards the defeated life of the victim, crying her anguish at the tragic 
injustice of her fate. 
Pinioned by forces which refuse the possibility of choice, the puritan Susan must 
embrace an entirely predictable life of pious resignation. Suddenly trapped in the 
'meanwhile' of Bhabha's "empty, homogeneous time" her role is akin to that of 
characters in a novel who transverse but never enter the flow of the linear 
development. Thus, denied novelistic fulfilment, they are doomed to the repetition 
of actions and behaviour which determine the authenticity of the novel without ever 
participating in its progress. The one choice open to Susan, if she is to carry her 
will beyond the confines of the reactive liminal, is to embrace the forces which 
threaten to destroy her but as a means of making herself anew. The nature of her 
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resistance is therefore the willed creation of a body that affirms; that discovers 
itself to be a work of 'art' in order to survive the destruction of that which believed 
itself to be authentic. 
Barker, in allowing Bradshaw's process of aesthetic transformation to carry the 
narrative of the play, refuses his audience the possibility of empathic response. 
Bradshaw the victim destroys that in herself which makes victimhood possible: a 
process which, as Barker has commented, makes her thoroughly unlikeable: 
What occurs in the form of consecutive scenes, or in real time 
played on the stage, inevitably implies a moral perspective unless the 
seductive effect of the stage is subverted, as I attempted in Victory... 
to prevent the audience wandering into a state of dreamy sympathy 
with a preordained morality, the sort of Christian-humanist ethic that 
says all victims are good. Susan Bradshaw is relentlessly bad, even 
if she is the victim of political pendulums. 25 
The transition from historical functionary to active player may be likened to the 
emergence of Bradshaw as an actor rather than a character. Theatrical discourse 
provides these two designations of 'being' upon the stage which, although offering 
discrete categorizations, are mutually dependent as agents of the 'appearance' of 
life within the stage's boundaries. The epistemology of this balanced combination - 
which forms the genealogical history of the actor - may be traced back to Aristotle 
who, -defined unequivocally the relationship of the actor to character as a means of 
securing the desired effect of the tragic drama upon its spectators. 
In chapter six of the Poetics, entitled "A Description of Tragedy", 26 Aristotle 
places the actor at the base of an hierarchical structuring of tragic form, which 
finds its apex in 'action' and its active agent in 'character'. In contemporary 
translations, character is defined by its service to the representation of the actions 
which form the raw material of the plot, and it is this combination of elements to 
which is attributed the stimulation of 'tragic emotion'. Aristotle emphasizes the fact 
that tragedy is not character based, and even goes so far as to suggest that a well 
constructed tragedy should work upon its audience without the necessity of 
characters being present. The. source of tragic art is, for Aristotle, the ordering of 
the events which will form the construction of the plot. In the drawing of 
character, therefore, he cautions: 
... one must always 
bear in mind what will be either necessary or 
probable; in other words, it should be necessary or probable that 
such and such a person should say or do such and such a thing, and 
similarly that this particular incident should follow on that. 27 
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Of the actor, Aristotle has little to say, except that his presence is not integral to 
the action, would most likely distract from the fragile web which holds the 
audience in thrall to the poet's art, and that his major function is to serve as the 
invisible mouthpiece to the tragic language. 
There are two points to be made here, both of which are pertinent to Barker's 
construction of the action of Victory. First, Aristotle's analysis is clear in its 
designation of that part of man which may be abstracted in order to illustrate 
action. Character is not conceived as a begetter of action, nor does its presence or 
absence either eliminate or determine the history of which it is a part. The tragic 
character, therefore, exists as a functionary of the plot; plot being defined by 
Aristotle as: 
... a unified whole; and 
its various incidents must be so arranged that 
if any one of them is differently placed or taken away the effect of 
wholeness will be seriously disrupted. For if the presence or absence 
of something makes no apparent difference, it is no real part of the 
whole. 28 
My second point concerns the actor, who bears no relation either to plot or to 
character, the power of tragedy being: "independent both of performance and 
actors. " 29 Thus, the ordered actions of tragedy are carried by the abstracted 
characteristics of man, in service to an historical progression, and given animation 
by the actor who must maintain an invisibility in order to hold the theatrical 
illusion in place. In his imposition of the categorical imperative upon the life of the 
stage event, Aristotle demands the absolute subordination of the actor to the 
representation of abstracted man which will appear upon the stage. In doing so he 
banishes from theatrical discourse the question for which the stage is supremely 
fashioned: "Who is it that speaks? " In ousting the actor, who carries the art of 
dissimulation as a badge of his trade, Aristotle refers the spectator back to the 
proper name of the historical character - which is identical with its theatrical 
representation - as the very origin and source of 'truth' within the text. The 
perspectivism made possible by the presence of the actor, who 'plays' his role 
rather than being identical with the roles allotted to him, is thus negated as a 
fundamental precept of theatrical discourse, leaving to historical event the dramatic 
spectrum that which may more properly be claimed to be the province of the actor 
The character in service to history carries the pathos of victimhood; 'character' 
being the focus of forces against which action is shown to be futile. The history is 
already written, man's part in it is to illustrate his inevitable obeisance to 
patternings of life beyond his comprehension. The response invited by man as 
character/victim is that of pity. Gilles Deleuze offers a Nietzschean interpretation 
of pity as a stimulus to non-affirmative life: 
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What is pity? It is this tolerance for states of life close to zero. Pity 
is the love of life, but of the weak, sick, reactive life. It is militant 
and announces the final victory of the poor, the suffering, the 
powerless and the small. It is divine and gives them this victory. 
Who feels pity? Precisely those who can only tolerate life when it is 
reactive, those who need this life and this triumph, those who build 
their temples on the marshy ground of such a life. 30 
Susan Bradshaw, recognizing her choice to be that of embracing victimhood or 
embracing the forces of reaction in order to make of herself the actor, or 
dissembler, who knowingly acquiesces to that which seeks her destruction, begins 
by refusing the Aristotelian caution that character should adhere to the possible, or 
probable. In a series of linguistic shifts she wills herself to dare to imagine beyond 
the confines of the world she has forged for herself and finds in her daughter's pity 
the stimulus required to the imaginative leap necessary to her travail beyond the 
known: 
Bradshaw: They have found him. And stuck his head on a pole. 
(Cropper goes to her, embraces her. ) Through his brain. His 
poor brain. An old spike. (She parts from her. ) Or not, do 
you think? I say brain, but that's silly, that really is silly, the 
brain I'd have thought, being soft - 
Cropper: Shh - 
Bradshaw: The very first thing to rot, I expect, I imagine would - 
Cropper: Don't imagine - 
Bradshaw: I want to imagine! Would go liquid or possibly -I have not 
seen a brain - dry up like a nut -a rattling nut - 
Cropper: Shh! 
Bradshaw: ... in the skull -a pebble - or 
imagine - 
Cropper: Don't imagine - 
Bradshaw: I will imagine! Stop telling me not to imagine! 31 
Susan Bradshaw finds in her daughter's pity-filled remonstrations the means by 
which to defy history. She uses a will born of the imagination first to transform the 
abstracted memory of her husband's intellectual body into the disintegrating vision 
lent to her by his enemies. Thus, the perfection of the punishment visited upon him 
by the King's forces - the making flesh of a man whose instinct was to deny the 
corporeal - is now inflicted a second time by his wife, not as the eruption of 
repressed desire, but rather as the creation of an impossible desire; to survive her 
own accommodation and capitulation to forces she recognizes as superior to her 
own inherited strategies of resistance. 
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Bradshaw's physical journey through the terrain of the play begins with her 
decision travel to London to retrieve her husband's 'bits', furnished with the 
understanding that in order to attempt this paradoxical act of piety she must "learn 
to be a dog now" thus eschewing the impotence of historically determined dignity 
in favour of a survival wrought in the exigencies of culturally determined struggle. 
Bradshaw re-makes herself in the image of that which her husband sought to 
expunge from his utopia, published under the title of Harmonia Britannia. In so 
doing she rejects his paean to ordered stasis and discovers her body capable of 
another life; one which triumphs in its ability to 'act', rather than to consider 
'action' and therefore to replace judgement with critique. Bradshaw's plunge into 
the sea of forces, which circulate as satellites to the kernel of history without ever 
conjoining their energy to its progress, sets free a life absented from gain or 
advantage. Thus, Susan's transformations, although premised upon her personal 
quest to return her husband to his home, become manifestations of untimeliness: 
the joyful affirmation of a life which bears no relation to the images of 'happiness' 
perpetuated by ideological frameworks of belief. Bradshaw's determination to say 
'yes' to all that is 'no' in her makes of her body a battleground, which draws its 
sustenance from the routing and destruction of every instinct that calls her to pity, 
forgiveness or shame: 
Yes means no resistance. Yes means going with the current. Yes 
means lying down when it rains and standing up when its sunny. Yes 
urge. Yes womb. Yes power. I lived with a man whose no was in 
the middle of his heart, whose no kept him thin as a bone and stole 
the juices from him. No is pain and yes is pleasure, no is man and 
yes is nature. Yes is old age and no is early death. Yes is laughter, 
no is torture. I hate no. No is misery and lonely nights. 32 
This rhetoric is offered as an 'education' by Bradshaw, (who has been reduced to 
begging) to Devonshire, the King's mistress - described by Susan as "the worst 
bitch in the kingdom" - on a beach on the Thames Estuary. The strength of 
Bradshaw's words lies not only in the powerful rhetoric they employ but also in the 
brutal disjuncture which is discerned between choice and happiness. Susan strips 
life of its capacity to offer 'happiness' and finds in its stead the ambiguous 'joy' of 
the body as a site of transformation, not at the hands of a sovereign power, but 
rather through the breadth and capacity of an imagination no longer trammelled by 
the need to reconcile contradiction. This untrammelled creativity makes of life an 
art, and of life's actions an aesthetic, constantly surprising with the possibility of 
active critique, that which had formerly appeared to be inviolable. 
Having reached London, Bradshaw finds herself in the garden of Clegg, the King's 
poet, in the presence of Milton whom Clegg hides "in case one day he writes a 
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good thing in adversity". Confronted with her husband's erstwhile colleague 
Bradshaw's response is to ignore the genius and castigate the man who has failed to 
maintain the power to hold her in thrall: 
Bradshaw: I do think it's impossible to respect a genius when he's out of 
luck. I do. I quailed before you once, couldn't bring myself 
to speak - not that Bradshaw wanted me to, did he - just cart 
the sandwiches this way and that - but really, you made me 
tremble, and now you move me so little I could - (With 
sudden inspiration, she slaps his face. ) 
Milton: Aaaggghhh! 
Clegg: (Returning with a tray) Oh, don't do that... 
Milton: Aaarrrhhh! 
Scrope: (To Bradshaw) I hate you for that! 
Bradshaw: (In delight) No, look - 
Scrope: Hate you for that! 
Bradshaw: See what I did! 
Scrope: Ugly! Ugly! 33 
Bradshaw's delight at having found the inspiration to offer a humiliating slap to the 
blind poet is translated by Milton himself into that which is comprehensible and 
applicable to political allegory; he returns her action to history, making of her the 
vessel of forces beyond her comprehension. Barker, however, refuses this action its 
historical import. Bradshaw declares to Milton that she has "broken herself into 
pieces to do this"; the slap articulates a new mastery, a new body which refuses as 
its goal political or historical utility. This, Barker declares to be a moment of 
'beauty', despite the ugliness of the spectacle, for Bradshaw has found the triumph 
of the actor over the character and discovered that it is a triumph which finally lies 
not in the action but in the ability to articulate the instinct without fear for its 
consequences. 
The play ends with the return of Susan to her daughter's home, carrying the bones 
of Bradshaw in a sack. She offers the remains to Cropper, who is unable to 
appreciate the weight of meaning woven into their retrieval, and responds by 
announcing her own resurrection of Bradshaw's body; the translation from the 
Latin of Harmonia Britannia which she intends to put into print. Juxtaposed with 
Cropper's dream of an accessed readership for her father's utopia, is the image of 
Bradshaw, in her arms the child which is the result of a rape, and at the end of a 
rope, Ball, the now mutilated rapist, whom she has chosen to take as her husband. 
Bradshaw has travelled where history wasn't, and in her rejection of either utopian 
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stasis, or dialectical progress, has returned to her daughter the debris that could not 
be redeemed; that chose to triumph in the life which made contradiction a victory 
over the inert or reactive life. In the closing moments of the play, the actions are 
shown to be futile; the price of the digression from history a rendering of Susan, in 
the apotheosis of her pain, a grotesque site of wrought meaning without 
consequence - the nightmarish wound from which the Harmonia will shield its 
future historical readership. 
There is no explanation for Bradshaw's actions, and as the lights fade she passes 
into her daughter's house, declaring "there is nowhere to go in the end, but where 
you came from, is there? " This is not an act of reconciliation however, rather the 
return defines change and the triumph inscribed in the new Susan's body is a 
triumph over the Aristotelian dictum: 
... whatever 
is beautiful, whether it be a living creature or an object 
made up of various parts, must necessarily not only have its parts 
properly ordered, but also be of an appropriate size, for beauty is 
bound up with size and order. 34 
Bradshaw the actor has said 'yes' to that which Aristotle refuses and thus 
discovered a drama wherein the chaos of perceptions is subject to the patterning of 
an individual aesthetic, which finds the self to be utterly dissimilar to the historical 
structure of the State, although having in common certain of its elements. Life, 
intimates Barker's Bradshaw, is subject to endless configurations, all of which 
return us to "where we came from". The actor knows that 'order' is the censorship 
of transformation, and that the desire to 'play' that which one is not affirms the 
potential of human culture. To posit 'order' as beauty and the possibility of 
perfection, is to fear change as the opening to catastrophe; in catastrophe Susan 
finds the possibility that creation itself, as a critique of what is, is the only order 
that does not return to the 'meanwhile' that which has dared the transgression of 
'not yet'. 
The 'beauty' posited by Aristotle stands in stark contrast to Barker's creation of 
Susan Bradshaw. Where Aristotle insists upon order and wholeness, Barker asks 
whether we don't, as human beings, require the possibility of a beauty made up of 
that which cannot be redeemed or made whole: 
The wound is the aim of the new theatre and the intention of the 
actor. His performance will create the wound and the wound will be 
the subject of continuing anxiety... Slowly the audience will 
discover the new theatre to be a necessity for its moral and 
emotional survival. It will endure the wound as a man drawn from a 
swamp endures the pain of the rope. 35 
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The Nature of Redemption in Wole Soyinka's Death and the King's Horseman 
What is this reconciliation with history? Not even Death and the 
King's Horseman, that purposefully 'unmediated' piece can be 
proposed as representing a society 'reconciled with history. 36 
Wole Soyinka's Death and the King's Horseman 37 is a play which has acted as a 
rallying cry to the redemptive urges of contemporary critics who, like Benjamin's 
"angel", long to gaze into the future but find their gaze fixed upon the catastrophic 
past which signals the inability of progress - the storm blown up from Paradise - to 
encompass all that man is. Written during Soyinka's Fellowship at Churchill 
College, Cambridge, in a period of self-imposed exile following the Nigerian civil 
war and his imprisonment at the hands of the Gowon regime, Death and the 
King's Horseman is the only one of Soyinka's plays to deal directly with a 
verifiable historical incident. Like Barker, however, Soyinka's attitude towards the 
treatment of history as dramatic material shuns the illustrative in order to examine 
the conceptual uses to which history - as a patterning of contemporary perceptions - 
is currently subject. The importance attributed to the means by which it shuns 
official discursive formulations may be gauged by the extremity of response it has 
elicited from critics who contest the right of the author to offer a fabricated version 
of events which may be proven to be otherwise by recourse to documentary 
evidence. The insistence by critics such as Femi Osofisan and Biodun Jeyifo, 38 that 
what Soyinka has 'created' must be categorized as reactionary myth, rather than 
history is, as this section will debate, a contestation over the 'rights' to fabricated 
history and the ownership of the discourse which supports historical fabrication as 
political expediency. This contestation of rights is in itself a part of the 
historicizing of the role of the artist in relation to the cultural and political needs of 
his society. The question concerning how those needs are determined, and by 
whom, returns us to the formulations of nationalist discourse as the shaping of a 
logic which determines, not only economic progress, but also the shapes and 
contours within which the thoughts and aspirations of its citizens may reside. 
In National Self-Determination in Post-Colonial Africa, Benjamin Neuberger 
suggests that the success of nationalist 'discourse rests upon its provision of a 
philosophical vessel - "a collectivization of Kant's idea of the autonomous will of 
individuals" 39 - which promises an enquiry into, and therefore a centralization of, 
identity as the motor to the development of democratic systems. The vessel proves 
however to be drained of its content, leaving only the shell of enquiry without the 
substance which would sustain its rigour. The content of the vessel is found to be 
the political expediency of State-based systems of economics, housed in the 
trappings of a concept which gains a universalized meaning only because it is 
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unable to offer the sophisticated particularity of response necessary to the 
categories it proposes. 
Neuberger asserts that any enquiry into the nature of nationalist discourse must first 
return to basic questions concerning the nature of the 'self' and its positioning in 
relation to the equally nebulous concept of the 'nation', together with its abstracted 
catalyst 'determination'. Neuberger's proposal runs thus: that shorn of the means to 
interrogate the philosophical concepts promised by nationalist discourse, the only 
definition of the self which will be made available within its contours is a version 
written from the perspective of politicians. The culture which that self articulates 
will therefore manifest itself in the reiteration of its political origins, and the 
history which will support those manifestations will be the consequence of a 
process of selection whereby history will appear to make inevitable that which is 
defined by its fabricated progress towards the present moment. History, culture and 
the self all become objects of a nationalist discourse, therefore, out of which may 
be wrought the politics of identity which names as 'natural', 'sacred', and 'given' 
that which is expedient. In response to this, Soyinka proffers, in Death and the 
King's Horseman, the potential posited by the artist as the maker of identificatory 
moulds of experience. In both cases the source involves fabricated material, but the 
use to which that material is put becomes a major aspect of Soyinka's text. 
The status accorded to Elesin Oba, the eponymous Horseman of Soyinka's play, is 
that of a man who is able to name himself: 
Elesin: ... You all 
know 
What I am. 
Praise: That rock that turns its open lodes 
Into the path of lightning. A gay 
Thoroughbred whose stride disdains 
To falter though an adder reared 
Suddenly in his path. 
Elesin: My rein is loosened. 
I am master of my Fate. When the hour comes 
Watch me dance along the narrowing path 
Glazed by the soles of my great precursors. 
My soul is eager. I shall not turn aside. 40 
Elesin's self-knowledge is bom of the fact that he is the carrier of a tradition which 
states that one month after the death of the King, his Horseman - through an act of 
will imposed upon the flesh - follows his master into the realm of death. As a man 
who carries the exact timing and manner of his death with him, Elesin's life is 
accorded the status of one who exceeds the merely human by virtue of the fact that 
he demonstrates a willing accommodation to that which cannot be avoided, and in 
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doing so transforms the terror afforded by death into joyful affirmation of a life 
circumscribed by the certain knowledge of its final dissolution. 
The failure of Elesin's will, at the moment of his entry into death, and his 
subsequent shame at having lost the name by which his life was given meaning, 
form the twin foci of Soyinka's play. His structuring of the events, which prove a 
catalyst to the exposure of his major concerns, involves, as has been amply 
documented, the alteration of both the time and the geography of the original 
incident. The willed death of the Horseman is thus written as having taken place 
during the Second World War, a few years earlier than the newspaper report of the 
incident appeared, and the Horseman's son, Olunde, is transported to Britain for 
his education, rather than Ghana. Soyinka's manipulation of events brings into 
sharp focus the relationship between the white, colonial presence and the African 
communities under their rule. This factor, which is described as 'incidental' by 
Soyinka, has been commented upon broadly by critics as a central element of 
Soyinka's stagecraft: 
Despite Soyinka's insistence on the incidental quality of the 
Europeans, it cannot be denied that one of the main ways in which 
the play's Yoruba values are dramatically defined is by contrast with 
the attitudes of the uncomprehending whites. Theatrically, this is a 
most effective device, since the overwhelming majority of any 
audience (black or white) will be ideologically more attuned to 
individualistic ideology than to the communalist values represented 
in the central religious sacrifice of the play. 41 
Whilst James Booth is undoubtedly accurate in his recognition of Soyinka's 
stagecraft, he, like a number of other critics writing on this work, assumes that the 
comparison to be drawn in the play depends upon the imposition of a value system 
whereby the ideologically saturated and individualist oriented whites are shown to 
be the villains of the piece, whilst the ritually oriented communalist blacks live a 
life in cosmic harmony and thus prove themselves superior by comparison. Biodun 
Jeyifo, in his essay on the play, offers an extreme reading of this polarized conflict 
of values and suggests that there is an inherent conservatism in Soyinka's approach: 
... the supernatural or metaphysical element.. . also serves as proof of 'Africanness', and the more dense and impenetrable the better. And 
conformism to the dramatised custom or metaphysics is the hallmark 
of this cultural and metaphysical immersion. 42 
Soyinka unambiguously asserts, both in the Preface to his play, and in his essay 
"Who's Afraid of Elesin Oba? " - which attempts to answer the criticism his work 
has elicited - that the re-ordering of the elements which make up the original report 
involve, not a dialectical structuring of cause and effect, but rather an exploration 
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of ritual as the aestheticization of perennial values current in social constructions, 
and its relationship to 'meaning' in the contemporary world. The producer of the 
play is warned that the essential theme of the play is its "threnodic essence", 43 and 
that any over-balancing towards a comparative treatment of the two cultures 
involved will weaken this delicate strand which weaves between the white and 
black worlds represented. Soyinka asks his spectators, critics and readers to 
consider history not as the recounting of events with more or less verisimilitude, 
but rather the historicization of death as an ultimate source of historical meaning, 
both within the play, and within the cultures represented. His decision to place the 
action within the context of the Second World War thus becomes relevant once one 
considers this event too to be a pivotal moment for the Western world in its re- 
negotiation of ritualized attitudes towards the dead: 
A study of society, even of contemporary society reveals that Man 
resorts to the strangest devices for nullifying that unanswerable 
nullity of History, progress, materialist certitude, etc. as 
experienced, in the phenomenon of death. Now that is the ultimate, 
imponderable dialectic over which tragic poetry builds its symbolic 
edifice. It is better than nothing, and nothing is precisely what is 
offered even by the most radical and humanistic systems of world or 
self-apprehension, faced with this one definitive human experience, 
and of its surrogate relations in the 'tragic' fortunes of the individual 
in socio-political contexts. 44 
Tragic poetry, for Soyinka, exposes a silence which no system can adequately 
contain or make subject to processes of social amelioration. The question 
underpinning the play therefore concerns the individual's relationship with death, at 
a moment when the systems which maintain, support or create meaning in life 
finally reveal their paucity in the face of a nothingness to which they ultimately 
return us. Soyinka thus attempts in his play to confront that within the human being 
that gives the lie to politically-redeemed man, by challenging him with that which 
culture continually picks apart whilst history mourns its inability to mend it. 
The distinction between culture and history in Death and the King's Horseman is 
offered during the course of a conversation between Jane Pilkings, wife to Pilkings 
the District Officer whose responsibility it is to stop Elesin's willed death, and 
Olunde, son and heir to Elesin who, by the good offices of the Pilkings has 
travelled to England in order to study medicine and now, having been sent news of 
the King's death, returns to his home to bury his father's corpse. The exchange 
takes place during a fancy-dress ball, held at the Residency, which is being 
honoured by the presence of the Prince of Wales, bedecked in the costume of a 
seventeenth century European. Jane Pilkings is wearing a confiscated egüngün 
masquerade and Olunde is attired in a contemporary European suit. The intricacy 
of the layered cultural articulation which offers the context to their conversation is 
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extraordinary in itself, as is the concept of a fancy-dress ball offering diversion 
from the mighty collision of forces raging in the war that is contemporaneously 
consuming a large proportion of the world. Thus, Soyinka dresses Royalty in 
history, and not in any history, but in the costume of the seventeenth century which 
saw the overthrow of the monarchy and the demise of sovereign power, He gives 
to Jane Pilkings the costume of an African cult of the dead, thus lending her the 
voice of death itself, and Olunde, wearing the European suit which articulates 
conformism to established values, is isolated, not only by his presence as a black at 
a white gathering, but also by his visual articulation of codes which have been 
ritually overturned - as Jane explains - in order to attempt "The preservation of 
sanity in the midst of chaos. " 45 The idea that chaos must be imitated as a means to 
controlling it is every bit as complicated a ritual as the African rituals represented 
in the play, and Olunde's incursion paradoxically, makes the esotericism of the 
event complete. 
Olunde, having failed to find Pilkings in order to warn him against interference in 
his father's death, encounters Jane and becomes embroiled in a conversation which 
highlights the perspectivism of the two cultures to which they stand as 
representatives. Olunde explains that his proximity to the suffering caused by the 
war has allowed him an understanding of the white races as the 'survivors' of 
history; a title which grows in significance throughout the course of the play. Jane, 
by contrast describes her contact with the war as peripheral: 
Jane: Mind you there is the occasional bit of excitement like that 
ship that was blown up on the harbour. 
Olunde: Here? Do you mean through enemy action? 
Jane: Oh no, the war hasn't come that close. The captain 
did it himself. I don't quite understand it really. Simon tried 
to explain. The ship had to be blown up because it had 
become dangerous to the other ships, even to the city itself. 
Hundreds of the coastal population would have died. 
Olunde: Maybe it was loaded with ammunition and had caught fire. 
Or some of those lethal gases they've been experimenting on. 
Jane: Something like that. The captain blew himself up with it. 
Deliberately. Simon said someone had to remain on board to 
light the fuse. 
Olunde: It must have been a very short fuse. 
Jane: (shrugs) I don't know much about it. Only that there was no 
other way to save lives. No time to devise anything else. The 
captain took the decision and carried it out. 
Olunde: Yes... I quite believe it. I met men like that in England. 
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Jane: Oh just look at me! Fancy welcoming you back with such 
morbid news. Stale too. It was at least six months ago. 
Olunde: I don't find it morbid at all. I find it rather inspiring. It is an 
affirmative commentary on life. 
Jane: What is? 
Olunde: That captain's self-sacrifice. 
Jane: Nonsense. Life should never be thrown deliberately away. 
Olunde: And the innocent people round the harbour? 
Jane: Oh, how does one know? The whole thing was probably 
exaggerated anyway. 46 
I have quoted this passage at length in order to offer a commentary upon the 
processes Soyinka employs as a means of mediating the original material from 
which the play emerged. He has Jane Pilkings relate to Olunde, reported details 
from an incident which is already marked by linear time as an historical event. 
Wole Soyinka describes the genesis of Death and the King's Horseman as being 
the reported details offered to him by his colleague Ulli Beier as material which 
might prove suitable for a theatrical treatment. Although I am in no way suggesting 
a likeness between theatrical character and the real persons involved, the transition 
from death as an article of news to death as the articulation of a cultural aesthetic is 
one which has distinct relevance to the structural requirements of Soyinka's play. 
For Jane, the event signals a failure of systems of control, making morbid reading 
in its confirmation of waste as a by-product of historical progress. Her non- 
understanding of the causes finally makes of the event a sad accident; its technical 
inexplicability leaving her nothing to learn from its occurrence. She is as unable to 
read its cultural articulation as she to decipher the context of the fancy-ball within 
which Soyinka has placed her; the captain's death, like the visit of royalty, is 
newsworthy only so long as its informational content remains relevant, as the 
memory of the sensation fades, so does the ability to render its contingent meaning, 
returning to silence that which has no place in functional discourse. 
Olunde offers back to Jane a meaning which places in death the affirmation of life 
as a worthy inheritance. He translates the passing on of news into the immensity of 
will shown by the captain in his decision to act rather than to contemplate the 
consequences of his action. The speed with which the decision had to be taken is, 
for Olunde, the essence of the inspiration it affords him, for it by-passes support 
systems and technological solutions, thus making a kind of beauty possible, even in 
the midst of a barbaric utilisation of industrial resources. The willed death of the 
captain, whilst aboard a ship laden with the agencies of death, in order to 
circumvent a localised loss of life which is designated as innocent merely by virtue 
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of the fact that their deaths were not the goal of the load, has as its basis the 
irrationalism of a bodily instinct which overcomes its terror of nullity in spite of the 
systems of reason to which it is subject. 
Where Olunde sees beauty, Jane suggests that possibly there was exaggeration, thus 
closing the subject which threatens to disorder its status as news and suggest her 
possible complicity in that which cannot be understood rationally. The captain is 
consigned once more to history, but it is no accident that Soyinka has his act of 
self-sacrifice precede the imminent failure of the Elesin's attempted affirmation in 
death. 
For Olunde, death is redeemed of its relegation to history by its potential for the 
eruption of a tragic lexicon where all other linguistic utterance fails. This is 
language in process; a meaning wrought out of nothingness which must return to 
silence and yet provides a beacon to the beauty of human endeavour in confronting 
that return to silence. Gerald Moore in his appraisal of Soyinka's work, considers 
the language with which Elesin's act of self-immolation is bounded, noting the 
constant intimations of cosmic disaster offered to the Horseman by his community 
as dire warnings of the consequences should his will fail him at the vital moment of 
deathly embrace. The meaning carried by the Horseman's joyful will to death is 
immense - as intimated by the terrifying consequences its failure promises to those 
left behind - but ultimately paradoxical in terms of the function it serves. Moore 
comments - with barely concealed irritation - upon the community's catastrophic 
prognostications which follow in the wake of Elesin's loss of will: 
All are united at least in their insistence that we are not dealing with 
a single incident, however poignant, but with a climacteric in the 
failure of African civilization to maintain its integrity and hold its 
own course. Do not all of them exaggerate? In the language of 
myth, the Elesin's dishonour might spell all these "things. In the 
language of history, it was the process of change, at every level and 
in every comer of Yoruba society, which made such an incident 
inevitable. (My italics) 47 
Moore is unable to reconcile the enormity of the import with which Soyinka has 
endowed what, after all, was already an outmoded practice and therefore proves the 
exception rather than the rule to Yoruba custom within the time frame offered it by 
the play. Moore, like Jane Pilkings, suggests that the exaggeration of response, in 
which Elesin is described as having "tilted the world from its course and crashed it 
beyond the edge of emptiness... ", 48 may have relevance within the mythical world, 
but really has nothing to do with contemporary history which quite clearly 
demonstrates the fact that the failure of the ritual process does not result in the 
tipping of the world over the 'edge of emptiness'; an antiquated belief which hardly 
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does justice to the progress of Yoruba thought throughout the last hundred years of 
its historical development. Moore thus arrives at a similar conclusion to that 
articulated in Biodun Jeyifo's essay, namely that Soyinka's play offers its spectators 
a "vision that is not without its nobility" 49 but one which signally fails to 
acknowledge the historical complexities with which the contemporary imagination 
must grapple. The suggestion is, that Soyinka's evocation of a "feudal" Yoruba 
society, which attempts a simplified understanding of the world, is inherently 
flawed as a commentary upon recent historical events. 
Simon Pilkings, the play's District Officer, shares Jeyifo's and Moore's 
incomprehension at the continued existence and intransigence of a 'feudal' system 
of belief which defies the inevitable progress of history towards civilization. He is 
a man lacking a metaphysical imagination, which he would call superstition, and 
this condition demonstrates itself as a clumsy arrogance which refuses to respect 
that which affords no rational explanation. He, like his wife, dons the egüngün as a 
fancy dress, and fails to comprehend his Sergeant Amusa's reaction to it: 
Pilkings: What the hell is the matter with you man! 
Jane: Your costume darling. Our fancy dress. 
Pilkings: Oh hell, I'd forgotten all about that. (Lifts the face mask over 
his head showing his face. His wife follows suit. ) 
Jane: I think you've shocked his big pagan heart bless him. 
Pilkings: Nonsense, he's a Moslem. Come on Amusa, you don't 
believe in all this nonsense do you? I thought you were a 
good Mustern. 
Amusa: Mista Pirinkin, I beg you sir, what you think you do with 
that dress? It belong to dead cult, not for human being. 
Pilkings: Oh Amusa, what a let down you are. I swear by you at the 
club you know - thank God for Amusa, he doesn't believe in 
any mumbo jumbo. And now look at you! 50 
Amusa's words, within the context of Soyinka's play, of course achieve an 
ambiguity with their suggestion that only the non-human, the dead, would dare to 
don the egüngün masquerade. This is an ambiguity which Soyinka leaves hanging 
throughout the sequences prior to, and at, the fancy dress ball; the transgression 
visits no punishment upon the wearers, beyond the perception it allows Soyinka to 
lend to his spectators. The real danger that Simon represents within the play, 
however, is born of his limited imagination ; an absence which allows the casting 
of himself within the role of the redeemer. Thus, on hearing of Elesin's proposed 
suicide he has only two modes of reason by which to negotiate his response to it; 
first, in an attempt to pursue his own plans to go to the ball, he attempts a liberal 
141 
attitude of laissez-faire, suggesting that if ritual suicide is where their beliefs have 
got them, then he has no responsibility for the consequences. Prompted by his wife 
to a consideration of his principles, he adopts the second mode, which declares his 
duty to be that of preventing the potential waste of a human life, at which point he, 
in cheerful ignorance, departs to set the structures of containment in place which 
for him represent the solution to this particular situation. 
The playwright and critic, Femi Osofisan, offers a commentary upon Death and 
the King's Horseman which perceives the return to mythic source actually 
articulates a desire, on the part of society from which it issues to come to terms 
with the historical progression by which that society is ultimately defined: 
The humanist asserts that a subliminal mythopoeic intuition identifies 
all humanity, that in every society 
impulse 
at whatever age of growth or 
decadence, the progressive humane - that is the human urge 
to come to terms with history or even to transcend mundane 
imbecilities, resolves itself ultimately and dynamically into a 
continual drive to invoke the ancient communal psyche, through a 
dance - even transient - backwards into the womb of primaeval 
chaos ... Then the archetypal myths are again resuscitated, the 
symbols renewed, the community is again reconciled with history. sl 
How different is Osofisan's strategy to that employed by Simon Pilkings in his 
attempt to contain 'pagan ritual' within the barricades of redemptive reason? The 
strength of Soyinka's play lies in its ability to make ridiculous the efforts of the 
white race in dealing with a system of belief beyond the comprehension of the 
secular mind. The strategy employed by Soyinka, in order to effect the 
transformation of reason into laughable clumsiness, is to satirize the milieu which 
they inhabit, thus denuding of power a structure which, in actuality, underpins and 
maintains a global system of politics. Osofisan's strategy is to contain, within a 
universalized dialectic of humane progression, the return to source as a means of 
strengthening the resolve to historical reconciliation. Thus, the 'source' becomes a 
function of rationality, accommodated into structures for which its contradictory 
impulses pose no threat so long as they may be categorized within a framework 
which suggests their cultural benefit for humanity. Amilcar Cabran, in a short 
passage which provides an afterword to Jeyifo's essay, offers a clear example of 
the utility factor which must be brought to bear upon the concept of myth as an 
element of historical progression: 
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The 'return to source' is of no historical importance unless it brings 
not only real movement in the struggle for independence, but also 
complete and absolute identification with the hopes of the mass of 
the people, who contest not only the foreign culture, but also the 
foreign domination as a whole. Otherwise, the 'return to source' is 
nothing more than an attempt to find short-term benefits - knowingly 
or unknowingly a kind of political opportunism. 52 
The implication in this short passage offered by Cabral is that the use of source 
must be respected as a function of 'the greater good' and that any individualistic 
manipulation or fabrication actually constitutes political transgression of codes 
operating as a covert policing of ideological boundaries of containment. In response 
to the warnings offered by his compatriots, Soyinka insistently demands to know 
what it is that critics fear in his work, 'fear' being that which he perceives to fuel 
their desire for an ideological redemption of his artistic creations. What danger 
may be constituted by the use of the artistic imagination in response to the 
"irrevocably incomplete" 'data' retrieved from the annals of historical record, he 
enquires. Soyinka's reiterated request concerning the nature of the danger his work 
poses, may or may not be a wry application of contrived innocence in response to 
the defensive 'manning of the ideological barricades' which his play has elicited. 
The answer to these questions is, of course, impossible without an exposure of the 
nationalist discourse which holds them in place, and must remain invisible - even to 
its progenitors - if its 'naturalness' is to be maintained. It is to historians of that 
discourse that we must turn, therefore, in order to clarify the ideological disquiet 
which disguises itself in the discourse of literary criticism. Benjamin Neuberger 
states: 
History is hardly an objective, clearly discernible test for the 
existence of a national self. Even for the well established nations of 
Europe, most of the objective common history covers less than two 
centuries, although subjective national myths greatly expand the 
period of common national experience. For nationalists, history has 
always meant, in fact, selective history. Nationalists, whose 
objective is to foster a sense of identity and solidarity, to establish a 
chain of heroes, or to prove their case for certain historical 
boundaries, pick up those raisins from the cake of history which 
support and rationalize their cause. 53 
Soyinka's choice of material is, he insists, a response to the inherent theatricality 
afforded by the incident. By contrast, Soyinka observes that Jeyifo questions the 
suitability of his selection of material, suggesting that the ideological commitment 
of the critic is being willingly subverted by the processes of mind displayed by the 
playwright. It is suggested, therefore, that Soyinka might have selected more 
'suitable' examples displaying "more egalitarian African cosmogonic and 
metaphysical systems, the erosion of which ideological and political progressives 
can, with greater reason regret. " 54 
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Soyinka demonstrates the schema of his play quite simply by allowing Olunde, in 
his conversation with Jane, to encapsulate for her the differing priorities of the 
systems from which they inherit the matrix of identity. "I know how history is 
made" states Olunde; it "is the art of calling things by names which don't remotely 
describe them. " 55 The simplicity with which Olunde describes a systematic and 
reasoned response to the world which depends for its efficacy upon the draining of 
the creative imagination is, of course, countered by the innate challenge offered by 
Soyinka to the spectator, to designate by name the actions of Elesin in his creative 
attempt to realise the terrifying potential of the man who is able to name himself, 
without recourse to explanatory systems of discursive reason. In the terrifying 
moment in which Elesin fails in his will to die, and is dragged by Pilkings into the 
hall of the Residency, in the midst of the fancy dress ball, he re-iterates Olunde's 
observation as a howl of despair: "Give me back the name you have taken away 
from me you ghost from the land of the nameless! " 56 
Elesin is Soyinka's artist, the product of a blood-line which takes life as its raw 
material and effortlessly transforms the mundane, through its translation into 
poetic metaphor, into a multi-layered existence richly-clad in an inexhaustible flow 
of creative possibilities. Elesin carries the responsibility for naming the world 
through which he walks, and by so doing he names himself as the storehouse for 
cultural potential: 
Elesin: The world I know is good. 
Women: We know you'll leave it so. 
Elesin: The world I know is the bounty 
Of hives after bees have swarmed. 
No goodness teems with such open hands 
Even in the dreams of deities. 
Women: We know you'll leave it so. 
Elesin: I was born to keep it so. A hive 
Is never known to wander. An anthill 
Does not desert its roots. We cannot see 
The still great womb of the world - No man beholds his mother's womb - Yet who denies it's there? Coiled 
To the navel of the world is that 
Endless cord which links us all 
To the great origin. If I lose my way 
The trailing cord will bring me back to the roots. 57 
The 'being' of Elesin is honoured as a 'promise' by the community from which he 
emerges. He is thus accorded the status of the semi-divine during his lifetime, in 
order that he may offer affirmation and re-creation as proof of the possibility that 
life may joyfully be embraced in all its aspects. Elesin carries in his body the 
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creative imagination of his race: he may thus be described as the communal 
creation of an aesthetic which functions, not at a practical level, but rather in its 
purposeless pursuit of the beautiful, the ambiguous and the terror-free existence. 
This imagined being is made possible by the distance it maintains from reality; by 
its ignorance of the mechanisms of survival, and its freedom from the rules which 
bind social, communal behaviour in lawful patternings. Elesin is imaginative 
transgression, but transgression which is willed and acknowledged as a part of that 
from which it is wrought, rather than - as in discursive reason -a tabooed 'other', 
against which systems of morality may be defined. 58 
Elesin determines to spend his last hours in the market amongst the women; this 
being the environment within which the adoration and nurturance of his being is at 
its greatest. The market women are not however drawn by Soyinka as dupes to the 
seductive presence of the, King's Horseman; they indulge him in all demands and 
negate the possibility of judgement upon one so adored, but as Iyaloja, the 'Mother 
of the market', makes clear, his existence is the articulation of a transaction which 
must be honoured if the world which is balanced between his promise and their 
desire is not to crash "beyond the edge of emptiness" leaving behind only the dregs 
through which survivors wade, bereft of the fortress of meaning so painfully 
wrought and maintained. The price Elesin must pay, in order to prove worthy of 
the adoration heaped upon him, is to demonstrate his victory over the terrors of 
nullity proffered by death's boundary, and enter willingly the realm which man 
may not know, thus demonstrating with his flesh the certainty that death itself is 
not the end of life, but rather the transformation of that life back into the 
imaginative matrix from which it first emerged: 
Elesin: How my friend would read 
Desire in my eyes before I knew the cause 
However rare, however precious, it was mine. 
Women: The town, the very land was yours. 
Elesin: The world was mine. Our joint hands 
Raised houseposts of trust that withstood 
The siege of envy and the termites of time. 
But the twilight hour brings bats and rodents - Shall I yield them cause to foul the rafters? 59 
Iyaloja's fear grows however, when Elesin makes a last request from which she 
recoils before unwillingly acceding to his demand. Many commentaries have 
suggested that Elesin's request to marry, on the night of his death, the woman to 
whom Iyaloja's son is betrothed, carries the kernel of his failure; the desire of the 
flesh proving stronger than the willed resolve to die. This explanation, however 
negates the nature of the transaction between Elesin and his fount of creation; his 
adorers. I would like to suggest, in its stead, the possibility that the seeds of failure 
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occur at the moment of Iyaloja's recoil from Elesin's request, for this is the 
moment at which the first schism appears between the identification of the women 
with the desires of their created aesthetic. The conditions under which the girl is 
'given' to Elesin are weighted with a sense of 'duty' quite out of keeping with his 
earlier relationship to the market-women. 
The actual reasons for Elesin's failure are never ascertained by Soyinka. The 
spectators are offered the beginnings of his 'dance of transition', but are then 
transported to the Residency, leaving the events which fuel the violent 
repercussions of the latter part of the play to their imaginations. The last act opens 
with the now caged Elesin under the protection of Pilkings. Throughout the course 
of the act, the world which Iyaloja has predicted as the outcome of failure finds its 
representation in a series of violent recriminations which demonstrate the dregs of a 
humanity shorn of the creative imagination by which the affirmation of life might 
be sustained. Perhaps the ugliest of its manifestations is the eruption of blame as a 
means by which despair may be contained. Elesin turns the power of his rhetoric 
upon Pilkings, visiting upon him a stream of invective and hate before inverting the 
emotive essence of his language and turning it upon his own flesh, making 
shameful his marriage with the market-girl which, relieved of its poetic layering, 
becomes a lust for flesh which has outweighed the desire of the imaginative will. 6o 
Iyaloja witnesses his desperation and pours further scorn upon him: 
You have betrayed us. We fed you sweetmeats such as we hoped 
awaited you on the other side. But you said No, I must eat the 
world's left-overs. We said you were the hunter who brought the 
quarry down; to you belonged the vital portions of the game. No, 
you said, I am the hunter's dog and I shall eat the entrails of the 
game and faeces of the hunter. 61 
With the world they had created between them irrevocably destroyed, Iyaloja has 
one last symptom of catastrophe with which to confront Elesin. She is permitted by 
Pilkings to bring in her burden, having pleaded with his reason to acknowledge a 
'meaning' which is not his own whilst recognizing that her plea already institutes a 
bondage to systems that will henceforth bound her actions. The corpse of Olunde is 
finally allowed to be presented to his father: 
There lies the honour of your household and of our race. Because he 
could not bear to let honour fly out of doors, he stopped it with his 
life. The son has proved the father Elesin, and there is nothing left in your mouth to gnash but infant gums. 62 
The horror of Olunde's death lies in it inability to articulate affirmation without 
concurrently exposing failure. It lacks the absence of purpose which was to define 
the beauty of Elesin's death, mirroring rather the self-sacrifice of the sea-captain 
146 
who wrought his will to death in the exigency of duty-bound honour. Olunde's 
death saves no-one, the world of the creative consciousness is already schismatized; 
Olunde's death is no more than capitulation to an outmoded ritual. Confronted with 
his son's corpse, the Elesin strangles himself with the loop the chain which binds 
him to his prison. Pilkings, in the only moment of beauty allowed him by Soyinka 
in the play, rushes to the lifeless body and attempts to breathe life into its inert 
matter, watched by Iyaloja who marvels at his actions asking: "Why do you strain 
yourself? Why do you labour at tasks for which no one, not even the man lying 
there would give you thanks? " 63 For Pilkings, of course, the question has no 
answer, his actions being those of a man who believes himself to be a redeemer 
without the accompanying knowledge which would allow him to question the 
nature of redemption beyond the categorical imperative inscribed in Enlightenment 
rationality which deems life, any life, to be preferable to death. 
Iyaloja makes it clear that there is no whole to be made out of the shards left 
behind by Elesin. The closing moments of the play bear comparison with the final 
speeches offered to an uncertain future faced by the survivors who are left to 
contemplate the two corpses of of a shattered world at the end of Shakespeare's 
King Lear. Commentators of Death and the King's Horseman have suggested' that 
Iyaloja's final words to the pregnant bride Elesin has left behind suggest a hope for 
the restoration of a lost world, but when placed against King Lear they offer the 
possibility of an alternative reading: 
Albany: Our present business 
Is general woe. (To Kent and Edgar) 
Friends of my soul, you twain 
Rule in this realm, and the gored state sustain. 
Kent: I have a journey, sir, shortly to go: 
My master calls me; I must not say no. 
Edgar: The weight of this sad time we must obey; 
Speak what we feel, not what we ought to say 
The oldest hath borne most: we that are young 
Shall never see so much, nor live so long. 64 
And from the final moments of Death and the King's Horseman: 
(Iyaloja turns to the Bride who has remained motionless 
throughout. ) 
Iyaloja: Child. 
(The girl takes up a little earth, walks calmly into the cell and closes 
Elesin's eyes. She then pours some earth over each eyelid and comes 
out again. ) 
Iyaloja: Now forget the dead, forget even the living. Turn your mind 
only to the unborn. 
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(She goes off accompanied by the Bride. The dirge rises in 
volume. )65 
In both excerpts "a gored state" is all that is left to the survivors and the future will 
be born of remnants and dishonour. Iyaloja's final words suggest a flattening of the 
densely layered existence to which Elesin's life stood as a promise. The matrix of 
the living, the dead and the unborn is cast asunder and in its place is the possibility 
of survival, held in sharp contrast to the richness of joyous transformation. The 
lament with which Soyinka closes the play may therefore be understood as a 
'threnody' for the living, who have known the potential held within the aesthetic as 
a manifestation of communal consciousness and now must live in the midst of its 
absence. History, one might surmise, from the structure of Soyinka's text, defines 
a life which has forgotten the very possibility of aesthetic potential and therefore 
wrenches meaning from nothing more than its strategies of survival. 
q 
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Chapter Five 
The Triumph of Illusion 
A nation dies when it no longer has the strength to invent new gods, 
new myths, new absurdities; its idols blur and vanish; it seeks them 
elsewhere, and feels alone before unknown monsters. This too is 
decadence. But if one of these monsters prevails, another world sets 
itself in motion, crude, dim, intolerant, until it exhausts its god and 
emancipates itself from him; for man is free - and sterile - only in 
the interval when the gods die; slave - and creative - only in the 
interval when, as tyrants, they flourish. I 
The American essayist, Susan Sontag, has described the European essayist and 
philosopher, E. M. Cioran as the thinker of "impossible states of being" and 
"unthinkable thoughts. " 2 The European pessimism which Sontag perceives to 
permeate his writing demonstrates itself in the cannibalistic act of thought 
devouring itself and surviving beyond the point of destruction to flourish anew, 
sustained only by the desire to create out of the wreckage new forms, which at the 
moment of their inception, proceed once more to split and engage in the mortal 
combat which finally proves the only means of their survival: "the thinker plays the 
roles of both protagonist and antagonist. He is both suffering Prometheus and the 
remorseless eagle who consumes his perpetually regenerated entrails. " 3 Cioran, 
like Theodor Adorno, is in relentless pursuit of the split dialectic which forever 
resists the moment of synthesis, creating in its stead a plethora of 'gaps' or 
'abysses' into which thought plunges, risking self-annihilation, in order to resist the 
cessation of what Soyinka has called "the tragic consciousness "; 4 the experience of 
language as risk and wager, whereby the desire to create overwhelms the fear of 
the unknowable void to which, in an act of faith, the thinker must surrender 
himself. 
When Cioran writes of the nation, he refers not only to the discourse which 
supports the body of invention through which nationalist thought makes its 
appearance, but also to the individual consciousness which it seeks to invigorate 
through the processes of socio-political and cultural systems of administration. The 
enslaved forms of 'creation' to which he refers are those which provide life with its 
storehouse of meanings; which endow lives with qualities guaranteed to shield the 
living from an 'unhealthy' or 'decadent' engagement with finitude: 
A civilization begins to decline the moment Life becomes its sole 
obsession. Epochs of apogee cultivate values for their own sake: life 
is only a means of realizing them; the individual is not aware of 
living, he lives - happy slave of the forms he engenders, tends, and 
idolizes. Affectivity dominates and fills him. 5 
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A nation's decline, states Cioran, produces symptoms which demonstrate the 
draining of those ideological vessels which provide citizenship with its palliative 
'affectivity'. In the wake of a national subjective consciousness, which is only 
partially recognized by its erstwhile citizens to have been in the gift of the State, 
fear replaces the emotional security of 'prejudice' - which national discourse 
nurtures as an ancestral bloodline of inheritance - and with the loss of this 
ideological shield to 'otherness' the emasculated masses confront their own sterility 
in the face of a communally forged language which no longer speaks the 'truth'. 
Cioran, alongside Foucault, Adorno, Horkheimer, Nietzsche, Marcuse and 
Kristeva, may be described as a philosopher of the schism, or gap, which emerges 
when belief fails; when the 'organicism' of systems dissolves to reveal the 
conceptual dogma upon which its 'natural' emotional growth had been dependent. 
The origins of this phenomenon of the philosopher as traverser of the abyss, or 
ideological 'code-breaker', is ascribed by Gilles Deleuze to the revolutionary 
writings of Nietzsche who, in resistance to the epochal creation of Marxist and 
Freudian bureaucracies of State and Family, attempted the creation of a philosophy 
that wrote for an 'other' body; one which would confound the codifications which 
returned to either national or familial systems the individual experience of man. as a 
creative being. 6 
It is no coincidence that Nietzsche's philosophy charting the decline of the 
European races, and the rise of the 'sickly' reactive doctrines of morality which he 
perceived to fuel the nihilism of a burgeoning victim-based culture, emerged 
parallel to the rapid growth of nationalist discourse throughout Europe; a 
movement which eschewed philosophy - although retaining certain aspects of its 
vocabulary - and embraced, in its stead, the certainty provided by ideological 
systems of belief committed to the scientific progress afforded by processes of 
dialectical thought. Thus, Nietzsche's cry of "God is Dead! " was a cry from the 
void which marked the commencement of the modem secular age. The 'other' 
body to which he addressed his writings was a product of that void: "Look at the 
good and the just! What do they hate the most? The one who breaks their table of 
values, the destroyer, the criminal; but it is he, the creator. " 7 
Gilles Deleuze describes Nietzsche's philosophy as a relentless attempt to break the 
codes which - at the end of the nineteenth century - furnished man's future as a 
creature of scientific progress - the dialectical man of Platonic origins - and create, 
out of the wracked language of immanent critique, a body which would be immune 
to codification; which would be born of a will wrought in resistance to 'man' as 
imagined by any system that sought only his containment or functional 
assimilation. In place of the realpolitik by which national discourse forged its 
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progress, Nietzsche proposed the reign of the creator and the institution of a "grand 
politics": 
... having been the only one to preserve the power of creating, he 
will steer the world toward a goal that necessarily remains unknown 
to men. He will reign inasmuch as he will incarnate precisely the 
possibility of a future. The Caesarism of the Overman.. . must be 
understood as a tyranny of an artist... art is henceforth to be 
acknowledged as the highest value... the principle of evaluation has 
been fundamentally turned about. 8 
Nietzsche, at a moment in European history when philosophy had been made 
redundant as a tool by which the world might be understood - its processes of 
abstraction having been overtaken by the political production of an historical 
consciousness as a means of 'making sense' of both man and his relationship to the 
world of which he is a part - made of philosophy an eruption which flooded 
language with the chaos of its own creative possibilities. In resistance to the 
scientific ordering of that which already exists, he placed hope in the hands of the 
artist whose innate need to create would resist the historicizing tendency and 
embrace instead the artistic consciousness fuelled by an intimate knowledge of 
illusion and transformation. Forever cast adrift from the moorings of scientific 
proof, the Nietzschean artist would cleave unerringly to a faith born of the dictum 
which states: "It is not a failing not to know the end at the beginning. " 9 
Nietzsche's schismatic philosophy attempts no less than the overturning of 
historical consciousness and a redefinition of the principles upon which 
philosophical discourse is founded. After Nietzsche, philosophy would have to 
confront that which the meta-discourse of nationalist identity could only disguise by 
the furnishing of ideological organization of systems of belief which were already 
threadbare in their propagation of meaning. Nietzschean philosophy posited an 
image of European man as a species that had willed the destruction of its own 
ability to create and was therefore trapped in a retrograde motion - the symptoms 
of which were, paradoxically, change and progress - towards the nihilistic 
immolation of language itself, the very source by which 'man' names himself and 
makes of his existence a creative storehouse of possibility. Nietzsche heralds the 
age in which history triumphs by making of all that has gone before no more than a 
stumbling and error-ridden preparation of what is to be, leaving man stranded in 
the 'meanwhile' of a redundant set of beliefs, denuded of his ability either to affirm 
the iconoclastic act of which he is a product, or to stem the progress for which he 
stands as a promise. The Nietzschean Europeans are a haunted race; they are the 
men who "cannot venerate themselves. " 10 
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The function of philosophy,. after Nietzsche, could no longer be defined as an 
investigation into the nature of 'being', which in turn occasioned the relinquishing 
of the Ideal as a founding premise. Rather, the philosopher was now to stand as 
guardian to the abyss to which man would inevitably return, sounding its depths 
and contemplating the possible transformations which man would have to undergo 
if he was to survive the onslaught of its unknown terrors. Philosophy becomes in 
the twentieth century therefore, a rearguard action: 
Philosophy does not serve the State or the Church, who have other 
concerns. It serves no established power. The cause of philosophy is 
to sadden. A philosophy that saddens no one, that annoys no one, is 
not a philosophy. It is useful for harming stupidity, for turning 
stupidity into something shameful. Its only use is the exposure of all 
forms of baseness of thought... Finally turning thought into 
something aggressive, active and affirmative. Creating free men, 
that is to say men who do not confuse the aims of culture with the 
benefit of State, morality or religion. " 
Cioran names the abyss to which he stands as guardian "a state of non-suicide"; 12 a 
realm wherein the inhabitants recognize that only the willing of their own death can 
retrieve dignity and yet they persist in life. For Adorno, the abyss finds its 
apotheosis in the rise of fascism where the progress of technology meets' the 
production of death as a 'natural' outcome of the logical procedures of reason 
combined with the irrationality which underpins their scientifically proven premiss. 
Kristeva describes the abyss as a state of abjection: 
Foreigner: a choked up rage deep down in my throat, a black angel 
clouding transparency, opaque, unfathomable spur. The image of 
hatred and of the other... Strangely the foreigner lives within us: he 
is the hidden face of our identity, the space that wrecks our abode, 
the time in which understanding and affinity founder... a symptom 
that precisely turns 'we' into a problem, perhaps makes it 
impossible. 13 
Foucault describes the abyss as that which lies beneath history, that which only the 
poet may retrieve from silence and only then in the knowledge that it -is to the 
silence that the "stubborn murmuring of a language which seems to speak quite by 
itself" must return. 
For each of them the abyss bears a knowledge which, if confronted will expose the 
terror from which systems of accommodation to the world 'as it is' would seek to 
shield its citizens; namely that man is not what we thought he was, thus 
constituting in his place the possibility of having to think differently but now 
knowing that thought may not be trusted as anything other than the production of 
illusions, the reality of which is verified by nothing other than their appearance in 
the world of our perceptions. If 'man' may no longer be venerated as a species 
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capable of adduction, he must henceforth stand in awe of his ability to furnish the 
world with illusory forms. Only in the triumph of illusion does the abyss find 
meaning beyond its inherent proclamation of the death of Man. 
Man "is the chatterbox of the universe" states Cioran, "he speaks in the name of 
others; his self loves the plural. " 14 It is to the poet that Cioran turns for respite 
from the fetters of a language which, in its conjoining of the one with the many, 
has ceased to render back to man the possibility of naming what he is. The poet, 
alternately described as the artist, is, for Cioran, alone amongst men in his ability 
to 'speak in his own name', 15 his discovery being that language, like life, was not 
made for proving, but rather for the affirmation of human audacity in the face of 
infinite terror. Cioran describes the poet's language as a virus in the blood, a 
pounding in the veins which when it breaks the silence out of which it is 
engendered, emits the howl of Lear, the overflowing excesses of Hamlet's 
soliloquies, Baudelaire's lament for life, none of which, he opines, have ever been 
successfully translated into the systematized conditions of a language predicated 
upon 'We'. The artist, states Cioran, stands sentinel to the preservation of a 
language which meets the experience of pain and suffering as an equal; Lear's howl 
of pain is the howl born of an understanding which dares to survive that which is 
intolerable to it, making the name of Lear one with the howl out of which he is 
wrought. The poet's language is the affirmation of the tragic individual as a 
representative of the willing traverser of the abyss: 
The nature of a faith, even if it must fail, is to elude the Irreparable. 
(What could Shakespeare have done with a martyr? ) The true hero 
fights and dies in the name of his destiny, and not in the name of a 
belief. His existence eliminates any notion of an escape... He tends 
to his denouement and instinctively manages everything to bring 
about events fatal to himself. Fatality being his vital juice, every 
way out can be no more than a disloyalty to his destruction. 16 
The paradox afforded by the spectacle of suffering to which the tragic hero devotes 
his life becomes, as critic George Steiner has stated in his seminal work The Death 
of Tragedy, 17 anathema to a society for whom history is no more than a 
progression towards the redemption of pain and pursuit of the 'solution' which will 
stem suffering. Such an age is one which seeks deliverance from the exigencies of 
tragic experience. A language wrought in the absence of the tragic is, however, a 
language underpinned by a loss of faith in man as an object of veneration. The 
transition undergone by a language that ceases to take as its priority the naming of 
the individual who speaks in order to embrace a description of the collective of 
which he is a part, contains within its journey the experience of irreparable loss. 
Only tragic poetry can meet the suffering contained within the arena of absence; 
within the gap between redemptive belief and the inevitable exposure of its artifice. 
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In The Joyful Wsdom, 18 Nietzsche considers the relationship of the spectator to 
the 'theatrical artist' -a term which he uses to describe both author and actor of the 
stage event. With persistent reference to the stage as a locus of affirmation, he 
comments - in an aphorism entitled What we should be Grateful for. - upon the 
essential perspectivism offered by the actor: 
It is only the artists, and especially the theatrical artists who have 
furnished men with eyes and ears to hear and see with some pleasure 
what everyone is in himself, what he experiences and aims at: it is 
only they who have taught us how to estimate the hero that is 
concealed in each of these common-place men, and the art of 
looking at ourselves from a distance as heroes, and as it were 
simplified and transfigured, - the art of 'putting ourselves on the 
stage' before ourselves. 19 
It is to the artist of the theatre that Nietzsche ascribes the diminishing art of 
perspectivizing individual perception. The ability to perceive the heroic in man - 
which is to say that part of man which retains a distance from his civic 
environment - is, for him, the antidote to social regeneration and redemption. The 
need for redemption makes victims of us all, states Nietzsche, and the state of 
victimhood is threefold. First, the seeker of redemption is the victim of life's 
injustices for which reparation must be sought in a transcendent existence. 
Secondly, the existence of transcendent vision makes present life unbearable, thus 
making the seeker a victim to impossible desires the gratification of which is 
achievable only through the annulment, or death, of what is. Thirdly, the state of 
transcendence is premised upon a hatred of life; it is therefore the genesis of an 
internalised consciousness which desires its own death in pursuit of 'happiness'. 
The image of man as victim is, for Nietzsche, symptomatic of a 'will to death' or 
nihilistic striving which characterizes the modern European races. 
The paradox upon which his philosophy hinges lies in the desire for death which is 
shared both by the seeker of eternal life - the herd animal - and the seeker of his 
own destruction - the tragic hero. The victim is no more than the slave with death 
as his master, caught in a deadly embrace which has historically been named as the 
dialectic. Every attempt made by the slave to ward off death's terrors is met by a 
new and more terrifying manifestation of the power it must continue to wield if 
redemption is to maintain its promise. The tragic hero is man freed of the dialectic 
into the terror of a world without redemption. He is, therefore, the man for whom 
death, in the absence of belief, provides the only certainty of release from pain. 
For tragic man life becomes a joyful affirmation because there is nothing else; he is 
thus in partnership with death; the name he bears being his sole stake on existence 
as, in the words of Gilles Deleuze, "designations of intensity inscribed upon a body 
that could be the earth or a book, but could also be the suffering body... " 20 The 
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suffering individual who makes of his life a tragic destiny claims an equality with 
death by declaring his relationship to life as nothing more than appearance wrought 
in the exigency of a will to overcome that which is known to be inevitable. Thus 
tragic language penetrates the silence which is death itself. The tragic hero is an 
actor whose sole purpose in living is the searching out of roles equal to the will 
which expresses itself through his being. The end is known in the beginning, but - 
as in the theatrical event - each performance has its unique flavour; the possibility 
of singular interpretation. Rather as Lear could not be played well by an actor who 
refused to shun at the beginning, the knowledge of his end, so - Nietzsche states - 
the affirmative man lives his life in the full knowledge that action is futility, and 
bearing this knowledge, still desires to act for the joy of it. To accept the role of 
the victim is, for Nietzsche, to give a bad performance of life, the will to 
ressentiment being a substitution for willed individual performance. The tragic 
actor is the supreme performer who makes of his life a statement of equality with 
death; 'I am nothing', the actor's performance states, 'making me master of my 
appearance if not of my life. ' Nietzsche returns in Book Five of The Joyful 
Wisdom to The Problem of the Actor and enquires: 
Falsity with a good conscience; delight in dissimulation breaking 
forth as power, pushing aside, overflowing, and sometimes 
extinguishing the so-called 'character'; the inner longing to play a 
role, to assume a mask, to put on an appearance; a surplus of 
capacity for adaptations of every kind, which can no longer gratify 
themselves in the service of the nearest and narrowest utility: all that 
perhaps does not pertain solely to the actor in himself? 21 
Nietzsche continues by considering that the actor's necessarily promiscuous 
relationship to life as appearance surely bears more than a passing resemblance to 
the "lowest orders" of society whose continued existence is dependent upon the 
creation of fleeting masks forged in answer to the need for adaptation and 
accommodation in the face of "shifting pressure and constraint. " And yet the sense 
of affirmative play suggested by their forced dissembling is held in check both by 
promises of redemption and by faith in the reality of the 'I' which is reflected in 
the 'We' as authenticity and 'truth'. The multiplicity of the 'I' as represented by 
the chimerical appearance of the mask is not therefore deemed to be reality, but 
rather pragmatic method from which safe return is guaranteed to the confines of the 
ideologically constituted unity of subjective experience, which is in fact a return to 
nothing more than continued victimhood and ressentiment. Nietzsche's desire to 
'overturn the tables of values' and instigate the 'tyranny of the artist' is therefore a 
challenge to the innate negation of 'joy' which scientific discourse has 
systematically pursued in the name of ideological 'happiness', or freedom from 
pain. Paradoxically, it is to tragedy - to the placing of one's life upon the stage as 
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magnified ambition - that enslaved man must turn if he is to 'remember' the artist 
in himself: man as the creator of values and systems, rather than the as victim of 
their administration. 
In Renaissance Self-Fashioning, 22 the American scholar Stephen Greenblatt offers 
a study of six Elizabethan authors. Of the six, Christopher Marlowe, the tragedian, 
proves to be the exception to the rule upon which the book premises its theoretical 
base, for according to Greenblatt's defining features of the age, Marlowe is 'an 
untimely man'; his work standing as anathema to the contemporary values of the 
Elizabethan age. Amongst the six authors studied, Marlowe is the rogue-card 
whose theatre is all resistance; forging a bridge over the chasm of drained belief 
and paving the way to the dark relentlessness of the Jacobean theatre which was to 
follow hard upon his death. In his Introduction, Greenblatt isolates the period of 
the Renaissance as an age in which "the power to impose a shape upon oneself", 
considered as an activity central to social hierarchy, was eroded in favour of an 
ethos that embraced the newly developing social mobility of the Elizabethan era. 
The Renaissance, states Greenblatt, was the age in which man's identity entered 
into a dialectical relationship with institutions of the State as a means of mapping 
the abstract social space which, in the absence of God, had become subject tp the 
art of the mortal cartographer. Thus, the process of 'self-fashioning' -a concept 
already in currency at this time - was newly negotiated as a means of articulating a 
struggle fought within the linguistic arena of literary production: 
Autonomy is an issue but not the sole or even the central issue: the 
power to impose a shape upon oneself is an aspect of the more 
general power to control identity - that of others at least as often as 
one's own. 23 
In this model, the orthodoxies offered by the institutions of the State represent a 
stable defining boundary for the 'I' within which the individual is 'free' to explore 
the limited fluidity of the improvised self. Thus, man relieves himself of what 
Catherine Belsey has described as "the solitude and uncertainty that haunt the 
humanist subject"; 24 the inability of the speaker to define himself as the origin of 
the 'I', but in turn subjects himself to the governing narrative of State politics and 
power. 
Of the two playwrights chosen for study by Greenblatt, Shakespeare is named as 
the true Elizabethan; a cultural conservative who accepts his culture as a defining 
boundary and improvises his own role within the framework offered by its 
orthodoxies. Marlowe however, comes closer to making his theatre an aberrational 
paradigm for radical self-fashioning; he side-steps the certainty offered by the 
cultural and historical dialectic of the State and defines his work against the 
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governing principles of the Elizabethan world-order. Greenblatt is quick to point 
out that Marlowe's theatrical embrace of all that the Elizabethan worldview held to 
be alien or 'other' binds him inextricably to that same order, but it is Marlowe 
alone, amongst his known contemporaries, who dares to expose as fictions both the 
creation of a stable identity, and the goals which drive the will of the individual 
towards his social fulfilment: 
Each of Marlowe's plays constitutes reality in a manner radically 
different from the plays that preceded it, just as his work as a whole 
marks a startling departure from the drama of his time. Each of his 
heroes makes a different leap from inchoate appetite to the all- 
consuming project: what is necessary in one play is accidental or 
absent in the next. Only the leap itself is always necessary, at once 
necessary and absurd, for it is the embracing of a fiction rendered 
desirable by the intoxication of language, by the will to play. 25 
Marlowe's theatre is, for Greenblatt, a site which exposes the terror underpinning 
social formation; it is the gauntlet of a world unbounded and unmapped, thrown to 
the self-determining and joyful will of the radical individual who discovers himself 
to be no more than actor or arch-dissembler. Marlowe retrieves the stage as the 
space which defines the actor, thus eschewing its confines as the contained 
confinement of character. In Marlowe's plays the actor himself becomes the raw 
material of the drama, his active will the driving mechanism of the plot. The 
protagonists are actors insofar as they know the worlds they inhabit to be fictional; 
it is through language alone that their wrought reality maintains its shape and 
purpose. The ultimate ambition of Marlovian heroes is described by Greenblatt as a 
desire "to be a character in Marlowe's plays. " 26 Their creative instinct resists 
sublimation and discharges itself instead in the service of a futile and absurd 
ambition: 
The will to play flaunts society's cherished orthodoxies, embraces 
what the culture finds loathsome or frightening, transforms the 
serious into the joke and then unsettles the category of the joke by 
taking it seriously, courts self-destruction in the interest of the 
anarchic discharge of its energy. This is play on the brink of an 
abyss, absolute play. 27 
Greenblatt's description of the Marlovian stage, and his analysis of the figures 
which traverse "the essential meaninglessness of theatrical space" 28 -a space he 
equates with the emptiness of a world drained of God's creative imprint - concedes 
'nothingness' to be the condition of appearance, and finds that the shape of the 
stage event, which owes its audacious power to the naming of itself as illusion, 
constitutes radical disturbance in its confrontation with an emergent and rational 
'truth' from which the tragic hero must eventually be effaced. Marlowe's theatre 
breaks with the Aristotelian system in its exposure of the actor as the agent of the 
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plot and sole raison d'etre for the event itself. In so doing he de-historicizes the 
action, making of history an 'eternal recurrence' wherein the "leap from inchoate 
appetite to all-consuming project" is repeated compulsively, each successive 
manifestation mapping man within the framework of catastrophic destiny. 
Marlowe's heroes were however flashes of brilliance in a world for which the cycle 
of glorious failure was becoming anathema; where the hero's audacity was doomed 
to become the arrogant usurpation of a power which assumed an individual life to 
have more significance than the lives of nations, peoples or masses. A modern 
politics has no place for heroes exhibiting neither victimhood nor doctrine: 
Reason creeps in like a thief in the night and the most gloriously 
unreasoning heroism crumbles eventually before the erosion of 
rationality. If an aim is necessarily futile, persistence in it turns out 
to be no longer heroic but stupid and admiration for the ill-starred 
hero, doomed by his very heroism too is irrational. This is the 
predicament in which we stand. 29 
The Tragic Source in Barker's and Soyinka's Theatres 
The 'tragic' or 'untimely' man is described by Cioran as one who makes of thought 
"an extreme act, ä risk", in that thought is turned against the thinker in an attempt 
to "acquire the habit of existence". 30 The tragic form in both Soyinka's and 
Barker's work describes a theatre which has turned against itself, refusing the 
dialectical illusion of synthesis, or end product, setting in its place the refractory 
impulses of an aesthetic drive determined by the interpretative will of the creator. 
An aesthetics of creation has Nietzschean philosophy as its source; its origins being 
an overt resistance to the Kantian formulation which places aesthetic sensibility in 
the spectator's disinterested contemplation of art as an object or totality. The 
Kantian aesthetic is not concerned with questions regarding the means by which the 
object appears before the spectator, nor in the interests the object may serve by 
virtue of its appearance; rather the contemplative mode seeks beauty - or its 
absence - in the formal qualities of the art object, thus ascribing to it a neutrality 
which in turn becomes an aspect of its beauty. The Nietzschean aesthetic, in its 
function as a critique of Kant's philosophy, urges the eviction of the spectator - as 
the progenitor of the social value which the art object will eventually acquire - 
from the concept of the creative act. 31 This means that creativity must re-define 
itself in the absence of a reception aesthetic which would grant to its appearance 
approval or disapproval, which is not to say that it embraces the aims of fart pour 
fart -a formation which is vilified by Nietzsche - rather the artist is required to 
dare, risk, wager the appearance in art of an ethical transformation. 
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In order to comprehend what Nietzsche means by 'ethical transformation' we must 
first consider his perception of Kant's 'disinterested' spectator: 
He is the person who considers the action that he does not perform - 
precisely because he does not perform it - as something to evaluate 
from the standpoint of the advantage which he draws or can draw 
from it. The person who does not act considers that he possesses a 
natural light over action, that he deserves to derive advantage or 
profit from it. 32 
Thus, what Kant describes as 'disinterestedness' reveals for Nietzsche the 'slave- 
ethics' of ressentiment which by a process of commonality transforms the artwork 
into an alternative manifestation of vested interest. The ethics of the artist are 
proposed by Nietzsche as an antidote to the nihilistic impulses of reactive forces - 
although the antidote goes only so far as to confer upon nihilism an affirmative 
aspect - in that they are forged in the process of daring and audacious creation 
rather than death-desiring negation. The transformative affectivity of the artist's 
work is therefore required to stimulate in the spectator the dawning consciousness 
of an 'other' life under the 'skin' of the State which struggles to birth stifled by the 
classifications of 'what is' and awaiting its naming as 'what might be. ' The 
Nietzschean artist is to probe the spectator's individual will to name himself; tö re- 
member the body which reason, in its unificatory impulses, has spread across a 
range of discourses thus betraying its alternative purpose: the dismantling of the 
corporeal in order that the conceptual, and therefore comprehensible, man might be 
born. 
The emergence of the tragic in Barker's and Soyinka's theatres is not an ambition 
with which they begin their dramatic writing but rather a necessity that emerges as 
a consequence of their engagement with theatrical form and practice. As has 
already been discussed, their individual pursuit of the means by which they might 
name themselves in relation to their work engenders not only a critique - in the 
form of essays - of the social constructions which seek to define their profession 
and its functions, but also a radical investigation into the nature of the drama 
produced by social and ideological classifications. The act of naming their mode of 
production as being that of the artist or poet has little impact per se, but the 
genealogical impact of its perspectivized relationship to theatrical discourse 
substantially shifts the priorities demonstrated by the stage event and its 
relationship to both the institutional organization of theatre and the audiences 
engendered by that institution. 
In Howard Barker's The Europeans, 33 the newly-restored Hapsburg Monarch, 
Leopold, gathers together a group of critics with whom he intends to debate the 
possible emergence of a new art for a new age: 
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A circle of Critics at The Imperial Academy of Art. Leopold enters to 
polite applause. 
Leopold: Not the room as we would want it. Not the salon we would 
choose, the swags being somewhat chipped and the putti 
lacking gilt, but in such pock-marked landscapes imagination 
might erupt, I call upon you to elucidate the principles of a 
new art, because the stir of Europe from its sleep commands 
a terrible and unrelenting movement of the soul. I only have 
half an hour. What shall the art be like now, you say! 34 
Having sent orders from the triumphant battlefield that the Vienna to which he will 
return should retain the chaotic ruin of the siege, the primary task Leopold attempts 
is the self-conscious charting of the city's reconstruction as the locus of cultural 
and moral values. The imperative issued by Leopold has as its premiss the 
imposition of order upon the chaos by which they are surrounded. As a liberal 
monarch he requires of his thinkers an art authenticated by its emergence from the 
ashes of a culture which is poised to - once again - rise phoenix-like from the very 
teeth of the Turkish onslaught. 
Leopold discovers in the responses of his critics, that there are no creators amongst 
them, rather they are the makers and instigators of conceptual values minus action. 
Thus a "People's art", loud in its celebration of heroism and future happiness, is 
pitched against an "art of shame", proposed by the unpopular Bomberg who cries 
his fury at those who would claim or own the people without for a moment placing 
their individual trust in those same people. Leopold, noting - guardedly - that the 
violent rhetoric aroused by the question of artistic commitment somewhat surpasses 
the courage of the speakers in confronting the Turks, turns to his commissioned 
artist in order to test the temper of the creative consciousness. The Painter, 
confronted by "the bullies of the mind" reveals an artistic sensibility which utterly 
lacks the will which would make of his cultivated emotional state an act of 
imaginative affirmation. The iconoclastic attacks of populist critics reduce him to a 
sobbing incoherence which is answered by the clumsy and impotent attempt of 
Bomberg to visit his anger physically upon the body of Arst, the People's man. 
The silent observer of this spectacle is Starhemberg; Barker's reluctant war hero, 
described by Leopold's Empress as "a cold and wonderfully imagined man. " 35 
Recognizing the impulse of the artist in the actions of the post-war man, the 
Empress confers on him the title of the 'actor', in recognition of his ability to 
evade the role the State would seek to cast him in, as heroic saviour and defender 
of the new Europe. The actorly impulse demonstrated by Starhemberg is one that 
resists a definition of his wartime actions as service to the State. The imposition of 
titles he recognizes as the collective suffocation of shame and in its stead he seeks 
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actions which absent from the effects of war the State-bestowed honours which 
would serve to neutralize its potential for the eruption of a life-affirming nihilism. 
Starhemberg proves himself the true artist when, urged to a response by Leopold, 
he reveals the foundations of a creative aesthetic which depends for its existence 
upon a reception which acknowledges not the truth of its utterances but rather the 
manifestation of an imaginative will that engenders them: 
What I need. And what there will be. I need an art which will recall 
pain. The art that will be will be all flourishes and celebration. I 
need an art that will plummet through the floor of consciousness and 
free the unborn self. The art that will be will be extravagant and 
dazzling. I need an art that will shatter the mirror in which we pose. 
The art that will be will be all mirrors. I want to make a new man 
and a new woman but only from the pieces of the old. The new man 
and new woman will insist on their utter novelty. I ask a lot. The 
new art will ask nothing. 36 
Starhemberg's need stands as a challenge to the utterly predictable art of a State 
reconciled to its past. The art is a tragic one insofar as it answers need - and makes 
of that need its aesthetic - without evaluating the cost, in terms of advantage or 
loss, for human life, per se. The will which speaks Starhemberg's 'need' is the 
continuation of the conditions of battle in artistic form; it is the individual 
articulation of that which the action of war answers in the human spirit beyond its 
collective ideological defence against guilt. The "art which will be" will attempt to 
stamp itself upon consciousness as a point of arrival, be it the arrival of the populus 
at shame or celebration; the art needed by Starhemberg would deny its goal to be 
the iteration of being, and posits instead the possibility that a creative ethics finds a 
veneration of man in his ceaseless pursuit of 'becoming'. To 'become' in 
Nietzschean terminology is to resist cultural ressentiment - this being the creation 
of culture as a series of iconic excuses for man's proliferated shame and bad 
conscience - with an artistic will to imaginative interpretation or speculation upon 
that in man which eternally recurs as the basis of his creative drive. Art and culture 
are, for Nietzsche, the willed return of originatory impulses from which the 
reactive forces of society find their flowering. The synthesis attempted by society - 
as a system of accumulated values - is no more than reaction against man's 
attempts to become more than he is; thus society seeks to save man from the tragic 
impulse of a life affirmed by death, and succeeds only by sublimating the instinct 
to death and sanctifying its reified form in a language permeated by an ideological 
fetishism for life. 
For Barker, after Nietzsche, the theatre which takes as its raw material the actor, 
finds its apotheosis in the tragic form, renamed as a 'theatre of Catastrophe'; its 
apogee being the moments of man's 'sterility' when belief fails and he is faced 
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once again with the choice to either rebuild reason through an act of collective 
'forgetting', or to affirm the life of the 'unborn' self which struggles into being 
only at the tremendous individual cost of an assertion that the pain of a life which 
knows the immanence of death is good: 
... a theatre of 
Catastrophe takes as its material the individual and the 
individual's ability to effect self-identification in a collective or 
historical nightmare, the moment of beauty is the moment of 
collision between two wills, the will of the irrational protagonist (the 
non-ideological) and the will of the irrational State (the officially 
ideological). 37 
In the work of Wole Soyinka, the tragic impulse finds its birth in a recognition of 
life as a cycle from which man must constantly seek severance. There is a point of 
return to which Wole Soyinka's writings continually take his readers, or spectators; 
this is the swampland to which are committed the futile heroes of revolutionary 
intent. Soyinka's self-description as an artist, in resistance to the socio-political 
ideologues of Nation-State formation, forces in his work, the repeated emergence 
of a site which rivals the structures of national architecture and yet permits limited 
access only, it being the manifestation of a fertile cultural imagining necessarily 
beyond the reach of the nationally redeemed. This is the swampland where the road 
to belief ends and the marshes of unredeemed stretch to fill the horizon. 
Thus, in "Who's Afraid of Elesin Oba? ", Soyinka takes the reader to a causeway, 
forged over the swamps which have claimed as victims the fallen bodies of a 
defeated insurrection: "I stood where Fidel Castro probably stood while the reel of 
his existence raced through his mind in one violent flashback. I stood, in other 
words, on a terrain that was severally and simultaneously tragic poetry and 
revolutionary will. " 38 The multifaceted complexity of this terrain is revisited in 
The Man Died, 39 an autobiographical account of the Soyinka's incarceration during 
the Nigerian civil war. In chapter twelve the factual accounts of his arrest and 
solitary confinement, alongside speculation concerning the political agenda to 
which his life had become inescapably subject, gives way to an interrogation of the 
creative aesthetics which would lend articulation to his state of being: 
Time vanished. I turned to stone. The world retreated into fumes of 
swampland. 
I have been here before. I have passed through this present point 
again and again... Desolation increases with my acute certainty that 
the sensation is deeper than the mere located place or event. It is 
closer to a phase of being... this ritual of transition is a perpetual one 
and the acquisition of experience in fording the pass does not lessen 
its overwhelming sadness... 
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What meaning then shall I attach to it, what name, what definition 
give to the monstrosity of this birth? I try to feed some muscularity 
into the marshmallow of sensations. 40 
The "muscularity" sought by Soyinka resides in a refusal of the "tragic lure! " 
which he perceives to offer only a return to the limitations of the "human spirit. " 
Citing Oedipus he vilifies the socially redemptive hero who emerges as proof to the 
gathered populace that the tragic will has found sublimation in "the blind oracular 
figure. " Soyinka, like Nietzsche, grants that there are conditions of despair from 
which the human being could not be expected to recover but - again following 
Nietzsche - he refuses this statement as a negation of life and 
insists that the 
eruption of will required in order to confront despair and still choose life initiates 
the retrieval of "superhuman energies" which would redefine human purpose and 
finally confront "the historical conspiracy, the literal brain-washing" 41 which 
elevates the martyrdom of the hero and vanquishes the life-affirming endeavour of 
his will. 
Soyinka is at his most Nietzschean in this moment when his public voice, which 
had maintained a political, artistic and intellectual appearance in Nigeria throughout 
the years preceding Biafra's attempted secession, was negated. Throughout his 
period of imprisonment rumours abounded concerning his death, and the 
overwhelming feeling described by the writer of The Man Died is the awareness of 
non-existence; of a body and a voice which had been temporally and spatially 
frozen by Gowon's regime. Soyinka's response is to recognize his condition to be 
no different from that of the masses who are lured by the promise of moral 
redemption into lives that constitute no more than a systematized and State- 
sanctioned authorship of their deaths. His only choice is therefore to "think 
against" that which is deemed to be the 'human' in him and thus produce a 
manifestation of the will Nietzsche proclaimed to be the 'truth' of tragic intent, a 
'truth' which precedes the Aristotelian schema wherein tragedy is hijacked by 
reason and brought to pity and fear: 
That longing in all human beings that will sooner expend last breath 
on words of affirmation than conserve it on behalf of life, believing 
that life is justified if only at the moment of quitting it, the remnant 
spittle of a parched tongue is launched against the enemy in one 
defiant gesture of contempt, supplying a final action of hope, of 
encouragement for the living, validating one's entire being in that 
last gesture or in a word of affirmation. 42 
The source of Soyinka's tragic form, as manifested in his dramatic writings, lies in 
his refusal of resignation as an attribute befitting heroism. In refusing the "tragic 
lure! " he excavates the will that drives a hero whose appearance is conditional upon 
'the good of the people', and finds this will to be a scion of the vested political 
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interests which first creates the "mindless mob" and then renders to them the 
sacrifice of the potential they possess to be anything other than a mirror of State 
virtu. The task of the artist, he declares, is to retrieve the 'revolutionary' will of a 
'people' by exposing the source of their existence to lie, not in the conservation of 
the race - this being akin to the musty relics of 
life exhibited in a museum culture - 
but rather in the fearless embrace of actions which may find their nemesis in the 
ultimate destruction of that race in order - paradoxically - that it may be liberated 
from fear. 
In "The Credo of Being and Nothingness", 43 Soyinka examines religious belief as a 
symptom of fear masquerading as a totalized understanding of the world. He shares 
with Cioran the conviction that the tragic hero is man freed from systems of fear- 
based belief and posits in resistance to their "murderous" versions of humanity, the 
myth-based gods of the Yoruba pantheon. The myths which brought these deities 
into being, he contends, were paradigms of man in search of knowledge but 
lacking the political instinct which furnished knowledge with its contemporary 
corollary, institutionalized power. The Yoruba pantheon lacks therefore the dictum 
which he perceives to drive the major world religions, namely: "I believe, 
therefore I am. " Soyinka's inherent critique of Cartesian rationality allows -him 
further, the recognition of a second absence, concomitant upon the first: "You do 
not believe, therefore you are not. "44 
In his seminal essay "The Fourth Stage", 45 Soyinka attempts an account of the 
Yoruba tragic aesthetic. This essay is a landmark in literary intent, both because it 
marks the first attempt by an African writer to create a non-western poetics, and 
also because the task Soyinka undertakes is supremely self-conscious in that he 
attempts the writing of that which is non-discursive; which does not take as its 
priority the rational validity of the premiss upon which it is founded. In so doing 
Soyinka's intent meets Nietzschean philosophy insofar as Nietzsche posits as the 
'birth' of tragedy the moment at which the mythical orientation of man collides 
with the birth of historical or reason-based man. 46 Tragedy is, for Nietzsche, the 
sublimation of myth into literary form; a process which draws into the arena of 
dramatic art the contending deities of Apollo "the god of light [who] reigns over 
the fair illusion of our inner world of fantasy", 47 and Dionysos through whose 
worship man "feels himself to be godlike and strides with the same elation and 
ecstasy as the gods he has seen in his dreams. " 48 
In Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy, Apollo, the moulder of illusions which make 
the suffering life bearable, contends with the transformational qualities of Dionysos 
which defy plastic form in their promiscuous relationship to a life underpinned by 
rational purpose. The task of the tragic poet is to render, in language, that which 
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explodes the reasoning capabilities of written linguistic usage; the will of the 
Nietzschean tragic poet comprises the writing of man in his desire to be more than 
the creative impulses of his language will allow - it is the transcendence of 
language as proof of being in order that language may represent man in the 
condition of his 'becoming'. Thus Nietzschean tragedy is the constant re-ordering 
of that which 'is' as a means of discovering that which may be. The tragic poet 
takes as his material language as utility and transforms it into language as 
irresponsible and promiscuous possibility: 
Acting is... a contradiction of the tragic spirit, yet it is also its natural 
complement. To act, the Promethean instinct of rebellion, channels 
anguish into creative purpose which releases man from a totally 
destructive despair, releasing from within him the most energetic, 
deeply combative inventions... Only the battle of the will is thus 
primally creative; from its spiritual stress springs the soul's 
despairing cry which proves its own solace ... 49 
In "The Fourth Stage", written as the collapse of the Nigerian State became an 
inevitability, Soyinka makes of his "swampland" a domain, and names it as the 
"chthonic realm"; as the birth-site of the tragic will. Soyinka peoples the realm 
with mythological deities both from the Nietzschean Greek pantheon and from the 
Yoruba, but he maintains contemporary links with the society to which he stands as 
artist by locating its bounds in a stage of consciousness beyond the three stages of 
despair and nationalist capitulation outlined in "The Writer in a Modern African 
State". 50 This is the 'Fourth Stage' wherein the death of the writer may herald the 
rebirth of the artist and of the race to which he stands as paradoxical promise. 
Soyinka parallels Nietzsche's deities - Apollo and Dionysos - with Obatala "the 
placid essence of creation" and Ogun "the creative urge and instinct, the essence of 
creativity. " 51 Where Nietzsche proposed tragedy as a provisional synthesis of his 
two contradictory elements however -a synthesis he was later to reject as a 
manifestation of the dialectic - Soyinka refuses "Obatala's patient suffering" as the 
"well-known aesthetics of the saint" 52 and allows only the rebellious impulse of 
Ogun the status of mythopoeic tragedy. 
Ogun is described by Soyinka as the first 'actor', the transitive verb being used 
ritually and theatrically in order to maintain the ambiguity which lies at the heart of 
the actor's profession. The terrifying plunge of the deity into the chthonic realm, 
"the seething cauldron of the dark world will and psyche" 53 answers a need shared 
by gods and man alike, to reunite the divine essence of the Yoruba race with the 
manifestation of man as finite, incomplete and lacking the "re-creative intelligence" 
which makes of his suffering a burden to be borne rather than a pathway to 
transitional will. The metaphysical abyss stands in direct contradiction to Utopian 
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ideals which might promise man a release from his present suffering via the agency 
of future progress or the ameliorative affects of historical understanding. Soyinka is 
firm in his resolve that tragic destiny resides in the moment at which man 
recognizes himself to be present as object only, to forces which threaten the 
annihilation of that which is perceived to be 'self'. This is man shorn of the 
individual self, as active principle, and relegated to the ranks of the 'We', whilst 
his conceptual counterparts - wrought of discursive evolution - take centre stage as 
protagonist and antagonist, now recast in the roles of thesis and antithesis. The only 
scenario available to man's usurpers is a driven progress towards a synthesis to 
which the historical man of the 'meanwhile' stands as spectator. The tragic moment 
described by "The Fourth Stage" is the fruit of a choice whereby man, perceiving 
incipient sterility, siezes upon his destiny and in an act of supreme hubris, resolves 
to take possession of the prize which is sought by forces inimical to life: 
[W]hen man is stripped of excrescences, when disasters and conflicts 
(the material of drama) have crushed and robbed him of self- 
consciousness and pretensions, he stands in present reality at the 
spiritual edge of this gulf, he has nothing left in physical existence 
which successfully impresses upon his spiritual or psychic 
perception. It is at such moments that transitional memory takes over 
and intimations rack him of that intense parallel of his progress 
through the gulf of transition, of the dissolution of his self and his 
struggle and triumph over subsumation through the agency of will. 54 
It is at the moment when life disallows action, either through the disabling of the 
individual's physical impact upon his environment or through an individual 
cessation of belief in the efficacy of action, that Soyinka posits Ogun as the choice 
confronting that which in man refuses to die; the creative will. Ogun is described 
as the embodiment of 'Will'; the paradoxical understanding that creation and 
destruction are the twinned contradictions which fuel the artistic consciousness of 
man: "he is a profound artist only to the degree to which he comprehends and 
expresses the principle of destruction and re-creation. " 55 Ogun is neither pathos - 
this being the domain of Obatala - nor redemptive idyll. The danger inherent in 
Ogun as challenging will resides in Soyinka's combination of his artistic impulse 
with a knowledge and harnessing of technology. Thus Ogun is the wielder of iron- 
ore, the carrier of metallic construction and creation to man. His journeying across 
the gulf of transition results, not only in the forging of an artistic will but also in 
the Promethean gift to man of a potentially murderous knowledge of technological 
progress. Finally, Ogun is a warlike god; he shares none of Obatala's serenity and 
his founding myth contains within it an account of his warlike ecstasy which leads, 
tragically, to the annihilation of his own race. Ogun is not the carrier of a morality 
to man; he is finally a force inimical to systems of social survival, his concern 
being the irresponsible retrieval of an instinct for life. 
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Myth, states Soyinka, is the history of a people's will, rather than a recounting of 
their historical progress. Myth bears witness to the means by which a race survives 
its own destruction through the willed processes of creation and re-creation. What 
Soyinka is ultimately attempting to express in his Yoruba poetics is a supremely 
Nietzschean position whereby race is symptomatic of a 'Will to Life' which 
counters the social organization of life as a mode of surviving the knowledge of 
death. Nietzsche describes cultural ethos - as opposed to social ethos - in the 
following way: 
The finished product of species activity is not the responsible man 
himself or the moral man, but the autonomous and supramoral 
man... He alone "is able to" promise, precisely because he is no 
longer responsible to any tribunal. The product of culture is not the 
man who obeys the law, but the sovereign and legislative individual 
who defines himself by power over himself, over destiny, over the 
law: the light, the free, the irresponsible. 56 
Soyinka's deity, Ogun, forges the abyss, and is torn apart by chthonic forces in the 
process, as a means of reconstituting the Will which forms a communicative link 
between man and the creation of his deities. The existence in mythical memory of 
Ogun's anguish and final triumph represents the only hope at a moment. when 
Soyinka perceived the 'tragic' destiny to be once more confronting Yoruba 
consciousness. Underpinning "The Fourth Stage" is an awareness perpetuated 
throughout his prison writings, namely, that the 'man' dies who indifferently 
delivers his destiny into the hands of others, thereby forgetting that to live is to 
dare confrontation with the abyss of non-belief. 
Howard Barker's Mythical Realm of Catastrophe. 
[E]very generation of archaeologists who dug at Troy/Hisarlik found 
what they wanted to find, and made of the story what they would. 
Schliemann, Dorpfeld, Biegen all did it, and I suppose we go on 
doing it today: such is the power of the legend that most people have 
found it impossible to exclude it from discussion of the evidence. 57 
It was the age of Enlightenment that made of the Trojan War a legend; the search 
for historical proof of its existence in chronological time wrenched Troy from its 
mythical moorings and attempted its re-location in an historical narrative accessible 
to contemporary interpretation. Howard Barker's The Bite of the Night, 58 first 
performed by the Royal Shakespeare Company in September 1988, shuns the 
illumination provided by archaeological excavation and has his catastrophic hero, 
Dr Savage, seek the darkness of the Classical myth: "Darkness permits the thought, 
darkness licenses, it bites, and sometimes you can be bitten by love and sometimes 
by fear. " 59 
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Barker takes as his setting for The Bite of the Night, "The Ruins of a University" 
described by the archaelogist Schleimann - whose narrative creation of an historical 
Troy parallels the progress of Savage into the depths of its mythical structures - as 
a "terrible place" where "tortured thinkers thrashed each other in pursuit of a deity 
they called Truth. " 60 Here we encounter Dr Savage, the last of the lecturers to quit 
the site of demolition, flanked by the remnants of his family and secretly observed 
by his erstwhile wife who declares her freedom to reside in the choice she has 
made to 'lose herself' in the chaos of fallen cities where structures of civilized 
intent give way to the plunge of the victors' flesh into "the well of skirt. " 61 
Contrary to Schleimann's observations, Dr Savage seeks, not Truth, but 
Knowledge which, he declares, is founded upon belief. The circle of dependency 
from which Savage seeks deliverance via the vehement iteration of his detestation 
for reified experience is made up of his son, his father and his one remaining 
student, all of whom are subject to the violent scorn of his invective, none of 
whom are able to break the bonds of hatred which hold them in their structured 
relationships of mutual impotence and shame. Hogbin, the student requires of 
Savage a foothold of truth upon which he may hoist himself beyond the confines of 
a mundane existence. The Homeric myth is for both of them the articulation, of a 
need to journey beyond the politics of ressentiment; a desire which is demonstrated 
in their mutual fracturing of academic debate: 
Hogbin: I heard the reggae through the wall. The beat bored into me. 
I looked at Homer. Dead letters swum before my eyes. Old 
Europe struggling with the beat. The beat! The fucking beat! 
Give us knowledge, Doctor Savage! (Pause) 
Savage: The Trojan War. (Pause) The Trojan War occurred because a 
married woman lent her body to a stranger. (Pause) That's 
all for today. (Pause) 
Hogbin: I knew that. 
Savage: Excellent. 
Hogbin: I knew that, git. 
Savage: You read it. You did not know it. Knowledge is belief. (He 
gets up to go. ) 
Hogbin: Don't get up. (Pause) The seduction of Helen. The 
seduction of Helen is a metaphor for the commercial success 
of the tribes of Asia Minor and the subsequent collapse of the Peloponnesian carrying trade. Only a military alliance of the 
Greek states restored the monopoly. In classical fashion the 
outcome of trade wars is the enslavement of populations in 
the interests of cost-free labour and the eradication of the 
infrastructure of the rival enterprise, namely the razing of 
cities. (Pause) 
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Savage: No, it was cunt. 62 
In the absence of institutional academic ambition, the debate becomes a description 
of need and desire. The Trojan War is for both of them an absence or void into 
which may be poured the exigencies of a life as yet unlived. The archaeologist, 
Schleimann - by contrast - seeks in his excavations to extract and translate artifacts 
which prove the existence of an 'ancient' world causally linked to our own by the 
thread of history. He digs in order to discover "the bed, the seed and womb of 
Europe" in a time 'before', to be designated as the birth of European culture 
against which future development and progress may be measured. 
Where Schleimann seeks the scientific proof of his theorem that a legendary Troy 
may be discovered in the geological stratifications of the archaelogist's dig, Doctor 
Savage, the Homerist, initiates an excavation of the mind's encrustations in his 
quest for the mythical Troy sedimented in the contemporary European imagination. 
Barker, like Soyinka, makes of his hero's quest a process of transition whereby the 
journey undertaken by Savage charts the progress of contemporary historical man 
towards the possibility of his imaginatively confronting the creative impulse of his 
own eruptive genealogy. The individual excavation of the mind's strata becomes, 
therefore, the dramatic conflict of the Barkerian stage, and the spectator is invited 
to witness Savage, a man who thinks 'against himself', becoming both antagonist 
and protagonist in the catastrophic action of the play's events. 
Barker describes Savage's mythical excavations as a "series of inspirations" which 
free him from domestic dependency and let fly the imaginative impulse to mythical 
orientation. The 'family life' is to Savage what reading books of Marxist theory is 
to his student Hogbin; the substitution of a discursive codification for the 
experience of man as "the product of culture", the latter being defined by the 
power he brings to bear upon himself, his destiny and the law. The Doctor, having 
hugged the impotence of his hatred, arrives at the juncture of despair in his 
recognition of the Enlightened life as a muted cry of deferred death: 
I woke in the night. I woke in the night and the sky was purple with 
the bruise of cities. I thought of avenues where they sleep the sleep 
of family love, the pillowcase, the nightdress, the twitching of the 
poodle. You call that life? 63 
Resolving to embrace the fear against which domesticity provides fortification, 
Savage relieves himself of his family, rejecting the space they occupy as 
representative of a site of a reconciliation with death, and commits himself to the 
realm of the mythical imagination, the boundaries of which are, as yet unknown to 
him. To this end Savage gives his son away to the wholly untrustworthy Macluby, 
in order that he may be apprenticed to the soap trade, and forces his father to 
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commit suicide, through a brutal exposition on the nature of their familial 
relationship: 
Savage: I hated you. Your mundane opinions. Your repetition of half- 
truths. Straddling my back. You burden. You dead 
weight.. . Give us some time for my own needs. Old bones. Old pelt. 64 
In this dramatic moment of violent speculation, Savage is inspired to an 
understanding of knowledge as that which lies beyond pity and kindness. This is 
what Nietzsche has described as the "species-activity" of man in the formation of 
his culture: "the labour performed by man upon himself during the greater part of 
the existence of the human race, his entire prehistoric labour ... notwithstanding the 
severity, tyranny, stupidity and idiocy involved in it. " 65 Thus, the dying father's 
reminiscences concerning an episode in his life - redolent with nostalgic images of 
a freedom glimpsed during his experiences as a soldier in the Second World War - 
provide for the audience a momentary respite of recognition and pity, but these are 
juxtaposed with a Savage for whom the excoriation of guilt and memory as 
delicious regret, represents an opening of the floodgates to an alternative structure 
of knowledge, born of the pain-sodden night. Now freed into a mode of experience 
which acknowledges its audacious hunger for individual 'truth', Savage is able to 
make of the stage a world of speculative enactment over which hovers Foucault's 
ominous statement: "Knowledge is not for understanding; it is made for cutting. " 66 
With his family gone, Dr Savage's academic obsession with Helen of Troy 
becomes a speculative reality. The moral accretions torn away, Savage enters into a 
union with Helen which explodes the received conventions of love in its 
participants' mutual exploration of a desire engendered by violence and pain. Their 
relationship is characterized by its physical immediacy, but the framework within 
which its catastrophic potential may be unleashed is - necessarily - mythical: 
Helen of Troy is described by Homer and all who follow him as 
youthful, beautiful, impossible-to-see-without-desire, etc., and 
Helen herself as reluctant, the victim of her appearance, and so on. 
But we know beauty has nothing to do with desire, and that a 
beautiful woman cannot launch a thousand ships, whereas we suspect 
that a desirable woman might. 67 
Savage finds in Helen "all that is unknowable" and discovers, according to 
Barker's schema, that desire, freed from its finite goals of procreation, progress 
and reconciled union, serves as a pretext to the mayhem of Nietzsche's "species- 
activity", which in turn allows man to know himself as a being beyond rational 
understanding. In The Bite of the Night, the iconic figure of Helen is made flesh 
by Barker who de-fetishizes the Homeric idolatry of youthful perfection by 
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showing her in her maturity. With age comes the recognition of her manipulated 
persona and in the ruins of vanquished Troy she berates her creator, Homer, for 
making of her body a solution to the mythical question-mark her presence might 
otherwise continue to engender. In a prosody which celebrates violence, she too 
knows violence, she insists, and in songs which celebrate her beauty she questions 
the absence of her will: 
I loved Troy, because Troy was to sin. Why did you never say that? 
But him who took me there was not a sinner only an exhibitionist, 
and not my equal. Don't you know what hell it is to find no man 
your equal? Say that in your next book. That was the agony of 
Troy, not slippery swords or old men massacred... 68 
Only in Savage, the seeker after knowledge, does Helen find a worthy adversary in 
catastrophic intent. Helen 'loves' Savage insofar as his violent irresponsibility calls 
to life in her the eruption of a willed power - formerly negated by Homer - in its 
confrontation with death. 
In selecting the confrontation of his domestic self with his passion for Helen, Dr 
Savage is forced to confront knowledge as belief in its most terrifying aspect; 
namely the desire to know that which is unknowable and thus to destroy the abject 
of veneration in an individual re-creation of its essence. Knowledge is the action of 
human perception upon the body which proves impervious to thought; as such it is 
unmerciless in the unleashing of its force and the contending of its amoral will. 
Barker, in commenting upon Nigel Terry's portrayal of Savage in the RSC's 
production of the play, noted the importance of "innocence" as the seed of his 
violent onslaught upon Helen's body: 
He found a posture in which to watch the unforgivable act. In this 
posture he conveyed the combination of horror and curiosity that 
attends all of us in the presence of pain. Eventually, this posture 
developed an ease, a casualness, an objectivity, which was the 
essence of his corruption. In the beginning he suffered the horror of 
parting with sympathy, and at the end, he bathed in his own 
indifference. Thus in this figuring of the body, he revealed the 
labour of his journey. 69 
The "pruning" of Helen's body, which leaves her at the end of the play a shaved 
torso, begins with Savage's discovery of rhetoric as political instinct. As Savage's 
journeying through the strata of mythical thought progresses, so Troy transforms, 
manifesting itself in a succession of regimes, each one offering an articulation of 
power masquerading as belief, and each one extending the inventiveness of 
Savage's monstrous thoughts in relation to Helen as the object of his desire for 
knowledge. In the second of the twelve Troys through which Savage and Helen 
will pass, public celebration has become an edict by which to censor privacy and 
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the power of the individual will. Spawned by the guard of the victorious army, 
"Happy Troy" insists upon the retrieval of instinct and the instantaneous translation 
of thought into accessed speech. Urged into eager participation by Shade, the 
brutish creator of the new constitution, Savage passes his first sentence upon 
Helen's body, seduced by a hunger for the knowledge of thought as retributive 
action: 
Shade: I see no place for Helen, do you, Savage? No place for her in 
Laughing Troy? Her ego and her filthy legs? Her mouth and 
acts of endless privacy? She is all I and this is the age of 
we... 
Savage: I has no arms. (Pause. He looks up, half-curious. ) Does it? 
The letter? (Pause) I is a single stem? (Pause) 
Creusa: (With rising horror) Oh, God, he's - 
Shade: (To Savage) Go on. More cogitation. Further elaboration of 
the infant thought... 
Creusa: Listen - 
Savage: I think because I have to. 
Shade: Oh, yes, you do, you do. 
Savage: And having thought it - out thought! Vile object, out for 
scrutiny! 70 
Savage's union with a politics that will sanction the birth of the monstrous thought 
and absolve him of the responsibility for its affectivity lends him a temporary 
power over the development of Troy and, in his passion for Helen - who remains, 
despite her loss of limbs, unknowable and desirable - the "gulf of imagination 
yawns" promising a limitless striving to reach to the end of thought itself. 
The final seminar, offered by Savage to his pupil Hogbin, involves the 
transmission of knowledge under the guise of political expediency. Hogbin, having 
fathered an imperfect child, is, in the context of the third Troy - named "Mum's 
Troy" wherein the voice of the child is interpreted as law - named as a "genetic 
criminal". Confronted with the possibility of a violent death, he appeals to Savage, 
now masquerading as the Patriarch, to offer his advice. In response Savage 
recollects the mythical mist proffered by Athene as a disguise and suggests that 
maybe 'opinion' may serve as a mist with which to confound one's enemies when 
all other hiding-places have proved useless. Heeding his advice, Hogbin graduates 
from student to find his true vocation as "accountant", the word being used in 
Barker's work to define the instrument of rational organization visited upon the 
chaos of undefined experience. Hogbin begins his transition with a return to the 
ruins of Helen's body, which he names as the source to which all blame might be 
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attached. In a process of knowing self-effacement he elevates the innate instinct of 
the common soldiers who arrive to take him to his death, and suggests that lurking 
behind the utilitarian violence of their profession may be a foetal knowledge of the 
world struggling to find its birth in the articulation of a value system, or morality. 
Helen, Hogbin suggests, may be the cause of their unhappiness; the boundary 
beyond which lies their scarcely comprehended potential for fulfilment. The 
shaving of Helen's limbs, Hogbin acknowledges, can mean little to soldiers 
carrying out orders, but the naming of Helen as a crime against their assumed 
rights as human beings may prove the key to a life with future purpose. Draped in 
the disguise of language, Hogbin effects the miracle which Nietzsche attributes to 
the eruption of the "slave-mentality"; he separates action from language and places 
in the schism between the two a moral sensibility masquerading as 'belief': 
[Popular morality] espouses no belief more ardently than that it is 
within the discretion of the strong to be weak, of the bird of prey to 
be a lamb. Thus they assume the right of calling the bird of prey to 
account for being a bird of prey. We can hear the oppressed, 
downtrodden, violated whispering among themselves with the wily 
vengefulness of the impotent, 'Let us be unlike those evil ones. Let 
us be good. And the good shall be he who does not do 
violence.. . who shuns all that 
is evil, and altogether asks very little 
of life. ' 71 
As the light of incipient belief shines upon the soldiers faces, Hogbin arrives at an 
understanding that "The - Word - Saves - Life! ", 72 in making impotent the active 
force to which - henceforth - language will stand as judgement and redemption. 
The perfection of Hogbin's strategy lies not only in the saving of his own skin but 
also the refutation of violence on the part of his erstwhile aggressors. It is to 
Hogbin, therefore, in his role as saviour and divine legislator, that the next stage of 
Helen's pruning falls. Equal to the argument, but not to the action, Hogbin relieves 
himself of the stage presence of Savage - who proves the triumphant possibility of 
the impossible act - and allows the death which had proved inspiration to his 
strategic manipulation of language, to now permeate his body in full gaze of the 
spectators. Hogbin wills his own death as a wholly paradoxical affirmation of a life 
which refuses to offer itself as evidence to the shameful approbation of a 'slave- 
ethics'; a redemption born of fear. 
The 'catastrophic' form of Barker's play lies in its central collision between the 
mythical Helen who is the manifestation, in flesh and language, of a pure will 
which cannot cease willing even though the outcome may be devastating, and the 
mortal Dr Savage whose will - in its requirement for belief - is unalterably 
sublimated by an instinct for survival. Thus, like his theatrical predecessor in the 
quest for knowledge, Dr Faustus, the will to know is predicated upon the 
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continuation of life and not upon the voraciousness of a will which knows its death 
to be immanent. In loving Savage, Helen knows that she embraces a will equal to 
her own but one which must, if it is to survive, destroy her. As the action of the 
play proceeds it is the nature of her death which assumes vital importance to her; 
this being essential to her articulation of her final triumph over knowledge. As 
Troy falls for the last time, Savage explores the dawning realisation that he hates 
Helen and orders, by political decree, that she should die. Intuiting this she cries: 
I want to be killed. But in a gush of violence. I want to be beaten 
out of life by some mad male all red about the neck and veins 
outstanding like the protesting prostitute in the bite of the night, 
discovered all brain and sheet and stocking. Not this cold political 
thing. 73 
Helen's 'cold' death is no more than the retraction of Savage's will from her 
corporeal being as a prelude to her cultural assimilation into a version of the 
Homeric legend cleansed of the mythical blood and guts into which the Doctor first 
desired to plunge his hungry mind. Savage's son, who at the beginning of the play 
is apprenticed to the soap trade, now discerns an 'opening' for Helen, via the 
transformation of her essential qualities into a perfumed commodity to which all 
women will have equal access. The final 'pruning' of Helen is thus the levelling of 
her experience to an equality shared by all women everywhere: Helen is to become 
universally 'understood'. 
For Savage, the final act of destruction, which destroys in the pursuit of knowledge 
the very object which served as stimulus to his quest, leads him to his greatest 
discovery. Confronting Helen's executioner he insists that his moment of triumph 
is shared: 
Savage: I insist that you imagine. (Epsom stops sweeping. ) To have 
had Helen, imagine it... 
Epsom: Trying... 
Savage: Yes, but to have had Helen, and to have no longer, Imagine 
that. (Epsom shrugs) The greater the love, the more terrible 
the knowledge of its absence. No sooner did she love me 
than I longed for her death, And you call yourself a 
monster! (Pause) 74 
The immense will to knowledge possessed by Savage, now fed by his final act of 
iconoclasm, kills not only his desire which wrought the action of the drama, but 
also absents from the imagination the possibility of Helen as anything other than 
history's Trojan whore. Barker, however, refuses Savage's political transformation 
of Helen, and has her survive in the ruins of Troy. Savage ends the play in the 
ruins of the University, alone in his awareness that the will he carries has the 
177 
capacity only to destroy. Now indifferently acknowledged by his successful son, 
Savage attempts, like his father before him, to commit suicide with the shard of a 
broken plate. Finding himself unable to enact violence upon his own flesh, he 
looks to Macluby, the Soap Boiler, to explain his impotence: 
Macluby: What do you think suicide is, a solitary act? It's peopled with 
absences. 
Savage: I have absences. 
Macluby: You murdered everything, and long for nothing. Aren't you 
already dead? (He picks up his bag and walks away. ) 
Savage: That's knowledge, then ... 75 
Barker leaves his spectators with the terrifying spectacle of man as an object of 
disgust; the emblem of catastrophe in a world which, like Helen, has been shorn of 
its potential for the affirmative mobility of desire. Savage begins the play with a 
need to 'adore' the genius of Homer; in a godless existence the myth of Troy alone 
offers him the possibility of veneration for a 'life' which would burst the contours 
of sublimated vengeance and hate. In myth he relocates the power of life as the 
'appearance' of desire beyond recourse to judgement and morality. The catastrophe 
of his discovery lies in the innate condition of his own appearance as the seeker 
after knowledge; the manifestation of contemporary man. To love Helen is, 
therefore - for Savage - to anatomise both Helen's body and his own desire in order 
that meaning retain its transcendence of a fleshy corporeality: 
Nihilism, the experience of the exhaustion of meaning, amounts to a 
grand weariness, a 'grand disgust', on the part of man, directed 
toward himself as well. Nothing is worth much anymore, everything 
comes down to the same thing, everything is equalized. Everything 
is the same and equivalent: the true and the false, the good and the 
bad. Everything is outdated, used up, old, dilapidated, dying: an 
undefined agony of meaning, an unending twilight: not a definite 
annihilation of significations, but their indefinite collapse. 76 
In The Bite of the Night, Barker poses - for both the actor and the spectator - the 
Nietzschean question which concerns itself not with the temporal/historical 
persona, but rather with the condition to which man must address himself if his 
nature is to be understood: 'What is the will that articulates man? ' The catastrophe 
recognized by the play is that of a species wholly regulated by an instinct to 
destruction, without its concomitant urge to create. The 'end' of man, represented 
by the final image of Savage slumped in the ruins of thought, articulates a weary 
disgust with the cycle of a 'will to knowledge' premised upon the destruction of the 
object of that knowledge. 
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Homer, when considering the creation of his Odyssey earlier in the play admits: 
When Troy fell I followed Odysseus. I followed him because I could 
not bring myself to look into the ruins. We all knew, there was a 
history in the ruins. But I thought, there will be no public for a song 
about the ruins ... 77 
Barker makes of the ruins of Troy a 'threnody' to be repeated at every ruined site 
from which the gaze of the pioneers of progress have turned. The threnody is, 
however, a lament for death and not death itself. In The Bite of the Night Savage 
dares to act upon the will to knowledge, and fords that the journey inscribed in its 
progress leads to the end of belief, to nihilism. The result of his dare is to return to 
the place where he began; the ruins of knowledge, now transformed into the abyss 
of non-belief. The futility of Savage's quest, paradoxically, presents the possibility 
for a 'life' which embraces absence as its condition. The radical nature of Barker's 
catastrophic theatre is to dare to leave his spectator no means of redemption; thus 
the play ends with both Savage and spectator contemplating ruined belief and 
finding there a history to which artistic consciousness alone stands sentinel. 
Wole Soyinka's Asphalt Swamp. 
Although Wole Soyinka's adaptation of Euripides' The Bacchae 78 could be said to 
illustrate most clearly the tragic schema initiated in "The Fourth Stage", The Road, 
79 which shares its gestational period with that of the essay on Yoruba tragic form - 
seems to me to offer a more intimate - and therefore uncertain - relationship with 
the stage as a site of tragic potential. In Wole Soyinka and Modern Tragedy, 80 
Katrak offers the following quotation as illustration of the status the play achieves 
in Soyinka's oeuvre: 
The Road is based on what I might call a personal intimacy which I 
have developed with a certain aspect of the road ... it is a very strange 
personal experience which developed out of my travels on the road. 
It was almost a kind of exorcism writing that play ... I consider The Road one of the three personal plays I have written... It concerns the 
reality of death. 81 
The play - despite the fact that Soyinka describes its form as filmic - utilizes a 
classical structure within which the events of a day, between sunrise and sunset, are 
placed before the spectator. There is one location only for the action, this being "a 
road-side shack" which doubles as a store selling spare-parts and a palm-wine bar, 
erected in the shadow of an imposing Victorian church-steeple. The action of the 
play conforms to Aristotelian unity in that it concerns the quest of its protagonist 
"Professor" for "the Word" by which everyday life may be illumined as 'meaning' 
rather than as the desultory re-iteration of existence. The frame provided by 
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Soyinka's demonstration of the Classical form is however broken by the addition of 
a prologue and epilogue which attribute mythical, rather than historical, 
consequence to the events unfolding in the course of the drama. Thus, in place of 
the telling of a narrative by which the dramatis personae may be contextualized as 
characters, Soyinka offers the articulation of a silence in his lyrical exposition of 
the "the religious cult of flesh dissolution": the agemo. 
The agemo is described by Soyinka in a prefatory note as "the movement of 
transition; it is used in the play as a visual suspension of death. " 82 His framing of 
the drama with a poetic statement concerning a state of ritual consciousness which 
attempts mortal comprehension of death as the absence of 'appearance' in life, thus 
lends an alternative status to the actor/characters that take part in the intervening 
events: 
The thing about agemo that I use essentially in a sort of 
representative way, is a masquerade. There are many forms of 
agemo festival. Some agemo are just like any other egüngün 
masquerade. There are certain others who dance within mats rolled 
around their bodies. The human being, the form, is there [inside the 
mats]. After a while, this form dances, dances into a terrific whirl 
and then it just collapses. There is absolutely nothing inside the 
mat... It's actually a kind of illusion but it's done in the open, in the 
courtyard, and suddenly one sees that there is nothing, just a fold of 
mats, collapsed. 83 
In a poem which prefaces the action of the play, and in the words spoken by the 
Professor at the play's close, Soyinka attempts to reproduce in language that which 
the agemo offers as an illusion in the courtyard; the clothing of nothingness in 
material form. 84 As this contextualizing device suggests, the themes of death as 
absence, and of life as the illusion of mobility and presence are revisited 
throughout The Road, thus making of theatre a paradigm for the transformative 
possibilities inherent in the apprehension of illusion as a central matrix of man's 
perceptions. 
Many of Soyinka's commentators have described The Road as interrupted ritual, 
and Oyin Ogunba extends this thesis to suggest that such interruption allows 
Soyinka examination of his major pre-occupation as a dramatist: "The stage 
between being and not-being. " 85 This reading of the text creates, I would like to 
suggest, an over-dependence upon a central understanding of the figure of Murano, 
a mute palm-wine tapper who has been adopted by the Professor following his 
being wrenched from a state of trance during a Driver's Festival celebrating Ogun, 
the god of the road. Murano, the carrier of the Ogunian mask in the festival, 
appears in the action of the play as a non-character, his condition being that of one 
suspended between the life of the mortal and Ogun's divine essence; his tongue 
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locked into a silence, perpetually in thrall to the apprehension of non-being to 
which the egüngün carriers are traditionally privy. 86 Through Murano, the 
Professor hopes to achieve communication with the essence to which the egüngün 
mask gives appearance; the knowledge of life which is borne by the dead. To this 
end he nurtures the mute, anxiously awaiting the moment when "the crust cracks" 
87 and the divine essence emerges from its mortal chrysalis in the form of language 
saturated with knowledge. 
Derek Wright in Wole Soyinka Revisted perceives the same dramatic problems 
inherent in Murano as are exhibited in the appearance on stage of the "Half-Child" 
in A Dance of the Forests. Once more, Soyinka appears to be presenting to his 
spectators a symbol for which the matrix of meaning remains obsure, or at the very 
least ambiguous, thus creating in the centre of his dramatic structure an absence or 
void which proves potentially deleterious to the fragile structuring of the dramatic 
action to which it serves as pivot. Once more, Wright attempts to equate the 
dramatic figure with the social conditions of its engendering: 
Murano is an image of the new nation-state, suspended between 
worlds and uncertain of its survival of the historical accident of 
independence, and the road is the historical track upon which it 
careers aimlessly forward in its passage between a lost past and an 
ill-prepared, uncertain future. 88 
Although this reading may prove seductive in its creation of a 'meaning' for what 
Soyinka has essentially created as a blank page to be placed before both the 
Professor and the spectator, it in no way answers, or even applies itself to, the 
overriding concerns of Soyinka's drama. Wright, in his analysis, falls prey to the 
same delusion as the Professor, in his assumption that Murano's silence is the 
masking of substantive knowledge. It may be more profitable to consider that what 
Soyinka achieves in the figure of Murano is the presentation of the unmasked 
mystery of the death cult which proves to be nothing more than a mute palm-wine 
tapper who, without the appearance of the mask - which clothes mortal flesh in the 
appearance of divine essence - articulates 'nothing' beyond the trade by which he 
earns his living. 
Although Murano is the carrier of the agemo in the play's narrative structure, the 
arcane knowledge which he is presumed by the Professor to possess serves, I 
would like to suggest, as merely an element of the mythical structure which allows 
the events of the dramatic action to transcend the Aristotelian determination of 
tragic form. Let us return for a moment to Soyinka's description of the agemo as 
"a kind of illusion... done in the open, in a courtyard" and consider how this 
parallels the stage event which he then places before his audience as a discourse on 
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death. The concept of 'acting' is of central importance in The Road, probably 
more so than in any other play, and it is not by co-incidence that the 'actor' 
achieves centrality in a play which takes as its dramatis personae men whose lot it 
is to deal in death. These are the satellites who find their 'living' on the fringes of 
the carrying trade supported by the vast networks of roads so essential to the 
industrial life and progress of the nation. For Soyinka, the road is the life pulse of 
an organism; it bleeds its waste with the regularity of a woman's menstrual cycle, 
its foundations are fertile with the growth of twisted metal wrought into signs of 
hazard and warning, and it has its harvest of death which provides sustenance to 
those who understand its dark husbandry. In Soyinka's play it is the understanding 
of death provided, or articulated, by this organism which proves the central 
fascination of the action. 
In The Road Soyinka gathers upon the stage an exclusively male cast, reminiscent 
of the egüngün masquerade, or death cult, which allows only men to participate in 
its rites, whose lives represent nothing more than a waiting-room for death. These 
are the layabouts, touts, drivers and forgers who contribute to their society nothing 
more than the proliferated potential for accidental or untimely death. 89 They are the 
new mythology spawned of the asphalt who, like the mythic deities of the Yoruba 
pantheon, find in the maws of death the transformative potential which lends to life 
its joyous and terrifying illusion of reality. Soyinka's transgressors are, however, 
unknowing in their unique relationship to death; a fact which is underlined by the 
presence of the - relatively - educated and charismatic Professor who seeks 
meaning where those who gather at his nightly dispensation of palm-wine require 
no more than the continued suspension of their inevitable deaths. 
Soyinka's assembled cast are not, therefore, the willing traversers of the abyss, 
although their deity is the same Ogun who forged the first road in his attempt to 
link human and divine essence. Rather they are accidental inhabitants of the void 
which denies them tragic status but nevertheless acquaints them intimately with a 
stage of existence outside the parameters of the Nation-State frame. Their lack of a 
national identity lends to them the consummate art of the actor and concomitant to 
this, the creation of a pantheon of heroes all of whom are distinguished not by their 
preparedness for death, but rather by the rapidity by which their absence in life was 
effected: 
Kotonu: Where is Sigidi Ope? Where is Sapele Joe who took on six 
policemen at the crossing and knocked them all into the 
river? 
Samson: Overshot the pontoon, went down with his lorry. 
Kotonu: And Saidu-Say? Indian Charlie who taught us driving? Well, 
tried to teach you anyway and wore out his soul in the 
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attempt. Where is Humphrey Bogart? Cimarron Kid? Have 
you known any other driver take an oil-tanker from Port 
Harcourt to Kaduna non-stop since Muftau died? Where is 
Sergeant Burma who treated his tanker like a child's toy? 
Samson: Just the same... 
Kotonu: Sergeant Burma was never moved by these accidents. He told 
me himself how once he was stripping down a crash and 
found the driver was an old comrade from the front. He took 
him to the mortuary but first he stopped to remove all the 
tyres. 
Samson: He wasn't human. 
Kotonu: But he was. He was. 90 
Kotonu's roll-call is made up of fictitious identities which give no indication of any 
existence beyond that linked to the life of the road. This is a world of heroes and 
mythologies which, as Kotonu has to remind Samson, is also a representation of 
humanity. In addition to the semi-deification of the drivers and touts via the 
acquisition of names which carry with them a history of their owners' triumphs 
over death, Soyinka makes of their costumes a mask which, again parallelling the 
egüngün, offers the appearance of animated death rather than self-evident life. 
Early on in the play's action, Salubi, who lacks even the status of a carrier of 
forged documents and thus is forced into a ceaseless struggle to make his 
'appearance' in the gathered throng, acquires a driver's uniform which, he is 
convinced, will secure for him the living to which it acts as a sign. Samson, 
observing the transformed Salubi, comments upon the blood-stains with which it is 
smeared at the front. Notwithstanding Salubi's protestations that they are merely 
palm-wine stains, the spectator is given an insight into the nature of an existence 
which depends for its continuity upon the re-animation of the uniforms of the dead. 
The means by which the living cleave to an identity which will differentiate them 
from the ranks of their dead colleagues, and the dangers of self-effacement 
confronted by those living in such close proximity with death, is illustrated by 
Soyinka in an incident which involves Samson in the mimicry of his erstwhile 
colleague, Sergeant Burma. Urged into an imitation of Burma's characteristics by 
the assembled crowd of palm-wine drinkers, Samson takes the opportunity to 
display his skills as actor and impersonator. Beginning with the voice, and then 
progressing to take on the physical characteristics, he finally 'inhabits' his uniform 
and offers a Burma-like oration on the nature of the road-trade: 
Samson: Business na business. If you see accident make you tell me I 
go run go there before those useless men steal all the spare 
part finish. 
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P. Joe: Sergeant Burma looked forward to retiring and doing the 
spare part business full time. But of course his brakes failed 
going down a hill... 
(The group begins to dirge, softly as if singing to themselves. 
Samson's face begins to show horror and he gasps as he realizes 
what he has been doing. ) 
Samson: (Tearing off the clothes. ) God forgive me! Oh God, forgive 
me. Just see, I have been fooling around pretending to be a 
dead man. Oh God I was only playing I hope you realize. I 
was only playing. 91 
The fine line drawn between acting and possession is one to which Soyinka returns 
in a number of his plays. 92 In The Road, however, the mystery of the dissolution 
of the self and its reconstitution as acted appearance forms part of the major 
substance of the play. The dramatic device that allows Samson's playful imitation 
to suddenly open to him the chasm of non-being, is one which reflects the structure 
of the play as a whole. The bargain struck by each of Soyinka's characters with the 
road, and with the death it promises them, is to experience life in the joyful 
indifference to moral and social boundaries thus being possessors of a knowledge 
unbearable to those for whom death remains an undefined terror. Each of them 
knows that the road will claim them, and that the heroism and audacity of their 
short lives is born of a comradeship with the agent of their own dissolution. Theirs 
is therefore a brutal existence transversed with the eruption into life of death itself. 
The translation of death into disappearance, which constitutes a willed 
unknowingness on the part of the layabouts, makes of their lives however, agencies 
which serve to proliferate death as a condition denuded of its creative potential. 
Their dulling of pain in response to death as an everyday occurence and source of 
profitable trade, habituates them to a realm of non-being in which their lives mirror 
the muted potential of Murano's 'trance-state'; only their occupations articulate 
them, beyond that is nothingness. 
The alien in the group, and the catalyst to the climax of the dramatic action, is the 
Professor. He alone seeks knowledge in a milieu characterized by its awareness of 
death as the final arbiter of human life. Soyinka has described this figure as: 
"Charlatan, outcast yet communal, teacher and quester, innocent and cunning, a 
stray among strays, priest and profaner, moulder and iconoclast. " 93 He is, like 
those with whom he surrounds himself, unassimilable into any framework which 
would seek homogeneity as its goal, and yet he remains an outcast amongst the 
drivers and touts because he seeks, outside the confines of society, that which only 
society could offer him; a palliative by which to "cheat fear. " Unlike Samson, 
Kotonu et al, the Professor has known and been ejected from a moral framework 
which had once promised meaning to his life. We learn in the course of the action 
that in his earlier years he has been a devout churchgoer, famed for his readings of 
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the holy 'Word'. Consequent upon accusations concerning the disappearance of 
church funds, the Professor is forced to leave the church and makes his home in its 
shadow amongst those the church despises; the men for whom morality holds no 
meaningful injunction as a boundary to action. 
The Professor also wears the masquerade of death suspended: he appears "in 
Victorian outfit - tails, top-hat etc., all thread-bare and shiny. " 94 His costume is 
perhaps most obvious in its declaration of the dead men to whom it stands as 
testimony; the Professor is the carrier of a system of morals which has as its 
uniform the garb of a solemnity equal to that of the Undertaker. It is also the outfit 
of the stage-illusionist, or quack doctor thus visiting upon the Professor an 
identificatory ambiguity which far surpasses even Samson's adroit mimicry. In his 
new incarnation the Professor has become a forger of driving-licenses, thus 
furnishing the means for the perpetuation of the road's harvest of accidents, 
although remaining distanced from the brutal reality of the violent crop. 
The Professor chooses to steep himself in the culture of death afforded by the 
shelter of the church's perimeter wall. He spends his nights in the graveyard, 
seeking an unholy communion with souls wrenched from their lives as a result of 
traffic accidents, and his days are passed in the raking of the road's remnänts, 
seeking for signs which will illuminate with meaning the carrion flesh of the 
Victims: 
Prof: There are dangers in the Quest I know, but the Word may be 
found companion not to life, but Death. Three souls you 
know, fled up that tree. You would think, to see it, that the 
motor-car had tried to clamber after them. Oh there was such 
an angry buzz but the matter was beyond repair. They died, 
all three of them crucified on rigid branches. I found this 
word growing where their blood had spread and sunk along 
plough scouring of the wheel. 95 
The prize with which the Professor has returned from the scene of carnage is 
nothing more than a twisted metal sign - ironically exposed by the accident - 
bearing the word 'BEND'. This he adds to his treasury of linguistic remnants, 
made up of bills, torn newspapers and pools coupons, all of which attain a meaning 
contingent upon their accidental discovery and retrieval. The Professor desires to 
create a system, wrought in the arbitrary conjunction of linguistic signs, with which 
to crack the edifice of the looming church, which mocks with its solidity the 
incompleteness of those lives which find their shelter beyond its bounds. He 
therefore huddles amongst those for whom morality proves no injuction, and yet 
remains bound to that which he attempts to reject, by a desire to transcend and 
therefore escape death's silence. 
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The acquisition of Murano represents for the Professor a sign that his Quest is 
finally approaching its goal. In holding to ransom the agent of death, he is 
persuaded that soon the silence will be broken that frustrates his attempts to extract 
from the thugs the essence of their knowledge of mortality. Murano is the 
Professor's trump card in his endeavour to cheat death. He, unlike the frequenters 
of his shack, refuses the open confrontation offered by the road, preferring instead 
to document and detail the reports, in a desperate effort to glean from the objective 
standpoint of the observer that which defies rational comprehension. Believing 
himself in possession of the final secret, he nurtures the mute Murano, patiently 
awaiting the moment in which the floodgates will open to expose the 'Word' or 
knowledge which will wash away the fear of death's terrors: 
Prof: When a man has one leg in each world, his legs are never the 
same. The big toe of Murano's foot - the left one of course - 
rests on the slumbering chrysalis of the Word. When that 
crust cracks my friends - you and I, that is the moment we 
await. That is the moment of our rehabilitation. When that 
crust cracks ... 96 
As the sun sets on the action of the play, the Professor is finally driven to issue the 
invitation to death which will make of his Quest a reality in its confrontation with 
mortality. Goaded to an act of transgression, the Professor determines to restore 
Murano's voice and penetrate the veil of silence which surrounds him by making 
him once more don the masquerade and complete the interrupted dance of the 
agemo. To witness the agemo is forbidden by traditional Yoruba belief, as is the 
dancing of the agemo 'out of season'. The Professor's transgression is, therefore, 
twofold and the crisis deepens as the thugs and layabouts are ordered by him to 
facilitate Murano's possession and witness the transgression of their orthodoxies. 
The Professor, in daring to pierce the boundaries of traditional belief polarizes his 
relationship to the gathered men, by treating as 'play' that which transcends the 
accidental reality of death which they they have become accustomed to confronting 
daily. 
In a programme note accompanying the Talawa Company's London production of 
The Road in 1992, Kole Omotoso offers the following note as an accompaniment 
to the performance: 
What would seem to be a joyous gift, man's play consciousness, 
when it probes things beyond and above itself leads to disaster. But 
those who watch go away with a gift, not of the Aristotelian order 
but of another kind of tragic benevolence: a vision of the possibility 
of human dare, the vision that lies beneath all human and humane 
achievements. Wole Soyinka's tragedies work at this level of 
vision. 97 
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For Omotoso, the dare undertaken by the Professor in his scornful refusal of 
traditional belief, opens the stage to the possibility of transformation, whereby 
character, costume, language and meaning, achieve a doubling of appearance thus 
allowing theatrical illusion to become a 'truth' in itself. The dance of the agemo is 
both illusion and reality; a stage trick and the presence of death which makes of 
mortal life a divine jest. 
In the final moments of The Road, the tragic potential of the play is realized in the 
Professor's desire to risk all in order to achieve his will to knowledge. In 
confronting the accommodative belief which perpetuates the daily harvest of the 
road's accidents, the Professor finally confronts the essence that has eluded both 
the thugs and - as a consequence of the dramatic structure - the spectators. As the 
agemo nears its climax, forcing each of the figures that people the stage to witness, 
not the accidental harvest of the road, but rather the invited presence of death as a 
combatant in the Quest for life, the thugs effect their vengeance upon the audacious 
darer and the Professor falls to the ground, stabbed in the back by Say Tokyo Kid. 
The Kid's mortal blow does not however stem the terrifying flow of language 
steeped, at last, in the knowledge of death. The Professor's eloquence does not fail 
him as he utters Soyinka's epilogue which in itself attempts to break the silence to 
which the agemo stands testimony. Confronting the abyss of non-being, the 
Professor articulates the life of which the road is only a manifestation; this is 
Soyinka's vision of man that makes in his image a world of objects through which 
the horrors of humanity may be perpetuated. In the road, he opines, we may - if 
we dare - read the essence of what we are and what we desire: 
Breathe like the road. Be the road. Coil yourself in dreams, lay flat 
in treachery and deceit and at the moment of a trusting step, rear 
your head and strike the traveller in his confidence, swallow him 
whole or break him on the earth. Spread a broad sheet for death with 
the length and time of the sun between you until the one face 
multiplies and the one shadow is cast by all the doomed. Breathe like 
the road, be even like the road itself ... 98 
As in Barker's The Bite of the Night, the final moments of The Road bear witness 
to a vision accessible only to those who make of their destiny a pathway to the 
brink of the abyss of non-belief. Of all the figures in Soyinka's play, only the 
Professor, with his last breath, testifies to the terrifying knowledge of one who has 
plunged. His audacity, however, has dragged - unwillingly - the partakers of 
Murano's palm-wine communion, to the very edge of the void, thus forcing them 
to confront the essence of a death from which accommodative belief had shielded 
them. 
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In making of his play the ritual and dramatic enactment of the agemo, Soyinka too 
breaks the taboo which holds the mysteries of the death cult in place. In 
challenging, and testing belief, however, he exposes to danger, not only traditional 
systems of thought and enquiry, but also the reified accretions which threaten to 
encase belief in fortifications of fear which shield adherents from the monstrous 
forms of humanity to which their thought has given birth. Soyinka's essay, "The 
Fourth Stage" describes Ogun as the carrier of iron-ore to man but is careful in its 
warning that the god does not furnish his gift with a moral remonstration; man 
therefore is made responsible for the use or abuse of its properties. In The Road, 
Ogun is treated by the drivers and touts as the deity to whom final responsibility 
for a death on the road may be attributed. The Professor's last speech removes the 
possibility of such redemption and suggests that myth is, paradoxically, the antidote 
to redemptive belief, in that its deities offer in their changing aspects, a terrifying 
reflection of that which lurks beneath the comforting adherence to repeated and 
unquestioned ritual. As the lights fade on the action, the spectator is confronted by 
the god of the road unmasked by the questor after knowledge. The implication of 
the speech, as it is written in the text, is that it should cyclically repeat itself over 
and over. 
For a long time [I] could not accept why Ogun, the Creative God 
should also be the agency of death... Interpretation of his domain, 
the Road, proved particulary depressing and symbolically 
uninspiring especially inasmuch as the road is so obviously part of 
the same cyclic order. I know of nothing more futile, more 
monotonous or boring than a circle. 99 
Whilst Soyinka duplicates the cyclical at the end of The Road, it is a circle from 
which man may extricate himself, only however, if he - like the Professor - can 
arrive at the moment of the audacious and fundamentally human dare which forces 
him to confront the mythical imaginings which prove the underbelly to life's 
appearance. 
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In Conclusion 
In the closing moments of Euripides' The Women of Troy, ' Hecabe, in her 
anguish, announces that she has "seen the cold abyss of truth. " Urged by the 
Chorus to disclose her vision, she proclaims: 
All through these years the gods had but one end in mind, 
No other destiny than this for me, and Troy - The one city they chose for their especial hate. 
Our sacrifices and our prayers have all been vain. 
Yet, had not heaven cast down our greatness and engulfed 
All in the earth's depth, Troy would be a name unknown, 
Our agony unrecorded, and those songs unsung 
Which we shall give to poets of a future age. 2 
Hecabe's lamentation in the ruins of Troy is a moment of theatrical transformation 
in which the artistic sublimation of her agony makes anew the speaker. The 'tragic' 
Hecabe is the 'victim' Hecabe doubled by the effects of theatrical space and made 
anew by a language which in turn finds enrichment via her lamentation. She, like 
the Professor and Dr Savage, achieves her knowledge in recognizing the 'cold 
abyss' of a world inimical to human fortune, and forges her destiny in the moment 
at which she dares to name herself as consequent to that knowledge. In this 
moment of creative passion, she knows what it is to be human. Euripides allows 
Hecabe, in the course of her short threnodic lament, the progress from character to 
actor, thus recognizing in her pain the body of wisdom out of which her race is 
born. 
Andrew Gurr, in "Third-World Drama: Soyinka and Tragedy", 3 comments that 
"Faith in human progress, even Brecht's espousal of it as a possibility, is not really 
reconcilable with the view of the cosmos which tragedy embodies. " 4 The inference 
is that tragedy perpetuates a chronicle of human experience which radically 
challenges the official history of State. Throughout this study I have argued that the 
work of Wole Soyinka and Howard Barker is linked by the root-metaphor of a 
journeying through unmapped space, with only the pioneering imagination of the 
artist as guide to the terrain. In the course of this journey, throughout which 
theatrical form has emerged as the product of social critique, both have re- 
discovered the tragic individual upon the stage, and in so doing have attempted the 
radical re-definition of contemporary theatrical discourse. In embracing the concept 
of the artist, each - within widely differing cultural contexts - has attempted to slip 
the net of social cartography, and return to the imagination the exiled vista of 
thought untrammelled by ideological fear. 
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I' have suggested that the journey of the artist begins with a promiscuous 
relationship to his society, and that only in the creation of art which takes its 
premiss to be 'uselessness' may the contemporary artist free himself from the 
shackles of utilitarian or ideological productivity. The theatres which emerge from 
this 'promiscuity' have marked both Soyinka and Barker as cultural anomalies. The 
resultant attacks, criticisms and doses of measured advice have, concomitantly, 
served both authors as the means by which to expose and critique the discourses 
which seek to appropriate culture as a tool of social progress. 
For Soyinka, in the dawning of the new Nigerian Nation State, and Barker who has 
described the Thatcher years as "an era of authoritarian government" 5 in which "a 
government of the extreme right ... base[d] 
its moral status on the idea of the 
infallibility of the People... ", 6 the democratic ideal of their respective cultures has 
been exposed as no more than a cynical pseudo-democracy utilizing a conceptual 
vocabulary of populist egalitarianism by which to dismantle difference in a society 
pledged to economic and technological progress. The theatre thus provides a 
vocabulary by which to explore the philosophical concepts of 'being' which rapidly 
lose currency in a language dedicated to the ideological 'We' in preference to the 
potentially non-ideological 'I'. In naming themselves as poet or artist, both Barker 
and Soyinka claim their right to speak to the Nation rather than for the Nation. 
I have emphasized Barker's and Soyinka's relationship to the actor as the primary 
carrier of 'meaning' in a theatre dedicated to a spatial orientation born of the 
emotional power of the individual. The 'journey' of the actor from social being to 
Goldman's "fearful other" is one that serves as paradigmatic to the experience of 
both the artist in his, specifically defined, service to his society and to the spectator 
who encounters his work. Ian McDiarmid, commenting upon his relationship to 
Howard Barker's work, has stated that Barker is the only contemporary playwright 
who allows the actor to "become possessed" by the language of the text.? 
Possession is of central importance to Soyinka's use of the actor within his plays, 
its occurrence being suggestive of a spatial and temporal awareness of being as 
'becoming' which wholly transcends, and partially negates, the social orientation of 
the individual. To be possessed is to be freed into the authority of a language or 
behaviour which denies 'proof' as the basis of its utterance, and relies instead upon 
the immediacy and affect of its communication upon those who witness. Although 
the contextual meaning of 'possession' is quite different for a European actor from 
that of the Nigerian, or more specifically, Yoruba actor, I would contend that the 
mystery of the actor's transformation upon the stage and the power attendant upon 
its occurrence, is of central import to the work of both Soyinka and Barker as 
artists working in theatre. 
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The fascination exercised by these two authors with regard the actor is not least 
contingent upon the layered structuring of language achieved by the 'doubling' of 
its articulation. Thus, the words spoken by the actor refuse a monogamous 
relationship to meaning by dint of the fact that the speaker becomes wholly 
untrustworthy as the source or origin of their articulation. In this way the 
ambiguity of 'meaning' which allows the 'truth' content of the utterance to be 
consequent upon cultural perspective is returned to the listener, or witness of the 
theatrical event, as a pivotal element of the experience. 'Culture' is, therefore, re- 
admitted into the very fabric of language; language being defined in this context as 
the performed relationship of meaning to individual utterance. 
This study has attempted to chart the journey of the playwright from social 
functionary to individual creator, or artist. Without an awareness of the nature of 
that journey, the creative potential for communication of their work is severely 
limited; there is a danger that they will be relegated to the Adornian drawer marked 
'I don't understand'. 8 The charting of the journey serves, however, not only as a 
means to elucidate the context within which such work should be read or 
experienced, but also to prize open areas of artistic debate which are in danger of 
remaining sealed from view as the discourse which supports theatrical creation 
leans ever more heavily towards public approval as the yardstick of artistic merit. 
Finally, the artist stands in the nature of a cultural dare for his society, just as the 
actor dares on behalf of the spectator. In charting the journey from playwright to 
artist, I have also charted the search for the defining parameters of the dare which 
prove specific to social and political structures operating as policed boundaries to 
human experience. In making themselves exiles to ideological citizenship, both 
Soyinka and Barker have discovered a seam of human experience which has as its 
priority, not a faith in human progress but rather an affirmation of 'the will to life' 
which must be quelled if progress is to be achieved. This 'tragic', or 'catastrophic' 
race which peoples Soyinka and Barker's stages are neither reflections of the 
Yoruba nor the British, although their existence is ultimately dependent upon the 
defined boundaries of those categories. These are instead the creations that face 
without fear the nihilism inherent in an Enlightened, liberal-humanist worldview 
dedicated to the rationalizing of human resources. To dare, for these creations, is 
to know, like Hecabe, that destiny wrought in the knowledge of nihilism, provides 
the uniquely theatrical chronicle of human endeavour. Whilst the causal chains of 
rationalizing history demand the perception that 'man is thus'; the actor, placed by 
the artist upon the stage, repeatedly returns for his creative thrust to the insistent 
and unanswerable question: "What is it to be human? " 
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